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TERMINOLOGY
Scandinavia, as used herein, encompasses the five-state area of
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. The term





There is a strong argument from a continuum of events that the
foreign policy of the USSR today is largely unchanged from that of
Ivan I (1325-1341). Karl Marx observed:
One merely needs to replace one series of names and dates
by others and it becomes clear that the policies of Ivan III (1462-
1505) and those of Russia today are not merely similar but
identical. Ivan, in turn, only perfected the traditional Muscovite
policy which he inherited from Ivan I, Katila. Ivan Katila, the
slave of the Mongols, achieved his greatness by deflecting the
power of his greatest enemies, the Tatars, against his lesser
enemies, the Russian princes. But he could guide this power
only by falsehood and pretense
The editors of a collection of essays by Marx and Engels on
Russian attitudes toward Europe summarize:
The major objective of Russian foreign policy as Marx
and Engels saw it is domination of the world, or at least
domination of Europe
We may be impressed by the Engels' prophetic vision,
who in 185 5 foresaw the preliminary boundaries of Russian
expansionism in its march toward domination of the world.
But even more impressive is the fact that the very objective
of Russian foreign policy, which Engels considered the chief
threat to the freedom of Europe, had now been realized by a
power which pretends to follow in the footsteps of his and
Marx's teachings. Let no one pretend that the case which
Engels had in mind and the actual policies of Stalinism are
fundamentally different.
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Russian Menace to Europe ,






In summary, the aims and methods of Czarist foreign
policy as described by Marx and Engels have striking par-
allels in the objectives and methods of Soviet foreign policy
of the last few years.
STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE
If anything would handicap the prestige of one of the most powerful
states in the world and retard its freedom of action in formulating
foreign policy, being effectively landlocked with access to the ocean
only through the courtesy of international conventions and the per-
mission of lesser state "gate keepers" would undoubtedly do so. This
basic geographical constraint has inevitably figured prominently in the
4
Soviet Union's strategic objectives. It is no surprise, therefore,
that the Soviet Navy makes frequent "visits" to the waters of its
Scandinavian neighbors , as reported by TASS, 12 November 1974:
Oslo: Norwegian high officials received a squadron of
Soviet warships during a celebration of the 30th anniversary
of the liberation of the northern parts of Norway by the Soviet
army . . . strengthening the neighborly relations and mutual






For a detailed treatment of the subject, see The Significance
of International Straits to Soviet Naval Operations, James Paul
Deaton, Naval Postgraduate School (MA Naval Intelligence, March 1975),
5 TASS, 12 November 1974, FBIS, Soviet Union, III (13 November
1974), E6.

As reported by the Norwegian press, the growing Soviet presence
in Norway's coastal waters is disturbing. Denmark, too, has reg-
istered alarm over Soviet violations of its sovereignty in territorial
7
waters and airspace.
Generally, Soviet strategic naval activity has focused on either
the Danish straits area, including the Kattegat and Skagerrak waters,
or the northern extremities of Norway and Finland abutting the Kola
Peninsula -- a Soviet barracks for air, ground and naval forces.
Soviet war games have employed scenarios that resemble the German
invasion of Scandinavia in 1940, where landing ships exited the Straits
3
and followed the Norwegian coast northward. ° In view of the force
concentration in Kola, a Finnish military writer has speculated that
the Soviet military regards Norway potentially as one huge aircraft
carrier from which to support naval operations ranging far out into
9
the Atlantic.
"Defense Minister Cautions Against Economy Motivated Spending
Cuts, " Aftenposten
,
13 January 1976, FBIS, VII (19 January 1976), p. 2;
and "Nation Now More Vulnerable to Soviet Attack, " Aftenposten,
4 February 1976, FBIS VII (February 11, 1976), p. 1.
7
"Discussion with Polish Foreign Minister of Eastern Military
Activity Close to Danish Territory, " Berlinske Tidende , 10 February
1976, FBIS, VII (17 February 1976), p. 1.
Q
Nils Orvik, "Scandinavian Security in Transition: The Two
Dimensional Threat, " Orbis
,








Soviet air and naval activity is conspicuous also in the Iceland-
Faero gap, while Warsaw Pact forces have reinforced Socialist
dominance throughout the Baltic.
In a strategic survey published by the Rand Corporation in 1974,
author Thomas W. Wolfe concludes that Soviet strategic parity has
weakened the credibility of the U.S. dominated NATO structure; and,
in the eyes of the Soviets, the U.S. is becoming "de-coupled from that
alliance as its military participation wanes. If a state of military apathy
is perceived by the Soviets to exist in NATO, says Wolfe, a challenge
12
to the northern "rim of Europe" is not unlikely.
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE
The political perspective of Soviet foreign relations encompasses
two dimensions. One, we can imagine as the horizontal plane, consists
of official, state to state relations which are conducted through the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a department of the Council of Ministers.
The other dimension, we can imagine as the vertical plane, consists of
Communist Party relations which are conducted directly by the Politburo
(political bureau) of the Communist Party. 13
10Jbid.
"Discussion of Eastern Military Activity Close to Danish »
Territory, " op. cit .
, p. 1.
12 Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Military Capabilities and Intentions
in Europe
,
Rand Corporation, (1974), p. 36.
13 Darrell P. Hammer, USSR: The Politics of Oligarchy , (Hinsdale,




As of this writing, Moscow is maintaining diplomatic relations
with all the Scandinavian states. Diplomatic interaction between the
Soviet Union and each of the Scandinavian states except Iceland was
traced through a computer search (WEIS Program) of topical data
extracted from the New York Times over a nine-year period (6/66-
12/75). From 76 Soviet-Scandinavian diplomatic dialogues reported,
a quantitative assessment of the harmony versus discord in diplomatic
relations over time is presented in Appendix B.
The spirit of the Soviet- Finnish relationship is documented in an
October, 1974, TASS account of the visit of Soviet Praesidium President
Nikolay Podgornyy to Helsinki on the occasion of the 30th anniversary
of the Soviet- Finnish armistice and founding of the Finland- USSR
Society:
The president of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme
Soviet pointed out that relations between the USSR and
Finland 'are justly considered as an example of peaceful
co-existence and cooperation of states with differing social
systems. ' This example is especially important now, in
the contemporary situation, when significant positive changes
are taking place in the international arena, including Europe,
when the world moves step by step in the direction of detente,
when the principles of peaceful co-existence receive broad
recognition and application in practice.
Thus, it is no coincidence that Helsinki was selected by the Soviet
Union as the site for the 1975 European Security and Cooperation
14,!Speech to Soviety, " TASS, 14 October 1974, in FBIS - Soviet
Union, III (15 October 1974), E7.
14

Conference, which Podgornyy called "a reflection of the general
recognition of Finland's services to this cause all- important for the
15destinies of the European continent. " Soviet diplomacy with Finland
has set the stage for Soviet relations with the remainder of Scandinavia.
The immediate objective is to bring about a passivity among the USSR's
pro- West neighbors that will encourage their independence from Western
bloc diplomacy (e. g. , NATO and the ECC) and will ultimately facilitate
Soviet bidding in an alliance-free Europe.
Party Affairs
International relations as practiced by the Soviet Union is officially,
since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, a promulgation of Marxist-
Leninist ideology. In fact, it had been the intention of the founders of
the Soviet state that it was not to continue as a state at all, but rather
the epicenter for a world-wide revolution to unite the world into a
politically amorphous state of socialism in quest of a Utopian
17
communism. Even though the forces of reality -- balance of power
politics -- have inevitably brought the USSR into the mainstream of
international diplomacy to insure its own survival, the Party voice











policy is the indisputable domain of the Politburo, an expression of
1
8
Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) goals.
The management of an ideologically based foreign policy has
been a challenging task. Starting with the Communist International, or
Comintern, in 1919, a uniting of the world's communist parties has
proven futile. Stalin himself may have unwittingly validated the cause
of separatism when he advocated the dissolution of the Comintern, in
1943, and the support of Common Front organizations at the national
level to defeat "fascism. " The Comintern was succeeded by the Corn-
inform, which foundered just after its christening when a charter mem-
19
ber, Yugoslavia, bolted in the name of democratic centralism.
It remained for another charter member, Italy, to deal the coup de
grace to monolithic communism. Upon convening a session of the
Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party on 24 January 1956,
General Secretary Togliatti, (alias Ercoli), uttered perhaps the most
portentous statement since Lenin:
For us, there is no doubt that the Soviet Union remains
the first great historical model of conquest of power by the
working class . . . but this experience cannot include either
the ready made solution of all the problems which today
present themselves in those countries which are already ruled




19Robert H. McNeal, ed. , International Relations Among
Communists, ( Englewood Cliffs , N. J. : Prentice Hall, 1967), pp. 175-176,
16

the ready made answer to the questions which arise where,
instead, the communist parties or the parties oriented toward
socialism are opposition parties which moved the vanguard
of the working class in Russia during and after the seizure
of power. The experiment accomplished in the building of
a socialist society in the Soviet Union cannot contain instruc-
tion for solving all the questions which may present them-
selves today to us and to the communists of other countries,
whether in power or not, and to all the vanguard parties of
the working class and of the people.
Thus, various points or centers of development and
orientation are established ... a polycentric system cor-
responding to the new situation, to the alteration in the
world make-up and in the very structure of the workers'
movements, and to this system correspond also new types of
relations among the communist parties themselves.
Even though a Communist diaspora followed the polycentric develop-
ments of the Fifties, Moscow never abandoned its position of authority:
"Today, despite the existence of the mighty socialist system, Com-
munists also consider the Soviet Union to be the center of the world
„21Communist movement.
In June of 1969, the third international conference of Communist
parties since the dissolution of the Comintern convened in Moscow. Its
foremost purpose was to align the world's Communist parties with
Moscow and to ostracize the wayward Communist Party of China. Again,
the unifying effort was a failure from the start. Of the 90 recognized
20 Ibid.
2 1
I. E. Kravtsev, Proletarskii Internatsionalizm, Otechestvo i
Patriotizm (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1965), p. 298, quoted in W. W.
Kulski, op. cit.
, p. 25 9.
17

world Communist parties, only 75 attended; and of the 14 ruling Com-
munist parties, five were absent. One of the ruling parties, Cuba, sent
only an observer rather than a participating delegate, to protest the
prevailing CPSU policies in Latin America which favored recognition of
22
existing governments rather than guerrilla insurrection. It is worth
noting, however, that all of the Scandinavian Communist parties were
represented at this last international conference. And although con-
ference attendance revealed breaks in allegiance to Moscow, it also
highlighted the expansion of the communist movement in general.
No other political movement of our time can compare
with the Communist movement regarding either its total
membership or the dynamic pace of its growth. This due
primarily to the fact that Communist parties have become
ruling parties in fourteen countries where over one-third
of mankind lives. The ranks of the Communist movement
have also multiplied beyond the frontiers of socialist countries.
The number of communists in European capitalist countries
has increased in the sixties five times (from 500, 000 to-,-
emphasis added. J
Perhaps a more significant Moscow event, in terms of the changing
international outlook of the Soviet Communist Party, was the centennial
celebration of Lenin's birth in 1970. W. W. Kulski notes that Moscow
invited a more diverse assortment of guests to this memorial than is
22W. W. Kulski, "1969 Moscow Conference of Communist Parties
Russian Review
,
XXVIII (October, 1959), p. 385.
23 Zhilin, "Glavnaia tendentsiia: Aktual'nye problemy kommunist-
icheskovo dvizheniia, " MEMO, No. 4, 1968, p. 13, quoted in Kulski,




usual for such occasions. Three segments of "progressive mankind"
were represented: socialist states, the non- ruling Communist parties,
24
and the "revolutionary democrats" of the Third World. Given this
broader scope of international communist interests, the Soviets seized
the occasion to proclaim the essence of the communist movement,
"proletarian internationalism":
Proletarian internationalism means the international
solidarity and fraternal alliance of the working people of all
countries .... The extent of proletarian internationalism
is revealed by observing the relations between the main
revolutionary forces which exist in the era of transition
from capitalism to socialism. These forces in our time are
the world socialist system, which is the main offspring of
the international workers' movement; the world Workers'
and Communist movement; and the national liberation move-
ment of those peoples who have liberated or are liberating
themselves from colonial dependence ... V.I. Lenin defined
one of the principal tasks of proletarian internationalism in
the following slogan: 'Proletarians of all countries and op-
pressed peoples, unite!'
This proclamation can be regarded as the newest theme of Soviet
Communist Party international relations.
The primary link between Moscow and the national communist
parties in non-socialist states is the regional conference. The regional
conference can serve two purposes: it can lend respectability to national
Party movements where the incumbent government is anti-communist;
and it can enhance the image of the CPSU as leader and standard bearer.






The Scandinavian Communist parties participate in two regional
organizations, the Nordic and the European. The last assembly of a
Nordic Conference of Communist Parties was at Karja-Lohja, Finland
during 5-7 September 1974. TASS reports:
The communist parties of the Nordic countries have
declared their willingness to cooperate with all peace forces
in the struggle for stronger European security and for the
earliest convocation of the third stage of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe at summit level. This
is said in a communique issued by a conference of the com-
munist parties of Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland.
The assembly of West European Communist Parties, held in Brussels
during 25-28 January 1974, focused on "the present crisis of capitalism
in Europe. " Denmark, Finland and Sweden were represented there,
but not Iceland and Norway. The conference concluded with a declaration
calling for "an alliance of the broadest social forces, of all working
class and democratic forces, to bring about a new upsurge in their com-
mon struggle" and "resistance to U.S. imperialism's attempts to heighten
its already rigid control over the economics and policies of European
27
countries and 'revitalize 1 NATO. " The most recent European Com-
munist summit was held during the first week of July, 1976, in East
Berlin. Delegates from all of the Scandinavian Communist parties except
Iceland's attended.
26 TASS, 9 September 1974, FBIS - Soviet Union, III (10 September
1974), p. El.
27
J. A. Lauwerys, Scandinavian Democracy: Development of
Democratic Thought and Institutions in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden
,
(American-Scandinavian Foundation, Publisher, 1959), p. 10.
20

As reported by Time correspondent Herman Nickel, the conference
28proved to be a forum for anti-Kremlin communists. Spain's Party-
leader Santiago Carrillo summed up the effect of the assembly, "There
can be no doubt that we Communists today have no center of leadership
and are not bound by any international leadership. " Soviet General
Secretary Leonid Brezhnev himself conceded to the gathering that the
USSR does not wish to reassert an "organizational center, " such as
the Cominform, to control national parties. The formal declaration
endorsed by the Conference delegates affirmed the complete independence
"of each party in accordance with the socio-economic condition and specific
national features prevailing in the country concerned. "
The new stance of Moscow in wary deference to "Eurocommunism"
reflects a political pragmatism characteristic of the Brezhnev-Kosygin
era. The preferred relationship between Moscow and Western Europe is
one stressing trust, rather than authority; conflicts are to be resolved
through conciliation, not coercion. This is the spirit of Helsinki, the
precedence of diplomacy over dialectics. It is also the process of
29
Finlandization.
28Herman Nickel, "Communists: The Last Summit: No Past or
Future, " Time
,
12 July 1976, p. 24.
^George Kennan cautions that "Finlandization" is a theory that has
no relevance beyond Scandinavia, though some would apply it to Western
Europe generally. See Kennan's article, "Europe's Problems, Europe's
Choices, '' in Foreign Policy , Spring, 1974.
For a contrary view, extending Finlandization to Europe as a whole,
see R. J. Vincent, Military Power and Political Influence: The Soviet
Union and Western Europe , Adelphi Paper No. 119 (London: International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975).
21
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Scandinavia is not a stranger to international conflict. From the
expansion and contraction of its own Viking exploits at the turn of the
first millenium (850-1050 A. D. ) to the conflagration of two European
wars in the present century, Scandinavia has wreaked and suffered the
havoc of European warfare. Today, Scandinavia lies as a median separat-
ing the bi-polar centers of world power. Using a globe, one can run a
string from Washington, D.C. to Moscow and see that it passes through
the heart of Scandinavia. Similarly, using the great circle route of
nearest range, the strategic forces of both powers confront each other
across a Scandinavian fence. From the point of view of the Soviet Union,
which is lacking an Atlantic coastline, Scandinavia, depending upon its
commitment to either East or West, looms as either a defender's bulwark
or an attacker's pedestal. Finland has tentatively teamed with the USSR
under the provision of a 1948 treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual
defense, (see Attachment A); Sweden is non-aligned and professedly
neutral; Denmark and Norway are conditional members of NATO, proscrib-
ing nuclear weapons and foreign bases; and Iceland has tentatively acqui-
esced to non-military membership in NATO and has permitted limited
use of naval and air facilities by U.S. Armed Forces.
1
Egil Ulstein, Nordic Security , Adelphi Papers No. 81 (London:
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), p. 21.
23

To describe the Soviet foreign policy toward this realm, I will trace
Soviet relations with the five Scandinavian states through four media of
interaction: Communist Party, diplomatic, trade and military.
Critical readers will rightfully question the validity of incorporating
for analysis an area that includes five independent states and ranges over
an expanse exceeding the distance from Paris to Istanbul. The scope of
analysis is justified on four grounds. First, the pattern of Soviet inter-
2
national relations reveals a regional coherence; second, the region of
Scandinavia does in fact comprise a geo-strategic entity for the pur-
3poses of Soviet strategic planning and defense; third, the people and
institutions of Scandinavia's five states (Denmark, Norway, Sweden,
Finland and Iceland) exhibit a remarkable homogeneity, unequaled in
4
any other national grouping; and fourth, a more accurate and coherent
definition of Soviet foreign policy is likely to emerge from a holistic,
regional survey of Soviet foreign relations than from a narrower analysis
5
of Soviet policy toward a particular state. To fit a global perspective,
the world's most powerful states are increasingly obliged to organize the
2 W. W. Kulski, The Soviet Union in World Affairs: A Documented
Analysis, 1964-1972
.
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1973), p. 9.
3 Richard B. Foster, et. al.
,
eds., Strategy for the West: American -
Allied Relations in Transition (New York: Crane, Russak and Company,
Inc.
, 1974), p. 165.
4
John H. Wuorinen, Scandinavia (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. ,





conduct of foreign relations on a regional basis. The progress of
regional integration, which affects the Scandinavian states in the form
of the Nordic Council and even all- European groupings such as the EEC
and the Council of Europe, demands a commensurately comprehensive
scope of foreign policy. The regional nature of alliances, the regional
divisions of responsibility within the U.S. State Department and the
regional focus of much of the United Nations' business (Articles 51 and 52,
UN Charter, for example) testify to the regional structure of global
relationships and the consequent regional focus of foreign policy. Soviet
foreign policy toward individual Scandinavian states is, accordingly,
best seen in the context of Soviet relations collectively within the
Scandinavian region.
Given the scope of analysis, there are other problems confronting
the student of Soviet foreign policy. Alfred Grosser, addressing the
complexity of Soviet foreign policy in Western Europe in Professor Kurt
London's compendium, The Soviet Impact on World Politics , observes
that
The 'foreign policy of the Soviet Union' comprises at
least three different subjects that should not be confused
even if they do overlap from time to time. These are:
1. The policy which is deliberately pursued by those in
power in accordance with the objectives they have set.
2. The policy that is in fact pursued, though not neces-
sarily deliberately.
Nils Orvik, "Nordic Cooperation and High Politics, " International




3. The image of this policy to outside interlocutors. . .
In the course of this paper, the Grosser differences in Soviet foreign
policy will become apparent. The declared purpose of Soviet foreign
policy is to further the cause of socialism through the vehicle of pro-
letarian internationalism. This is the ideological aspect of Soviet foreign
relations championed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Gen-
eral Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev proclaimed at the most recent Congress
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) held on 24 February
1976:
In the domain of foreign policy the 24th Party Congress
advanced a Peace Programme. Its main purpose was to achieve
a turn in international relations with reliance on the might, unity
and dynamism of world socialism .... We Soviet Communists
consider defense of proletarian internationalism the sacred
duty of every Marxist-Leninist.
The promotion of Marxist-Leninist ideology represents the first function
of foreign policy identified by Grosser, "Policy which is deliberately
pursued by those in power in accordance with the objectives they have
set. " This ideological aspect of foreign policy is seen in Soviet support
7
Alfred Grosser, "Western Europe" in The Soviet Impact on World
Politics, edited by Kurt London (New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1974)
p. 73.
8L. I. Brezhnev, "Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the
Party's Immediate Objectives in Home and Foreign Policy, " New Times ,






of Communist, and to an increasing extent, Socialist party participation
in national governments and international assemblies. The recruitment
and political mobilization of diverse economic and social interest groups
(from trade unions to ethnic minority caucuses) under socialist banners
world wide are other tasks of the ideological arm of Soviet foreign
policy. Secretary Brezhnev, like every Soviet leader since Lenin,
has unflaggingly stressed the pre-eminence of Marxist-Leninist ideology
in prosecution of every foreign policy program.
While pressing for the assertion of the principle of
peaceful coexistence, we realize that successes in this impor-
tant matter in no way signify the possibility of weakening the
ideological struggle. On the contrary, we should be prepared
for an intensification of this struggle and for it to assume an
increasingly more acute form of struggle between the two
social systems.
Chapter One of this paper concerns the ideological conflicts incurred by
Soviet foreign policy in Scandinavia. Marxist party advances in
Scandinavian politics have been low keyed, but they have been a force
to reckon with in the increasingly socialistic states of Scandinavia.
The distinctively "national' 1 character of most Scandinavian socialist
programs appear to be consistent with Soviet support of "national
independence, democracy and socialism all over the world" resolved
10
L. I. Brezhnev's speech of 27 June 1972, Pravda , 28 June 1972;
in Leonard Shapiro, "Totalitarianism in Foreign Policy, " Chapter One







at the Conference of European Communist and Workers Parties on
30 June 1976. lZ
Despite the Utopian or visionary aspects of its ideology, Soviet
foreign policy adapted rapidly after the Bolshevik Revolution to an
external world of realpolitik.
V. I. Lenin often warned Soviet diplomats against being
excessively carried away by theses and slogans which had
been correct in certain circumstances but had become
erroneous and harmful in other circumstances .... Con-
temporary international reality, which is marked by a great
complexity of processes, demands a particularly careful
study and sober evaluation of actual situations; any abstract
arguments and schemes are inadmissible.
This blend of ideology and realpolitik has produced a foreign policy that
differs in fact from the declared "policy which is deliberately pursued
by those in power in accordance with the (Marxist-Leninist) objectives
14
they have set. " Grosser's differentiation of "policy in fact" from a
declared policy of world revolution is explained by Leonard Shapiro as
being "the logical implementation of Lenin's policy of combining trade
and correct diplomatic relations on the one hand with subversion and
political warfare on the other. Shapiro continues,
12 Declaration of the Delegates to the Conference of the Communist
and Workers' Parties of Europe, 20 June 1976, New Times , No. 28,
Moscow, July 1976, p. 32.
13
A. Kaplin quoting V. I. Lenin in MZh (International Life ) No. 6,
1961, p. 9; Kulski, op. cit .
, p. 3.
Alfred Grosser in London, op. cit .
, p. 73.
^Leonard Shapiro, in London, p. 8.
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The overwhelming strength the Soviet Union has built
up against the forces of NATO is such a political force.
. . . This intimate link between the armed forces and foreign
policy was characteristic of Lenin's outlook from the start,
since Lenin, who greatly admired Clausewitz, drew no firm
distinction between war and politics, and whose specific
contribution to twentieth century foreign policy is its
militarization.
After ideology, then, trade, formal diplomatic relations and
military strength will each be considered in turn as they affect the
Scandinavian region. "The image of this policy to outside interlocutors, "
Grosser's third cut at Soviet foreign policy, will be considered in the
conclusion to assess the overall impact of Soviet foreign policy in
Scandinavia.
Because the Soviets themselves ascribe an overriding importance
to ideology in the formulation of foreign policy, Communist Party
developments in Scandinavia cannot be ignored as an element of Soviet
foreign policy. Nevertheless, as an observable element in foreign
relations, Communist Party interrelations are certainly the most
elusive aspect of Soviet foreign policy -- and today, maybe the most
17
insignificant. But even before an examination of regional Communist
Party activity can be attempted, a review of the Scandinavian social,
economic and political heritage is essential.
16 ibid.
17
Eric Willenz, Office of Research and Analysis for the Soviet
Union and East Europe, U.S. State Department (Washington, D.C.;
telephone interview by author, 0820-0855 hrs. , PDT, 20 October 1976).
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II. PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET IDEOLOGICAL ADVANCES
IN SCANDINAVIA
A. THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF SCANDINAVIA
Marxism brought about a profound revolution in the
whole conception of world history Marx discovered
that society, like nature, develops according to specific laws
.... By this is meant the great discoveries that put socialism
on a firm scientific foundation and showed that socialism is
the necessary and logical result of the whole course of develop-
ment of civilization.
In order to comprehend the ideological campaign for Scandinavia
as an element of Soviet foreign policy, the prospect of Scandinavian
socialism must be viewed through Marxist lenses. With so much
attention given to the inexorable march of history in Marxist doctrine,
it is appropriate to examine the history of Scandinavian social develop.
ment to determine if the region conforms to Marxist theory.
The economic structure of capitalistic society has
grown out of the economic structure of feudal society.
The dissolution of the latter set free the elements of
the former.
The foregoing quote from Karl Marx's Capital may have validity
under the assumed socio-economic conditions, namely where a feudal
aristocracy once dominated a peasant class. But the question is, to
what extent did fiefdom, fealty and serfdom prevail in Medieval
A. Leontiev, Marx's Capital (New York: International Publishers,
1946), pp. 9-11.
2
Karl Marx, Capital (New York: Random House, 1932), p. 183.
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Scandinavia? Since Marx rel ies upon the historical presence of a feudal
aristocracy, or a landed class, as his premise and point of departure
in arguing the inevitability of a class struggle and the ultimate victory
of labor over property in the form of communism, what basis does his




The development of Marx's argument of the historical inevitability
of the victory of labor over property runs as follows: History documents
that the feudal serfs were eventually emancipated by "enlightened"
monarchs whose power was formerly dissipated by a land- controlling
aristocracy. But the toiling serfs were freed from the land, not with
the land, and thus formed a vast labor pool that was "free" to go where
it pleased. Where did the laborers go? They went to work on the
lands of the wealthy aristocrats, except now as voluntary tenant
farmers -- i. e.
,
"freemen, " rather than serfs. This is the first phase
of emancipation alluded to by Marx in his dialectics of historical
materialism, or the acquisitive pursuit of property which begets a
class struggle between labor and the owners of property. With the
dawn of industrialization, the peasants at an increasing rate abandoned
the farms to become industrial laborers in the cities, or urban pro-
letariat. As labor units in factories of mass production, the laborers
have forfeited the creativity of artisans and have become essentially
property (chattels) themselves, owned (wage-earners) and operated
by a ruthlessly competitive class of capitalists, the inheritors of the
old aristocracy. Marx has hypothesized that the increasing numbers
of proletarians, the dwindling numbers of capitalists and the swelling
ranks of unemployed resulting from exhaustive, monopolistic competi-
tion will inevitably result in a proletarian revolution to institute a policy
of socialism, the penultimate goal of proponents of communism. After
Marx, Lenin modified and embellished the theory of proletarian revolu-
tion to provide for a) an elite vanguard of intelligentsia to lead the
undisciplined proletariat and b) an intermediate stage of "imperialism"
to explain the international phenomenon of capitalism that appeared to









Organization of social structures
within a social system or the
organization of two or more
social systems
+ denizens 7 ecosystem
+ people =7 economy
+ creeds y institutions
+ institutions
-7 culture
+ economy 7 social system
=y> political system
Proceeding from the assumptions listed above, economy is a corner-
stone of any social system. Social mobilization is spurred by changes
in economy. Social mobilization has occurred in its own distinct fashion
4
in Scandinavia. The first inhabitants traced by anthropologists arrived
in the northern reaches of Scandinavia as the glaciers of the last ice age
were receeding 12, 000 years ago. It is believed that they migrated as
hunters and fledgling herdsmen into the haven of Scandinavia from in-
temperate and barren habitats within the central Asian continent. A
plentitude of fresh water from thawing glaciers, the circulation of warm-
ing currents from the ocean to the southwest, and an abundance of fish
e
and grazing herds presumably sustained human life for several millenia.
Karl Deutsch, et. al. , Political Community and the North Atlantic
Area
,
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957); see
also, Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication
,
(Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1953), Chapter 6, "The Rate of Mobilization; Finland Example, "
p. 104.
5 Franklin D. Scott, Scandinavia
,
(Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1975), p. 19.
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But the resources did not support any significant propagation of society
until circa 1500 B. C.
By then, with the Bronze Age under way, there is evidence
from physical anthropology that the people of the far north
dwelling in the village settlements of the Varengenfjord were
of the same "nordic" racial type as the inhabitants of the Oslo-
fjord in the south; while Denmark and the more southerly
regions of the Scandinavian peninsula were entering upon a period
of comparative wealth, social change, modes of belief and artis-
tic achievement informative in themselves and prophetic of things
to come. To pay for tin and copper, and also gold from the
peoples farther south, Denmark had the high priced amber of
Jutland, and soon native smiths and artists were rivalling and at
times excelling their southern masters in the working of bronze.
By the onset of the Iron Age, however, one can find evidence of
decline -- grave offerings became fewer, silver had not yet appeared,
gold and bronze were less apparent among artifacts and artistic standards
were diminished. Two reasons are given for this decline: severely cold
7
climatic changes and the onslaught of the Celts. But the hardy inhabitants
of the Northern Peninsula, identified now as the Cimbri and the Teutones
by the Greek geographer Pytheas, survived the cold and the Celts and
engaged the Romans at home and abroad, in trade and in war. Caesar
Augustus and then Nero, circa A. D. 60, received emissaries from
Scandinavia, as recorded by Pliny the Elder. Trade and cultural contacts
between the north and south flanks of Europe increased exponentially
Gwyn Jones, A History of the Vikings , (New York: Oxford





with the expansion of the Romans and the decline of the Celts. Cultural
confrontation was evident in Bohemia, and traders traveled the Rhine,
the Danube, the Vistula rivers as well as the Mediterranean, Black,
Baltic and Atlantic sea routes. Silver and gold coins and tableware were
left in the North in exchange for skins, furs, amber, sea-ivory and
slaves headed south. "And with the profits of trade were combined the
8
profits of war. "
The proliferation of traders and raiders who encountered other cul-
tures coming and going resulted in a differentiation of northern peoples
by 5 A.D. The Teutones and Cimbri of old had now branched or merged
into Danes, Norse, Swedes, Jutes, Angles and Saxons. Russian history
(Russian Primary Chronicle, or Povest' Vremennykh Let ) records that
certain Scandinavian traders known as the "Varangian Rus" were invited
by the Slavic inhabitants of what is today Kiev to join and govern them:
They said to themselves, 'Let us seek a prince who may
rule over us and judge us according to the Law. ' They ac-
cordingly went overseas to the Varangian Russes: these
particular Varangians were known as Russes, just as some
are called Swedes, Northmen, Angles and Gotlanders, for
they were thus named. The Chuds, the Slavs, the Krivichiam,
and the Ves' then said to the people of Rus, 'Our land is great
and rich, but there is no order in it. Come to rule and reign
over us. ' They thus selected three brothers, with their kinfolk
.... The oldest, Rurik, located himself in Novgorod; the









So it appears that not only were Scandinavians of the Viking Age (780-
1070) the founders of Kiev and nearby towns, but, in time, a whole
nation assumed their adopted name, "the Russes. " Viking exploits
were more brutal in Western Europe, where the "Normans" savagely
subdued all peoples they encountered in their rambling over the western
coasts of the Carolingian Empire. By the Tenth Century Normandy
and the eastern coastal regions of England were theirs. By 1018, Knut
the Great was King of Denmark, Norway and England. "The whole
'movement' of these thrusts was a prodigal dispersion of power, never
centrally directed, never quite focused, but with far reaching results
11
impossible to calculate. " Such far flung exploits -- commerce with
Byzantium, rampages of the Carolingian coast and dominion over the
North Atlantic -- exceeded the capabilities of Rome and they certainly
overextended the means of the Vikings, who assimilated no foreign
"citizens" and worked from a population base that was as paltry as its
native resources. The high water mark of "Viking civilization" prob-
ably occurred on the eve of Hastings in 1066, when England's domination
by a series of Danish Kings after Knut was ended by the invasion of
William the Conqueror from Normandy, by then detached from Norse rule.
The Viking era faded as Norse adventurers settled upon new lives as







they dispersed from Byzantium to Ireland and those back home sought
increasing differentiation among themselves -- Norway, Denmark,
12Sweden and Iceland were now separate and at odds with one another.
It is imperatively borne in on us that as colonizers or
conquerors the Vikings were too few for the many and varied
causes they bore in hand. And this told more and more
against them as their initial advantages of surprise and
mobility were whittled away. J
"The Viking Period ... is unique in the early history of the
14
North. " It is, therefore, germane to a study of socio-economic
development to reflect upon this bizarre history, and its probable
effect upon later social development.
The deeper causes of the Viking movement overseas
were rooted in human nature: the northern peoples had
needs and ambitions, were prepared to make demands, and
had the will, strength, and technical means to enforce them.
They wanted land to farm, wealth to make life splendid, or
bearable, and some of them wanted dignity or fame. Trade,
colonization, piracy and war would get them these things,
and such could be practiced only at the expense of neighbors
near and far.
Vikingologist Johannes Steenstrup in his classic work Normannerne
uses demography to explain the movement of Norsemen to outlying
territories. Historian Gwyn Jones interprets this theory:





4 John H. Wuorinen, Scandinavia
,
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:






The limitations imposed on both crop and animal
husbandry in parts of Scandinavia in early times by sea,
mountains, latitude, and cold . . . were always constric-
tive and, at times, severely so. Domiciled in this cir-
cumscribed and vulnerable region was a vigorous and fast-
breeding race whose members increased considerably from
the seventh to the tenth century.
With reference to Marx's interpretation of history, the most
striking omission of Capital is any serious consideration of mobility
as is characterized by the Viking period. Here is a people that almost
instinctively dispersed to new horizons when their sparse resources
were constricted by increasing demand. They did not naturally
succumb to domination by a better endowed class of property owners.
In fact, when King Olaf of Norway sought to enlarge his realm and
prosecute wars of Christian liberation, independent-minded warriors
17
killed him. While it must be conceded that the warring Vikings
smack of the "brutishness " innate in a Hobbesian society, their
history lends no special credence to the theory of continuous class
conflict argued by Marx; unless by resorting to the most tortuous
logic one gathers all manner of "the vanquished" under an all-encom-
passing definition of "the oppressed class. " To be sure, matter
was appropriated to the construction of highly sophisticated vehicles
of commerce and personal property. But the accumulation of property-
Johannes Steenstrup, Normannern, (Copenhagen, 1876-82);
cited in Jones, op. cit .
, p. 196.





wealth was not a means of exploitation or of domination. Rather, the
emphasis was upon subsistence, freedom and communality. The booty
of war, the acquisitions of commerce and the yields from the land
were shared in common, though the communities were numerous and
hostile.
There was no private ownership of land, except for what
a man cleared himself . . . When the first houses could no
longer hold more inhabitants, new homes were built to one
side, and the growing flock obtained its sustenance by a
common --or partially common -- cultivation of the soil.
At the earliest stage the land was the property of the clan,
or group, and the individual could collect his share only by
living on the land and taking part in its cultivation.
The peasant of the Viking Age was a free holder, and
his mode of thought was shaped by this condition. The
defiant independence and the stern sense of honor which
were ancient traits of his race were enhanced where he
ruled over his land . . .
,
but less pronounced in districts
where property rights consisted in claims on a certain
share of the common output or yield of a village.
This legacy of rugged individualism, migration and militarism as
a means of social mobilization, contrary to the premises of
Capital
,
is deeply engraved upon the descendents of the Norsemen, in
Scandinavia and abroad.
Something like the converse of Lenin's theory, Imperialism, the
Highest Stage of Capitalism, took place after the Viking period. With
l^Axel.Olrik, Viking Civilization (New York: The American
Scandinavian Foundation, W. W. Norton, Inc., Publishers; Kraus
Reprint Company, 1971), pp. 23-26.
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the receding of overseas exploits and emigration, a landed aristocracy
1
9
and feudalism evolved in the Nordic homeland. Having exhausted
either their reach or their frontiers abroad, competition for the
resources of Scandinavia forced rivalries and divisions in that domain.
The limited amount of tillable land assumed increasing value. "The
new chieftains were landed men, concerned with stability and peaceful
20
development. " Groups and clans with like interests allied with each
other to secure their needs against those of others. Those who came
by good land invited others to cultivate it and enjoy the yield in return
for mutual defense. The king, in turn, provided for the organization
and defense of the realm in return for pro rata arms and revenues
from the incorporated lands. "Alas for private enterprise and the
,,21
rights of free men! Monarchs had taken over the business of war.
But alas, disunity within the Danish aristocracy and the result-
ing weakening of the realm's defenses led to an absolute monarchy
22
in 1658. Feudalism gained its strongest hold in Denmark,
*9v. I. Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Communism ,
Vol. I, Part II of Lenin's Collected Works (Moscow: Foreign Languages







22Vincent H. Malmstrom, Norden: Crossroads of Destiny and
Progress (New Jersey: Van Nostrand, 1965), p. 39.
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where the percentage of independent farmers declined from 50 to 15
23between 1250 and 1400. The 400 years of aristocratic domination
of Denmark was not typical of the remainder of Scandinavia. European
influence upon Denmark, "The Crossroads of the North, " has always
been stronger than elsewhere in Scandinavia. Of the five domains
that comprised Scandinavia by the beginning of the 12th century -- the
Kingdoms of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, the republic of Iceland
(930 A.D.) and Finland, a dominion of Sweden -- only Denmark allowed
serfdom to supersede the freedom of traditional peasant society
extensively.
Denmark had rich resources during a period when
agriculture was the backbone of economic life of the state.
These fortunate circumstances made it possible for the
country to build up a far more developed society of the
continental European type than was possible in any other
24
of the Nordic countries.
Denmark had the blessings of fertile land and a central location.
Elsewhere, agriculture remained at the subsistence level and there
was little potential for mass marketing. The settlement pattern was
widely dispersed and the commodities of trade remained the raw
products of nature -- fish, fur, timber, amber and metals. These
goods were in demand at home and abroad, and merchantmen at key
23
Nils And r en, Government and Politics in the Nordic Countries






points like Bergen, Aarhus, Copenhagen, Malmo, Visby and Stockholm
thrived. Soon, they came within the economic and political sphere of
the Hanseatic League. The Hansa began to exploit the Scandinavians
ruthlessly and numerous wars resulted. In the course of Hansa expan-
sion, timber and mineral extraction were developed to new heights of
technology in Norway and Sweden. It was also in the later Middle
Ages that the Scandinavians drew upon their special skill to tap a grow-
25
ing market for merchant ships, whalers and fishing boats.
By the dawn of the industrial age, it is apparent that whatever
"surplus value" had been acquired in the form of profits or wealth had
been won through favorable trade rather than production, with a few
notable exceptions. Danish squires prospered at the expense of toiling
peasants on rich soils. Swedish smiths turned out fine ironwork and
chartered what is reputedly the oldest corporation in the world to
produce copper, at Bergslag (Stora Kopparbergs) in 1347. Norwegians
were known for their exported iron stoves by the eighteenth century.
Industrialization occurred gradually in Scandinavia. The first
factories were situated near water power sites such as Sarpsborg,
Norway; Goteborg, Sweden; and Tampere, Finland. Heavier produc-
tion was not possible without steam power and that depended upon







imported coal. Accordingly, factories dependent upon the steam engine
appeared later in the port cities of Oslo, Copenhagen, Stockholm
and Helsinki. The real boom in industrialization was delayed until the
harnessing of hydro-electric power in recent decades. Nevertheless,
relying upon imported fuels, Denmark led the way in urban manufacturing.
By 1890, one-quarter of its population lived in cities and one-third of
the population was employed in industry. The urban-industrial move-
ment increased by only five percent by 1950. By contrast, only five
percent of the population of Norway worked in industry in 1890, increas-
ing to 37 percent by 1950. In Sweden it was one fifth in 1890 and 40
percent by 1950; and for Finland, 10% in 1890 and 30% by 1950. Indus-
trialization in both Sweden and Norway have overtaken Denmark in terms
of both employment of the population and industrial output, while Finland
27has overtaken all three in rate of industrial expansion.
Irrespective of these differences in the development
patterns of the Nordic countries, the economic and social
changes of the societies concerned have almost uniformly
advanced in the same direction. In Denmark, Finland and
Sweden the earlier estate-dominated societies have dissolved
The departure point for Norway and Iceland was dif-
ferent, for the aristocratic and bureaucratic foundations of a
traditional "estate society" were almost completely lacking.
Therefore, the development in these two countries has in part
proceeded along different lines. Nevertheless, thus far, the
results are essentially similar to those which have been at-
tained in the other three Nordic countries. One notable
feature of this new class society is that it emerged as an
"organization society" in which all interests, whether
27Nordiska Radet, Nordisk Statistisk Arsbok (Stockholm: Nordic
Council, 1971), p. 62.
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manifested by class, by vocation or by idealistic aims are
represented through organizations of shifting but increasing
strength.
The history of Scandinavian economic development clearly does not
conform to Marx's historical premises for proletarian revolution. The
salient distinctions in Scandinavian social progress have been mobility,
cooperation and a lack of class consciousness. Historian Franklin
Scott has commented on the attribute of individual initiative that has
been discernible since the earliest societies of Scandinavia:
'Who is chief among you? ' a Viking was asked. He replied,
'None, we are all chiefs here. ' Individual freedom was
preserved within a voluntary, deeply treasured, social and
economic organization.
The best explanation for the relative social harmony and lack of class
conflict within Scandinavia is not to be found in a qualitative cultural
analysis, but most likely in a systemic analysis of economy. The
Nordic peoples have succeeded in maintaining a finer balance of people
and resources than most cultures. A key was emigration:
Each of these countries ('those people whom the northern
pole aspects') was like a mighty hive, which by the vigor of
propagation and health of climate, growing to full of people,
threw out some new swarm at certain periods of time, that
took wing, and sought out some new abode, expelling or sub-






29' 7Scott, op. cit .
, p. 57.
30Sir William Temple, "Of Heroic Virtue, " 1690, quoted from
Works, iii, 363, 1814. (populos quos despict arctos from Lucan);




As a result of large scale emigration that occurred on the eve of
industrialization, population growth has not outrun economic develop-
ment. Peak emigration from Denmark and Sweden (7, 600 and 44, 700
respectively) occurred in 1880; Iceland (6,300) in 1890; and Norway
and Finland (35, 000 and 15, 900 respectively) in 1910. 31 On the contrary,
the population base was so modest that per capita increase in wealth
was the highest in Europe during its period of industrialization and has
given Scandinavia today a higher standard of living (GNP per capita)
32than any other sector of Europe.
It is not the wealth of the area and average income derived from
GNP per capita that excludes Scandinavia from Marx's prototype in
Capital ; rather, it is the distribution of income that defeats the theory
of Marx. Today, unskilled labor receives a higher income in Denmark
than anywhere in Europe; and the remainder of Scandinavia is almost
3 3even with Denmark in this respect. The explanation here lies in
cooperation and government regulation. Unlike the Marxist prototype
economy, the pre-twentieth century economy of the northern com-
munities, founded upon raw resources, involved little processing
3 1Andren, op. cit . , Appendix I, pp. 220-222.
32
CIA, Handbook of Economic Statistics (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1975), p. viii. See also Kenneth E.
Miller, Government and Politics in Denmark (Boston: Houghton- Mifflin
Company, 1968), p. 11.
3 Brian Patrick McGuire, "Denmark's Predicament, " Nation
,
22 March 1975, p. 327. See also Nordiska Radet, op. cit. , p. 91.
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except for the small domestic market. The more isolated they were,
the more they realized the value of cooperation, in building houses,
constructing boats and organizing farming and fishing. The state,
early on in the person of the king, realized the need to protect the
interests of the people and preserve the integrity of his domain by
intervening to thwart the rapacious developments stemming from
Hanseatic ventures. King Sverre, witnessing the predatory competi-
tion for control of goods and commerce in Bergen in 1186, said in a
speech:
We thank Englishmen who have brought wheat, flour,
honey and cloth, and those who brought flax linen wax
[ sic]or kettles, and any who have brought useful goods, as
well as our friends from Orkneys, Shetlands and Iceland.
But the Germans take out cod and butter and thus create want,
and bring wine, which produces evil and no good. Some of
our people have lost lives or been dishonored or beaten. If
these Germans wish to keep their lives or their goods, they
will have to depart immediately, as their visit has been of
little benefit to us and to our realm.
Thereafter, the Nordic states acquired increasing control over the
forests and took an active interest in management of commerce.
Monarchs of Denmark and Sweden, who dominated the region after
the twelfth century, acquired monopolies over trade in Greenland and
Finland. Much later, governments guided the foundation of industrial
establishments and the important natural resources were recognized
34Quoted in Wilhelm Keilhau, Norway in World History (London:
McDonald, 1944), p. 88; in Scott, op. cit . , p. 55.
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as state or community property. Likewise, the land itself was assured
to the peasants who worked it, rather than remote landlords. This
liberating of the land gave rise to the cooperative movement in Denmark
and then the rest of Scandinavia. Harvard historian Franklin Scott
concludes, "The modern socialist state is in many ways the natural
heir of the paternalistic state of the Middle Ages and of the mercantil-
• «.• I. h35istic epoch.
The Marxist preconditions for socialism to the contrary, uniform
social progress has taken place in Scandinavia through a distinctive
process of mobilization: emigration, cooperation and responsible
government.
B. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SCANDINAVIA
Custom/usa ge + creeds ? institutions
Language + institutions T culture
Culture + economy T social system
Organization of multiple social
structures or social systems ^ political system
Once the basis of an economy has been derived, the customs and
usages of a people are considered in conjunction with their concept
of the universe (creed or belief system) to yield institutions. Depend-






concept of "universe" is reduced to domain of habitation or local social
structure to yield commensurately specific institutions. One such
institution is law. Another is government.
Marx, Lenin and their apostolic practioners in the Socialist States
have forecast social and political development on the basis of economic,
or material, determinism. Although Part A of this paper denies that
Marx's economic premises -- dialectical materialism, class conflict
and capitalistic monopoly of the means of production -- historically
obtain in Scandinavia, this section will proceed, nevertheless, to a
consideration of the institutions that Marx maintains are "the super-
structure" of the economic base of society.
Then comes an epoch of social revolution. With the change
in the economic foundation the whole immense superstructure
is slowly or rapidly transformed. In studying such a transfor-
mation one must always distinguish between the material trans-
formation in the economic conditions essential to production --
which can be established with the exactitude of natural science --
and the juridical, political, religious, artistic or philosophic,
in short the ideological forms, in which men become conscious
of this conflict and fight it out. 3 "
36
The discussion which precedes this quote, a classic justification
for the ideological struggle of Marxism, is as follows:
In the social production of their subsistence men enter
into determined and necessary relations with each other which
are independent of their wills -- production- relations which
correspond to a definite stage of development of their material
productive forces. The sum of these production- relations
forms the economic structure of society, the real basis upon
which a juridical and political superstructure arises, and to
which definite social forms of consciousness correspond.
The mode of production of the material subsistence, [sic]
conditions the social, political and spiritual life-process in
general. It is not the consciousness of men which determines
their existence, but on the contrary, it is their social existency
47

The thesis of this paper does not argue the validity of a relationship
between economic conditions and institutional structure, as the sequence
of "Assumptions" (above) suggests. Rather, it attempts to show that
the process of economic development hypothesized by Marx's theory of
dialectical materialism is not corroborated by the available history of
socio-economic development in Scandinavia. Furthermore, certain
institutional developments not unrelated to the existing economy, but
contrary to Marx's theory of socio-economic development, have re-
inforced social harmony and mitigated or pre-empted class conflict in
Scandinavia. Foremost among these institutions is the law.
One of the most far reaching conceptual differences between the
early Scandinavians and other peoples in both Europe and Asia was the
acceptance by the latter peoples of rule by divine right or heavenly
mandate. These concepts were institutionalized and extended over
time to justify master-servant relationships and to simply bring about
resignation to one's fate. By the time Christianity took root in
36 (continued)
which determines their consciousness. At a certain stage
of their development the material productive forces of
society come into contradiction with the existing production
relations, or what is merely a juridical expression for the
same thing, the property relations within which they have
operated before. From being forms of development of the
productive forces, these relations turn into fetters upon
their development. Then comes ..."
From the Introduction to "Critique of Political Economy, " Capital ,




Scandinavia hundreds of years after the advent of Christ, primitive
apotheosis of the self-sufficient man had long since been inscribed
upon the Nordic culture and soon became institutionalized in law.
Perhaps the adoption of English of so many originally Norse words
such as knee, eye, hand, and arm attests to the importance of mann
37(Norwegian) in ancient Nordic society. Exaltation of the man, or
every man of character, was institutionalized by common law in
Scandinavia at an earlier age than in most cultures. "Lawman" and
38
"outlaw" are evolutions from Old Norse. Scott notes that the insti-
tution of law was strong in Scandinavia and reflective of its social
structure: "Law regulates the relationship of individuals within a
community; it is given character by the moral standards and ideals
39
of society and is thus closely associated with religion. "
The development of law by these northern peoples preceded the
establishment of the state. If we except the canons and precepts of
the Church and the codes set out by ruling elites of Mediterranean
empires, the "common law" of the teutonic peoples may be unprec-
edented in European civilization. The effect of this institution was to
37
M. O'D. Walshe, Introduction to the Scandinavian Languages
,
(London: Andre Deutsch, Ltd., 1965), pp. 161-163. See also John
Geipel, The Viking Legacy (London: William Closer &t Sons, Ltd., 1971),
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reinforce the concept of an egalitarian society and to negate the accept-
ance of hierarchical authority. The common law evolved naturally
into tribunals and representative assemblies to guarantee the rights of
the people, a germinating polity. The oldest legislature in the world,
the Althing, was founded in Iceland in A.D. 930, the date which marks
40
the creation of Iceland as a republic. Gradually, kings in Sweden
and Denmark took over the administration of government, but Things
persisted in Norway to guarantee representative decisions. The
resistance of the Thing to arbitrary hierarchical authority is documented
in an ultimatum delivered by "Torgny the Law-man" from the Thing to
the King:
We freemen wish that you, King Olof, make peace with Olaf
Digre, Norway's king, and give him your daughter Ingegard
to marry. But if you want to reconquer the kingdom in the east
that your forefathers have owned, then we will all follow you.
If you do not wish to do as we say, so will we go against you
and kill you, for we will not tolerate lawlessness or disorder
of you. So have our ancestors before us done. [Note reliance
upon precedent, or authority of previous decisions in common
law. ] They threw five kings in a well at Mora Thing, when
they were full of presumptuous ness as you now are toward us.
Say quickly, which will you choose.
Ibid., p. 43. See also Oliver Wendall Holmes, The Common
Law, edited by M. D. Howe (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1963), p. 17,
Quoted in E. Ingers, Bonden i svensk historia , I (Stockholm:
Lautbrukets Tidskriftsaktiebolag, 1949), pp. 31-32; translated by
Scott in Scandinavia, op. cit. , p. 43.
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Common law was progresively codified, especially with the begin-
ning of monarchies. Article VI, item one of the Norwegian Frostathing
Law (circa 1270) declared: "The first provision in our law of personal
rights is, that every one of our countrymen shall be inviolate in his
42
rights and in his person, both in the kingdom and outside the kingdom. "
Monarchies were elective throughout Scandinavia until Denmark's King
Frederick III summoned the pluralistic Rigsdag to decide on an absolute,
hereditary monarchy to be ruled "as should seem best to his majesty
43for the general good. ' The King effected this constitutional change by-
allying himself with the commoners in the Rigsdag against the increas-
ingly powerful but less popular nobility. It was, therefore, the pre-
existing (1320) democratic institution of the Rigsdag that permitted the
constitutional monarchy to become hereditary, as it is today in all
three Scandinavian kingdoms. And the power of the monarchs has
always been kept in check by representative assemblies, as when the
Swedish Ricksdag deposed King Gustavus IV Adolphus in 1809, replaced
him with Bernadotte and amended the constitution to strengthen par-
liamentary government. Norway, when it became independent of
Kenneth E. Miller, Government and Politics in Denmark
(Boston: Houghton- Mifflin Co. , 1968), p. 26; see footnote





Sweden in 1905, invited a Danish prince to be its King (with royal
succession henceforth in Norway) and patterned its constitutional
monarchy after the liberal one of Sweden. "It is remarkable that
Denmark remained so little affected by the constitutional and ideological
theories of the French Revolution, " writes Nils Andren in his primer
for English speaking students of government at the University of
Stockholm. "In fact, this tends to show that the absolute monarchy in
Denmark was enlightened, reforming and scarcely oppressive, and
that absolutism was almost as appreciated by its contemporaries as
it has been by subsequent historians. "
Sweden had the earliest start as a democracy, creating a consti-
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tutional government in 1718, with roots in the Middle Ages. Norway
adopted a free constitution in 1814, Denmark in 1848 and Finland in
1906. What is perhaps more significant regarding the thesis of this
paper, the transition to constitutional democracy was accomplished
throughout Scandinavia without revolution. In fact, there seems to be
a deep-seated aversion among Nordic countries to popular revolt, even
though there is a continuum of reform through the constitutional or
46
"legal process.
44Andren, op. cit .
, pp. 31, 142, 161.
4
^J. A. Lauwerys, Scandinavian Democracy: Development of
Democratic Thought and Institutions in Denmark, Norway and Sweden
(American-Scandinavian Foundation, Publisher, 195 9), p. 10. See also,
William L. Langer, ed. , Encyclopedia of World History (New York:




It is historically clear, then, that Scandinavia has a political
heritage that bears no comparison to the states of eastern or even
central Europe. The historical momentum of the Scandinavian demo-
cratic political process demands an alteration of the Marxist-Leninist
theories which might be applied to other areas of Europe, and this
fact is recognized by the Soviets and the Scandinavians alike. Trond
Gilberg sets out the differences between Soviet and Scandinavia com-
munist party development in well researched analysis, The Soviet
Communist Party and Scandinavian Communism: The Norwegian Case
(Oslo: Universiletsforlaget, 1973). Although Lenin visited Copenhagen
in 1910 to attend a Soviet Democratic Congress, he was disappointed
by the lack of Danish commitment to revolutionary methods and
47
assigned that cause to a comrade, O. W. Kuuisnen,
Given this background, Scandinavia nevertheless emerged from
World War II and German control with a tinge of sympathy for Soviet
communism. Some of Denmark's most distinguished statesmen, such
as Mogens Fog and Aksel Larson, were elected to the post-war Folketing
48
(Danish parliament) as members of the Communist Party. The Soviets
capitalized on the potential political base provided in those areas of
47
A. F. Upton, Communism in Scandinavia and Finland: Politics
of Opportunity (New York: Anchor/ Doubleday, 1973), p. 7.
48Poul Hansen, Danish Politicians (Copenhagen: Det Danske
Selskab, 1949), pp. 88-91, 154-157.
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Nazi occupied Scandinavia that had been "liberated" by Soviet troops. "
Soviet support can still be found today among the people in Sweden's
northern provinces, the Norbotten
,
many of whom have a close kinship
with the Finns and regard the Bolsheviks as champions of emancipation
50from the tyranny of Czardom.
The fortunes of the pro-Moscow Communist Parties flourished in
the post-War parliamentary elections, mostly as a result of their
reputation for Nazi resistance (the Communist parties were banned
by the Nazis). Denmark, Norway and Sweden all registered Communist
Party high water marks in their immediate post-war elections, never




But Soviet popularity was short lived. Trust turned to skepticism
among the Norwegians in 1946 when the USSR began heavy-handed
negotiations with Norway to establish joint military control of the
49TASS, 12 November 1974, in FBIS , Soviet Union, Vol. Ill,
13 November 1974, p. E6.
50 Daniel Tarschys, "The Unique Role of the Swedish Communist
Party, " Problems of Communism, Vol. XXIII (May- June, 1974), 37.
51 Ibid. See also, Richard F. Starr, ed. , Yearbook on International
Communist Affairs (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1975).
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Svalbard Island and to override a 1920 international sanction against
52
military development of that archipelago. And skepticism turned to
fear with the news of the Czech Coup in 1948 and the isolation of East
Germany under Soviet suzerainty. Sweden took the initiative, citing the
Soviet threat, in proposing a Nordic Defensive Alliance. Negotiations
toward this Nordic pact became bogged down between 1948 and 1949 over
a disagreement regarding the need for arms support from the U.S.
Sweden, having the best equipped and organized military of the three,
insisted that the Alliance be totally independent of the major powers.
Norway was adament in demanding the aid of modern arms from the West
while Denmark endeavored to effect a compromise. Sweden abandoned
the effort and continued on its independent course, and Norway and
Denmark opted for NATO. 53
The Finnish relationship to the USSR warrants special attention as
a prototype for Soviet foreign policy in Scandinavia. After World War II,
Finland was expected to show penitence for its collaboration with Hitler
in attacking Russia. Accordingly, in preparing a new government to
ensure its expiation, the "keystone" of Party foreign affairs was agreed
to be "friendship with the Soviet Union; there must be no deviation into
Nils Orvik, "Scandinavian Security in Transition: The Two






'agitation for forming a so-called Scandinavian bloc, which reactionaries
54
in Sweden and at home are proposing. '" The Communist program for
Finnish foreign policy was largely realized in the Finno-Soviet Treaty of
1948, which has been ominously depicted by many western political
analysts as the Soviet model for "finlandization" of the remainder of
55
Scandinavia and even Western Europe.
So the Scandinavian states stand today, although debate over independ-
ence versus participation in NATO seems to be resurfacing in direct
response to the Soviet promise of detente and U.S. demands upon its
NATO allies. The tension of the fifties and sixties caused by the Soviet
counter-coup in Hungary (1956), the Berlin crisis culminating in the
walling off of the East Sector (1961), and the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakis (1968) has been tranquilized by the latest Soviet over-
tures toward detente, the spirit of Helsinki (Resolution of the European
Conference on Security and Cooperation, Summer, 1975), and the peace-
loving protestations of the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union, in February, 1976. The latter day Peace Program,
54Quoted from keynote speech by V. Persi, General Secretary of
Finnish Communist Party, to the 7th Congress of the Party, 19-23
October 1945, reported in Kommunisti, nos. 44-45 (1945); from Upton,
op. cit .
, p. 254.
55A strong case for the theory of Finlandization is given by R. J.
Vincent in Military Power and Political Influence: The Soviet Union and
Western Europe
,
Adelphi Paper No. 119 (London: International Institute
for Strategic Studies, 1975). A strong rebuttal of the theory is given by
George Kennan in "Europe's Problems, Europe's Choices, " Foreign
Policy, Spring, 1974, pp. 3-16.
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reiterated in the last two CPSU congresses, appears to be winning more
and more believers in Scandinavia as witnessed in the following reports:
Reykjavik, 5 September 1974: 'Icelanders Reject Rightist
Views on NATO, Favor Detente' - Under conditions of detente,
relations between Iceland and the USSR are also improving.
The circle of contacts is becoming increasingly broad and Soviet-
Icelandic business links are growing and strengthening. "
Danish and Norwegian governments have been under increas-
ing pressure from left-wing factions, demanding a break with
NATO and a retreat to some kind of a non-aligned Nordic
security arrangement.
Under these circumstances, exposed to a considerable degree
of pressure at all levels of society, the Norwegian and Danish
governments have chosen to keep their NATO membership cards
but to limit direct involvement with NATO, politically and
militarily. '
USSR press agency TASS welcomes Norway rejection by
popular referendum of EEC as a 'movement against splitting
into blocs. ,58
Soviet foul play, however, keeps cropping up to undermine their
own efforts toward detente, causing suspicion to persist.
Copenhagen, Berlingske Tidende: "Soviet Espionage
'Strains Detente. '" The report that in recent years up to 50
Soviet agents have been expelled from France with the same
discretion that has been shown by the Danish Government in
connection with the recent expulsion of four KGB agents does
not make the Danish modus operandi any more reasonable.
5 6 FBIS - Soviet Union, 10 September 1974, p. E2.
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Orvik, op. cit .
, p. 736.
58
"World Event Interaction Study Report, " computer program
constructed by School of Politics and International Relations, University
of Southern California from N. Y. Times survey, 1/66 to 12/75.
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The Soviet Union has always had a mania for gathering
information in secret and occasionally unlawful ways -- as if
the information were the better for it. This despite the fact
the Russians have so many opportunities to gather information
perfectly legally in the Western societies. Instead, they choose
by repeated violations of the laws in the Western countries to
strain the detente of which they declare themselves the keenest
and most active champion. ->
'
The Scandinavian attitude toward the Soviet Union can be seen in
both historical and contemporary contexts as one of cautious maneuver-
ing to preserve national autonomy and independence of action in a region
critical to the defensive strategies of both Western Europe and the Soviet
Union.
C. THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF SCANDINAVIA
In the Cold War Era, only the Communist Parties of Finland and
Iceland enjoyed a dependable popular support. The three-state core of
Denmark, Norway and Sweden has not voted its Communist parties to
more than a minimal representation (2-6%) since the Party fell out of
grace in 1948. But their popularity has increased significantly in
the present decade throughout Scandinavia. (See Tables 1-5, pp. 79-85. )
Finland
A sanctuary of Lenin during his exile from Russia in the course of
the Bolshevik Revolution, Finland is part of the heritage of Soviet
59 FBIS - Western Europe, Vol. VII, 23 January 1976, p. PI.
60
Starr, 1968, op. cit .
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Communism. Its Social Democratic Party was conceived in the dogma
of Marxist revolutionary doctrine in 1903. Its major enemy was czarist
Russia and that orientation provided a common ground for the ambitions
of Lenin and Stalin who met each other, as it happened, at a Bolshevik
61
meeting in Tampere, Finland in 1905. After the Bolshevik Revolution
succeeded in Russia, however, the first objective of the Finns proved
to be independence, rather than international Marxism. Nevertheless,
right in step with their Russian cohorts, the Finnish Social Democratic
revolutionaries opted for the new title of Finnish Communist Party (SKP)
in August, 1918. 62
Adroit diplomacy with the Soviet Union has steered the independent
Finnish governments clear of Soviet Communist Party control of local
63
party politics. The present Finnish Communist Party and its electoral
front, the Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL) has consistently
secured between a fourth and a fifth of the national vote. In the last
election in 1972, it obtained 37 of the parliament's 200 seats, second
only to the Social Democratic Party (SDP).
The Soviet Union . . . has given conflicting signals on
whether it puts higher priority on SKP unity, communist
participation in a broad based government (such as Finland's
president Urho Kekkonen would probably prefer), or greater
communist loyalty to Moscow.















There is recent evidence that the USSR is growing increasingly-
impatient with Finnish recalcitrance:
Pravda accuses Finland of promoting anti- communist
campaign through large Finnish newspaper.
Pravda denounces Finnish press for spreading lies
about USSR involvement with Finnish Communist Party.
Party electoral gains appear to be tied to labor sentiment resulting
from national economic troubles blamed on the incumbent government.
Iceland
The Communist Party of Iceland is known today as the People's
Alliance (PA), an electoral front that includes leftist Social Democrats,
a self-proclaimed "Marxist political party. " Its origin dates back to
1930 when it was formed, in typical European fashion, as a splinter
group of the Social Democrats. The Iceland communist movement
deserves special attention as it is the only one that has achieved a broad
base of support and has consistently held a respectable position in a
Nordic parliament -- outside of powerful Soviet influence, as in Finland.
ODWEIS Report, op. cit .
66Starr, 1975, op. cit.
, p. 155.
67
Ibid., p. 203. Its relatively late start might be attributable to
the fact that Iceland did not achieve home rule from Denmark until 1918
nor independence until 1944. Also it was about 1930 that Danish Com-
munist party organization and influence advanced under the dynamic
leadership of Axel Larson, one of the first two Communist representatives
elected to the Danish parliament in 1932.
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It has been one of the few Western European communist parties to partic-
ipate in a democratically elected government, polling between 12 and 20
percent of the popular vote since World War II. In the 1971 parliamentary
election, it gained 17. 1 percent of the vote and 10 of the Althing's
(parliament) 60 seats. It thereby secured a position in a left-center
coalition government and occupied two of the cabinet's seven posts.
Although it gained in electoral standing in the most recent election of
30 June 1974, it forfeited participation in government to a new Progres-
68
sive- Independent coalition.
Iceland has the largest number of communist party members of
any Scandinavian country. Its membership was between 2, 000 and
69
2, 500 out of a population of 207, 300 in 1973. Trond Gilberg, writing
in Problems of Communism , explains that Iceland, much like pre-war
Finland, offers a good example of "Wilderness Communism. "
According to this analysis, communism in Scandinavia
has not been primarily an urban movement, for the strong
Social Democrat parties and trade union organizations in
the cities have effectively precluded mass support for other
left wing movements. In the poorer rural areas, on the
other hand, lumberjacks, marginal farmers, and people
in closely knit fishing villages have tended to exhibit con-




697 World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations - 1973 , U.S.
State Department, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, (Washington,
D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 21.
7 Trond Gilberg, "Patterns of Nordic Communism, " Problems of
Communism, XXIV (May-June, 1975), p. 32.
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Factors which contribute to this phenomenon in Iceland are found
in the traditional social patterns of village solidarity, an egalitarian
71
culture and fervent nationalism. An example of the latter is seen in
the political reaction of single-industry fishing villages to foreign en-
72
croachment on their waters. Gilberg continues:
With perceptive understanding of the individualistic spirit
so prevalent among the people, the Communists have always
played down the collectivist elements of their own faith:
[sic] nevertheless recognizing that most of the country's
economic activities originally began as branches of Danish
state monopolies . . . and that broad sections of the population
seem to take state ownership for granted, they have pushed for
state ownership of much of industry and other major economic
ventures. The communists have also sought consistently to
validate their nationalist credentials, and they have acquired
a reputation as one of the most nationalistic political forces
in the country.
In summing up the Icelandic Communist Party success, it must be
emphasized that its willingness to participate in coalitions with other
more moderate parties and its image as a local brotherhood in no way










74Starr, "International Party Contacts, " 1975, op. cit. , p. 206.
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The People's Alliance strongly advocates Iceland's withdrawal from
NATO and elimination of the U.S. dominated Icelandic Defense Force,
while 40% inflation (1974) over the previous year poses an opportunity
, . ,
75
for unseating the incumbent government.
Denmark
The Danes founded their Communist Party in 1919. Membership
today is approximately 8, 000, against a national population of 5, 100, 000
(1973). The most dedicated members of the Danish Communist Party
and its Marxist offshoots have been characteristically intellectual types.
The present rector of the University of Copenhagen, Mogens Fog, was
a leading member of the DKP and later the Socialist Left Party just
after World War II. The chief theoretician and party liaison to most
Moscow summits is lb Norland, an atomic physicist and nephew of
Nobel laureate Niel Bohr, discoverer of the neutron and director of
Copenhagen's famous institute of theoretical physics. A charismatic
politician and former Chairman of the DKP, Axel Larson was joined
by aristocrat Kaj Moltke and zoology professor Morten Lange in form-
ing a new Marxist party, the Socialist Left in 195 8. All three took seats
in the Folketing following the new party's first election campaign in 1958.
Despite strong support to the Left parties by a liberal-intellectual element
of Danish society, organized labor has remained almost exclusively the
76
province of the Social Democrats.
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Ibid., p. 204; see also, FBIS -Soviet Union, 10 September 1974, p. El
'Peter P. Rohde, "The C
Upton, op.cit., pp. 10, 21, 30,
76Pe ommunist Party of Denmark, " in A. F.
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In 1973, the Party (DKP) scored its biggest electoral gains (3.6%
of vote) since 1953, and returned to parliament for the first time in
12 years. Since the 1973 election, opinion polls have registered a popular
gain to nearly 6% approval. The improved image was reflected in recent
(1974) municipal elections in which the DKP jumped from 6 seats to 54
seats. This gain was achieved in spite of severe competition among
parties of the Left. Since World War II, the DKP has splintered twice
into rival Marxist oriented parties: the Socialist People's Party (SF)
in 1958 and the Left Socialists (VS) in 1967. So the latest election, in
which the leftist rivals declined in popularity is seen as a vindication of
77
the Moscow-aligned DKP policies.
This latest boom in the fortunes of the Danish communists is a
cause of consternation among political scientists and sociologists who
had predicted the demise of Marxist parties with the advance of
material prosperity and narrowing of income differentials in industrial-
7 8
ized nations. Denmark, with the highest income for unskilled labor
79
in Europe, has not borne out that prediction. The puncturing of the
prediction of social tranquility with material prosperity has led
Scandinavian political scientist Trond Gilberg to a new hypothesis:
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Starr, 1975, op. cit .
, p. 149.
78 Gilberg, op. cit. , p. 20.
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Brian Patrick McGuire, op. cit . , p. 327.
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The erroneous expectation that political radicalism would
gradually wither away in modern society . . . was based on the
logic that with the development of social welfare states and
growing prosperity, the general public would become increas-
ingly middle-class in social status and economic position, and
public opinion would cluster in the middle of the spectrum.
Political trends in Western Europe -- including Norway, Denmark,
and Sweden -- during the last decade have disproved this notion;
in fact, it now appears that prosperous welfare states may be
expecially prone to the upheavals of a new form of radicalism
originating precisely in the middle class and leading to the
polarization of the entire political spectrum.
Gilberb ascribes a major cause of this new development -- the
alienation of the middle class foundation in a welfare state --to heavy
taxation on a broad middle-income base, while economic privileges
accrue to owners of industry. The author further postulates that the
Communist Party will capitalize upon the disaffection of the masses
through the issues of:
1) Big Power Policies - suggesting the ruthless exploitation
of Scandinavian resources and strategic geography to en-
hance the strength of Continental and U.S. power;
2) Internal Political Trends - pointing toward the "bourgeoisi-
zation" of Scandinavian social democracy;
3) The EEC Issue - which could be used to claim a sellout to
West Europe powers necessitating a compromise of
Scandinavian labor gains; and
4) Political Polarization - of socialist-labor-liberal group and
the conservative, financially well entrenched group.
80
Gilberg, op. cit .
, p. 2d.
81 Ibid., pp. 23-25.
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As in the other countries of "West Europe during the present period,
the rampant inflation (20%, March 1975) and unemployment (13%) asso-
ciated with the incumbent parties prove to be the most immediate means
of marshalling popular backing for Communist Party entry into
82government.
Norway
Founded in 192 3 as an offshoot of the Norwegian Labor Party, the
Norwegian Communist Party (NKP) has suffered from relentless compe-
tition on the Left: the Norwegian Labor Party (DNA) on one side, and
the Socialist People's Party (SF) and a variety of extremist groups on
the other. As elsewhere in Western Europe during the seventies, the
fortunes of the NKP has improved through electoral alliance. The SF-
NKP-DNA-dissident Front captured 10. 1 percent of the 1973 popular
vote and took 16 seats in the parliament -- one of them occupied by
the NKP. 83
The Norwegian Communist Party remains more aloof of Moscow
than does their Danish counterpart. But even without Soviet intercession
the NKP was instrumental in blocking Norway's entry into the EEC by
McGuire, op. cit.
,
p. 20. Many observers of the Scandinavian
political scene predict a conservative reaction by voters.. See "Denmark:
Something Rotten, " Newsweek , 17 December 1973, p. 50.




campaigning with other anti- Common Market groups before a referendum
84
in September of 1972.
The potential for further inroads into Norwegian Labor Party leader-
ship is similar to that cited by Gilberg for the Danish Party (preceding
section), although the biggest problem will be welding leftist factions
together before the Party disintegrates from within. The development
of oil reserves in Norway has drawn the Party into a campaign against
Q C
private control and possible cooperation in OPEC.
Sweden
The Swedish Communist Party (SKP) grew out of a dissident faction
of the Social Democratic Party in 1921. In 1967, it changed its name
to the Left- Party- Cornmunist (VKP) to increase its appeal among those
opposed to the traditional pro-Moscow stance. But the change proved
in vain as it has since further splintered into pro-Mao and pro-Moscow
groups. In a tense 1973 election, a perfect split between the socialist
left and the so called bourgeois parties, forced the SD Prime Minister
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to depend upon the Communist VKP for a government of the Left.
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Bureau of Intelligence and Research, World Strength of the
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In the most recent election, 19 September 1976, a "bourgeois" coalition
of Center, Moderate and Liberal parties ousted the socialist parties after
88
44 years of uninterrupted government.
The VKP has shown itself to be one of the most adaptable Scandinavian
communist parties in cooperating with the Social Democrat establishment
in that the VKP leader C. H. Hermansson has demonstrated a political
agility unsurpassed by his Scandinavian communist party cohorts by
entertaining a wide spectrum of communists in his liberal band. How-
ever, as long as the Social Democrats have retained control over labor,
the VKP has been willing to accept participation in government at the
pleasure of dominating Social Democrats. This fact has caused increas-
ing agitation among Marxists to withdraw from Social Democrat alliance
89
and to offer a revolutionary alternative to disenchanged proletarians.
The VKP dilemma for the future, then, is where to trade off the prestige
of participation in government for the opportunity of increased radical
support.
D. EUROCOMMUNISM
It is apparent that socialism and communism in their contemporary
European forms are in desperate need of redefinition. It is indisputable
88





that the trend of Scandinavian government is toward the left, ° but what
does that auger for the Soviet Union? What does it mean to be a "Social
Democrat, " a "Socialist" or a "Communist" in Scandinavia?
Degrees of Socialism
There are degrees of socialism that are traceable back to the
90
communaute movements that were spawned by the French Revolution.
Karl Marx was among the first to attempt a precise, even a "scientific, '
definition of socialism that would distinguish it from the broadly egali-
tarian movements of the day. And it was mainly at this juncture, about
the time of Das Kapital
,
(Vol. I, 1867), that differences over the struc-
ture, means and goals of socialism became pronounced. These funda-
mental differences persist largely intact today and define the competing
91
schools of socialism.
Bases for differentiation of "socialist" parties:
a) Structural
1. Popular based, bourgeois based, peasant based or
proletariat (Marx) based movement?
2. Local, national or universal (Marx) scope?
3. Decentralized (self-governing), representative or
hierarchical organization of society?
4. Common or elite leadership?
Robert Owen, New View of Society (London: 1813); in An Encyclope .
dia of World History by William L. Langer, ed. , (Boston: Houghton-
Mifflin, Company, 1974), p. 591.
° Joseph Shumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy ,




1. Evolutionary or revolutionary attainment of goals?
2. Democratic or anarchic change
c) Aspirational





6. Marxian- Maoist Socialism
Prior to Marx, socialism was generally regarded as an end in itself.
After Marx, socialism was to be regarded as a vehicle of the proletariat
to a more perfect society -- Communism, where the practice "from
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each according to his ability, to each according to his needs" prevailed.
All "socialists, " however, do not share this vision with Marx. The
Oxford English Dictionary defines socialism as "a theory or policy that
aims at or advocates the ownership or control by the means of production -
capital, land, property, etc. , --by the community as a whole and their
93




^ 3 Julius Gould and William L. Kolb, A Dictionary of the Social
Sciences, (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 670.
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The core concept of socialism, by any denomination of socialist, is
the "ownership or control of the means of production ... in the interests
of all. " Beyond this principle, proponents of socialism diverge in their
interpretations of the degree of ownership or control that is required
and how the interests of all are best served. It should be noted that
socialism, per se, does not assume either equality or democracy in its
application. To this extent, it is strictly a modus operandi of government.
For example,
In the emergent states socialism is more intimately
concerned with problems of nationalism and economic develop-
ment than with the nuances, paradoxes, and symbols of social
status. The vision of the 'good society' in such states is of
one in which problems of acute poverty have been abolished.
Socialism, as an economic instrumentality, here has the prime
aim of fostering economic growth -_ an aim to which many
other economic, political, and social values may be sub-
ordinated.
Given this range of construction -- from minimal governmental
controls to a dictatorship of the proletariat -- within the scope of
"ownership or control of the means of production, " what forms of
contemporary socialism can be found in Scandinavia?
1. Comprehensive State Welfare: The means of production are
reserved to private enterprise, but state control of the economy -- trade,
tariffs, prices, wages, cost of capital (discount rate), money supply,






subsistence level. "Excess profits" are taxed and distributed inpayment
or services to the public at large.
2. State Socialism: The state owns or manages the means of
production on behalf of the public.
3. Guild Socialism: The guild industries retain ownership and
control of the means of production and administer all profits in the
interest of all employed.
4. Pure Marxian Socialism: The proletariat owns and controls
the means of production pursuant to the withering away of the state
and the emerging of a communist society.
5. Marxian- Leninist Socialism: The proletariat has title to the
means of production under the direction of an elite vanguard. Eventually,
the proletariat will dissolve into a completely classless society of
communism.
6. Marxian- Maoist Socialism: The peasantry own and operate
the means of production and ultimately eliminate state bureaucracy
through a continuing revolution of ascendancy to a communist society.
Among these variants of socialism, revolution is the intervening
variable which determines the ultimate character of society. In the
first three forms of socialism, revolution is construed in the mildest
sense to mean peaceful reform of the existing social system through
technological breakthrough, political upheaval and changes in the social
structure (for example, mass movements to urban areas in the wake of
industrialization). In the case of pure Marxian socialism, proletarian
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revolution is generally considered a sine qua non of liberation from
capitalism, especially after the publication of the Communist Manifesto .
However, early treaties and correspondence by Marx indicate that
the means of transition to socialism is dependent upon the socio-economic
95
conditions existing at the moment. Lenin, despite his advocacy of
violent revolution when the "objective conditions" were right, conceded
that different conditions call for different tactics. Lenin was adamant,
however, in his insistence upon a "revolutionary vanguard" to organize
and lead the proletarian cause -- something which Marx did not reckon
96
on. The Maoist version of socialism places heavy emphasis upon
the need for a "continuing revolution, " which both Marx and Lenin would
abandon after the proletariat's emancipation from capitalism. Mao also
ascribes a much higher value to the peasantry in forging a revolution
97
than does either Marx or Lenin.
The last three forms of socialism described above have in common
an ultimate goal: a classless, communist society. The Twenty-second
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, held on 31 October
1961, put forth the following definition in its Program of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union:
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See Karl Marx, Das Kapital ; in Marx and the Marxists: The
Ambiguous Legacy by Sidney Hook, (Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand,
1955).
96W. W. Kulski, The Soviet Union in World Affairs , op. cit. ,
pp. 270-273.
° See Robert C. North, Moscow and the Chinese Communists
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1953).
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What is Communism? Communism is a classless social
system with one form of public ownership of the means of
production and full social equality of all members of society
Communism is a highly organized society of free, socially
conscious working people in which public self government will
be established, a society in which labor for the good of society
will become the prime vital requirement for everyone, a neces-
sity recognized by all, and the ability of each person will be
employed to the greatest benefit of the people. '
The Great Soviet Encyclopedia explains that:
The transition into Communism will be effected by strength-
ening the Socialist order and without a revolution. . . . and the
state will have withered away. ''
The Parties
The various socialist and communist parties of today have evolved
as exponents of the various interpretations of socialism outlined above.
To broadly distinguish the socialists from the communists by party,
one could assign a socialist label to the first three forms of socialism
mentioned (Comprehensive Social Welfare, State Socialism and Guild
Socialism) and a communist label to the latter three (Marxist, Marxian-
Leninist and Marxian- Maoist). The clarification given by Marx and
Engels in the preface to their Communist Manifesto in 1848, is revealing:
Communists do not form a separate party as opposed
to other working class parties . . . they do not set up any
sectarian principles of their own . . . but are simply the
98New Times , 29 November 1961, p. 27.




most advanced and resolute section of every country, that
section which pushes forward all others.
Against this background, a wide spectrum of parties have come
into existence across Scandinavia that espouse varying degrees of
socialism (see Party Tables 1-5). While it could be said that Russian
socialist rivalries at the turn of the century -- Narodniki, Bolsheviki
and Mensheviki -- are ghosts of today, that would be an oversimplifica-
tion. The connotations of Social Democrat, Left Socialist, and Com-
munist are the product of intervening history. Today, except for the
recent developments in Southern Europe, "Communist" calls to mind a
Soviet sympathizer; "Socialist" evokes a wayward Marxist Revolutionary;
and "Social Democrat" suggests a moderate socialist of the Berstein
101
school. But behind these contemporary classifications lurks an
immutable legacy. The "backwoods communists" of Iceland (the
People's Alliance Party) have a historic kinship with the Narodniki; the
Communist Parties of Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland are the
direct descendents of Bolshevik comrades; and the Social Democrats
are the prospering nephews of Menshevik dissidents (of the Russian
102
Social Democrats) who held out for political pluralism.
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto ,
1848; in Gould, op. cit .
, p. 113.
Lt. Jan Christiansen, Royal Danish Air Force; conversation





The Soviet model may not prove to be the best way to Communism.
As Milovan Djilas pointed out in The New Class
, a burgeoning bureau-
cracy breeds a managerial class to supplant the capitalists' control of
103
the means of production. Under such conditions, socialism is defeated
and communism is preempted by the rigidity of a new social hierarchy.
In this situation, the prospect of socialism through popular mandate --
rather than proletarian revolution --is the more logical method. The
politics of this decade in France and Italy have given communism a new
appeal. A rereading of Marx and even Lenin might disclose that the
Soviets have taken a very biased view of socialism to suit their own needs.
The Spanish Party Program proclaims:
No student of Marx has ever rationalized a one-party
system or a Communist Party that is by law more privileged
than other parties. Nor would he justify the elevation of
Marxism to an official national philosophy and the subjuga-
tion of the arts and culture to a government monopoly.
Typical of Scandinavian socialism, the Danish Social Democrat
Party's draft "program of principles" for its 1977 congress includes
the following proposals:
Milovan Djilas, The New Class ; in "Ideologies in Conflict, "
Air University Research Study (AU-202-71- 1PD), Maxwell AFB,
Alabama: Air University, 1972), p. 51.
1 4
" communi sm ' s New Face, " Atlas World Press Review ,
August 1976, p. 34; reproduced from "A Historic Compromise, "
Die Zeit, 9 April 1976.
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1. "Joint ownership of the means of production" and support of
movements opposing economic and political repression.
2. Collective ownership for all wage earners and governmental
control of credit, insurance and other private concentrations of economic
power, including multinational corporations.
3. Doctors and dentists under state employment and pharmaceutical
firms under public control.
4. Continued membership in NATO only as long as the alliance
105
provides a balanced foundation for East-West detente and cooperation.
It is intriguing that the symbol appearing on the cover of the Party
program is a clenched hand holding a rose. It thus appears that in the
final analysis a party label is simply a political calling card. The geno-
type, as opposed to the phenotype, of the party is to be found in the
application of its program for social and economic organization of
the state and its long-term means of achieving its goals. Seen in this
light, the program of Denmark's Social Democrats may be in deed be more
"Marxist" than the present program of Italy's Communists.
In the case of Scandinavia, one cannot judge the Marxist potential
from the party label alone. In Denmark, labor groups that are well
committed to and well fed by the Social Democrats have advanced to
levels of socialism well beyond those known to the French and Italian
105




communists. Remembering that V. I. Lenin stressed that the
"historical fate of social systems will be decided in the final account
107
not on the battlefields but in economics, " and that each country "finds
108for itself the forms through which it realizes social reconstruction, "
the rapid progress to Marxian socialism in Scandinavia is sobering.
Soviet author I. E. Kravtsev, a respected Party ideologue, also allows
that
Under contemporary conditions the national factor has
become an important force in ideology and politics. One
should not overlook this ... A nihilistic attitude toward
national feelings sometimes makes its appearance. People
who hold this view say that national feelings allegedly con-
tradict internationalism and even patriotism. This point of
view is incorrect. National feelings are by themselves
sound, all-human phenomena characteristic for men of all
nationalities. As long as nations exist, men will have
national feelings. '
Owing to the fervent nationalism peculiar to the Scandinavian
states, the course of communism there is likely to be an independent
one. The best bet for Moscow, then, is to cultivate a tolerant rap-
prochement with potentially socialist states while Nordic communists
labor toward a sympathetic social system, on their own terms.
See McGuire, op. cit.
, p. 32^, describing intra -Scandinavian
collaboration of labor and labor take-over of industry.
107
Miroshnichenko, Vneshniaia Politika Sovetskovo Soiuza , p. 47
in Kulski, The Soviet Union in World Affairs , op. cit ., p. 266.
108Kommunisti, No. 9, (1945), p. 3; nos. 14-15, p. 10 in Upton,
op. cit .
, p. 249. (Quote from V. I. Lenin).
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Communist Party membership: 49, 000 (estimated)
Communist Party orientation: Pro-Moscow
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Supplement to Table 1: Finland
1975 1975
Political Party Electoral % Seats
Social Democrats 695,394 54
People's Democratic
League 528,026 40
National Coalition 513,213 35
Center (Agrarian 488,930 39
Swedish People's 141,381 10
Liberal People's Party 121,722 9
Finnish Rural Party 100,771 2



























Communist Party membership: 2,000 - 2,500 (estimated)
Communist Party orientation: Neutral; no relations with CPSU
People's Alliance chairman Ragnar Arnolds stated in an interview
that his
that his party is "more in tune with Scandinavian Social Democrats than
with communists in those countries. " (Die Welt, December 27, 1973)
N. B. : Party data and quote extracted from "World Strength of Communist
Party Organizations - 1973, U.S. State Department, Bureau of Intelligence
















































Communist Party membership: 7,500 - 8,000 (estimated)
Communist Party orientation: Pro-Moscow
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Supplement to Table 3: Denmark
Political Party Electoral % Seats
Jan, 1975/Feb, 1977 1975/1977
Communists 4.2 3.7 7 7
Left Socialists 2.1 2.7 4 5
Socialist People's 4.9 3.9 9 7
Minority
Government Social Democrats 30.0 37. 53 65
23. 3 12.0 42 21Liberal Democrats
Radical Liberals 7.1 3.6 13
Christian People's Pty 5. 3 3.4 9 6
Conservatives 5.5 8.5 10 15
Center Democrats 2.2 6.4 4 11
Progress Party 13.6 14.6 24 26
Single -Tax Party 1. 8 3. 3 6
Pensioners' Party .9 _0
2, 913, 885 votes (75)























Non- socialist joint 1ist: 5.3
Conservative: 15. 6
Party for Reduction of Taxes
:
4.5












2, 373, 662 votes
155 seats
Communist Party membership: 2, 500 (estimated)





































5, 158, 839 votes
350 seats
Communist Party membership: 17, 000 (estimated)








Supplement to Table 5: Sweden
(September, 1976)
Political Party El ectora1% Seats
Left Communist 4.7 17
Communist Party of Swed en . 3
Social Democrats 42. 9 152








III. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION
AND THE SCANDINAVIAN STATES
While it is essential to understand that Marxist-Leninist ideology-
is the raison d'etre of the Soviet state and that the very purpose of
Soviet foreign policy is to realize a world revolution to socialism as
promised in that ideology, it is equally important to appreciate that the
method of attaining the ultimate foreign policy goal of world socialism
is definitely pragmatic. This is to say that in analyzing Soviet foreign
policy toward the non-Socialist states, the analyst must always reckon
with ideology as a motive of Soviet foreign policy while coping with
routine international diplomacy as a method of Soviet foreign policy.
Hannes Adomeit, a West German lecturer at the Institute of Soviet and
East European Studies at the University of Glasgow, stresses the
importance of this differentiation of motive and method in order to
comprehend what non-socialist analysts often perceive as a failure
between theory and practice.
Some of the major indications are that Soviet state
activity and the reliance on traditional 'classic' forms
of diplomacy has become more important in revolu-
tionary strategy than supporting local Communists and
'progressive forces' so as to create revolutionary
transformations which, in turn, might serve Soviet
foreign policy objectives.
Hannes Adomeit, Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior:
From Confrontation to Co-existence? Adelphi Paper 101 (London:
The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973), p. 19.
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Mr. Eric Willenz, Senior Analyst for Communist Affairs in the
U. S. State Department Office of Research and Analysis concurs in this
assessment of current Soviet foreign policy toward Scandinavia. He
describes Soviet foreign policy today as being very malleable to meet
the requirements of the area. In the case of Scandinavia, the Soviet
Union is very intent upon not creating tension which will drive those
2
states into the full embrace of NATO. This pattern of diplomacy con-
forms to the model of Soviet relations with Finland and has given cur-
's
rency to the theory of Finlandization.
Lenin himself was the personification of pragmatism in guiding
Soviet foreign policy. His instructive essay Infantile Disease of Leftism
in Communism "remains a monument to the Soviet view of policy in
conditions of coexistence. " In 1967 a latter day Soviet specialist,
V. IsraeUian, construed Lenin's concept of foreign policy to be holistic:
Leninist theory regards international life as a whole where
particular events are related to and condition each other.
Marxist-Leninists do not view international life as something
9
Eric Willenz, Office of Research and Analysis for the Soviet Union
and East Europe, U. S. State Department (Washington, D.C.; telephone
inverview by author, 0820-0855 hours, PDT, 20 October 1976).
For a thorough analysis of this theory, pro and con, see: Layton,
"What Finlandization Means, " Economist , (4 August 1973), p. 15; also,
R. J. Vincent, Military Power and Political Influence: The Soviet Union
and Western Europe, Adelphi Paper No. 119 (London: International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975 (PRO); and George Kennan in "Europe's
Problems, Europe's Choices, " Foreign Policy , Spring, 1974, pp. 3-16
(CON).
4Leonard Shapiro, "Totalitarianism in Foreign Policy, " in The
Soviet Impact on World Politics , Kurt L. London, editor, (New York:
Hawthorne Books, Inc., 1974), p. 7.
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frozen and unchangeable; they see, first of all, its dynamic
force. At the same time, they fully realize that any dip-
lomatic action or foreign policy demarche is insolubly linked
to an actual but constantly changing historical situation,
which in turn constantly produces new diplomatic actions and
new foreign events. *
How has this Leninist concept of a continuously changing foreign
policy affected traditional diplomacy in the West? The answer is that
the standards of Western diplomacy have only gradually adapted to the
"new rules of the, game. " Ever since the emergence of states, envoys,
protocols, treaties and other vehicles of diplomacy have had the express
7purpose of fixing the status quo between sovereigns. But how does a
traditional, sovereign state conduct diplomatic relations -- i. e. , agree
upon a status quo -- with a "state" that explicitly rejects sovereignty
on the basis of political legitimacy and, moreover, is explicitly comit-
g
ted to world revolution? There is no solution to this predicament
except either to refuse diplomatic recognition to the non-sovereign state,
or to alter the meaning and function of diplomacy. The non- socialist
5
V. Israel'ian, "Leninskaia nowka o mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniialsh
i vneshnepoliticheskaia real'nost', " MZh (Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn 1 ), No. 6,
1967, pp. 70-71; in W. W. Kulski, The Soviet Union in World Affairs
(New York: Syracuse University Press, 1973), p. 9.
°Adam B. Ulam, "The Soviet Union and the Rules of the International
Game, " in London, op. cit .
, pp. 40-4L
'See Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations , 4th edition
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), Chapter One.




states of the West have invariably opted for the latter course, and
thereby accepted different rules of diplomacy with regard to the Soviet/
Socialist states than had prevailed in the state system ante Sovietum.
In a review of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the
Scandinavian states, therefore, one must define the significance of
diplomatic activity that in fact takes place. Given the self-admitted
opportunism of Soviet foreign policy --to exploit the "crisis of capitalism'
in non-Socialist states -- and the poor Soviet record in honoring treaty
obligations, the importance of diplomatic relations as a measure of
9
mutual affinity with the Soviet Union is questionable. Substantively,
Soviet treaties have seldom been remarkable for binding the Soviets to
a prescribed course of action. But for the analyst of trends in Soviet
foreign relations, a review of treaties and diplomatic communiques is
useful in tracing the direction of Soviet foreign relations. For this
purpose, a quantitative analysis of bilateral treaties concluded between
Q
L. I. Brezhnev, "Report on the CPSU Central Committee and the
Party's Immediate Objectives in Home and Foreign Policy, " at the 25th
Congress of the CPSU (Moscow, 24 February 1976); in New Times , No. 9,
(Moscow, February 1976), p. 39; and Peter Sager, The Soviet Union's
Treaty Record (Berne, Switzerland: Swiss Eastern Institute, 1962).
Peter Sager, The Soviet Union's Treaty Record, A Study in Soviet
Legal Morality (Berne, Switzerland: Swiss Eastern Institute, 1962), p. 29.
Nils Orvik, "Nordic Cooperation and High Politics, " International
Organization
,
Vol. 28, no. 1 (Winter, 1974), p. 83.
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the Soviet Union and the five Scandinavian States between 1920 and 1970
was undertaken by the author.
While a longitudinal breakdown of the number of treaties negotiated
periodically since 1920 illuminates the progress of diplomacy (improved
Soviet-Scandinavian State relations?), perhaps the more significant data
concerns the number of Soviet/Scandinavian State treaties relative to
the number of Soviet treaties concluded bilaterally with certain other
states. The analysis includes the United Kingdom and West Germany
as comparative treaty partners because of their historical roles, to-
gether with the USSR, in the international relations of the Scandinavian
12
states. The United States is included to compare the diplomatic effort
(in terms of treaties) expended by the superpowers bidding for influence
in Scandinavia; while Poland and East Germany are included to gauge
the diplomatic importance of representative East Bloc states versus
established relations of the U.K. and the FRG with Scandinavian states.
(For a chronological listing of treaties concluded between the USSR and
each of the Scandinavian states and pertinent topical data, see Appendix B),
A. Scandinavian state treaties with the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (See Treaty Chronology, Appendix A)
Finland
Finland maintains the closest diplomatic relations with the Soviet





Finland's leading partner in international relations and has concluded
twice as many treaties with Finland as Finland has with the U.S.
, as of
1970. The majority (20 out of 50) of these agreements were concluded
in the post-war period from 1945 to 1950, which included the benchmark
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1948 (see Attachment B for the
full text). Under the terms of this agreement, Finland became a condi-
tional ally of the Soviet Union. Article One declares that
Should either Finland, or the Soviet Union through
the territory of Finland become the object of military
aggression on the part of Germany or any Power allied
with Germany, Finland will carry out the duty as a
sovereign State and will fight to repel aggression.
.... with the help, if necessary of the Soviet Union or
together with the Soviet Union. ^
Some analysts of Soviet foreign policy regard this treaty as a
harbinger of "Finlandization" destined to envelop greater Scandinavia
14
and perhaps the rest of Europe. The salient clauses, from which a
prototype for Finlandization is constructed, are contained in Articles
Four and Six.
13
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Finland, Signed
at Moscow, on 6 April 1948, United Nations Treaty Series , Vol. 28 (New
York: United Nations, 1950), pp. 149-160. UNTS No. 100742; see
Appendix B, this paper.
See George W. Kennan, "Europe's Problems, Europe's Choices, "
Foreign Policy
,
Spring,. 1974, pp. 3-16; H. Peter Krosby, "Scandinavia
and 'Finlandization, '" Scandinavian Review , No. 2, (June, 1975), pp.
11-19; Lord Layton, "What Finlandization Means, " Economist , 4 August
1973, pp. 15-16; R. J. Vincent, "Military Power and Political Influence,
"





The High Contracting Parties confirm the undertaking con-
tained in article 3 of the Treaty of Peace signed at Paris
on 10 February 1947 not to enter into any alliance or take
part in any coalition directed against the High Contracting
Party.
Article Six:
The High Contracting Parties agree to act in accordance
with the principles of mutual respect for their national
sovereignty and independence and of non-interference in
the internal affairs of the other State. ^
These clauses have been construed by Western Sovietologists to
characterize the present Soviet foreign policy toward Finland -- and
the projected Soviet foreign policy for the rest of Scandinavia -- as
demanding deference to the Soviet Union in matters of international
relations, such as regional alliance (Article Four) in return for freedom
of action in domestic affairs (Article Six). H. Peter Krosby, an ack-
nowledged authority on Finnish affairs at the State University of New
York in Albany, explains:
What the Russians did demand of the Finns after the
end of the war was that Finland's foreign policy henceforth
consider -- and not clash with -- the vital security interests
of the Soviet Union . . . Finland was free to align itself with
the Sovtet Union in any way it wished, but not with potential
adversaries of the Soviet Union. . . . Within the limits of
these restrictions, Finland was free to pursue its own
policies at home and abroad. *"
°48 UNTS 149, op. cit .
, p. 158.
H. Peter Krosby, "Scandinavia and 'Finlandization,
Scandinavian Review, No. 2, June 1975, p. 17.
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Even if one concedes the most benign intentions to the Soviets in
concluding this treaty with Finland, the treaty itself represents a prima
facie forfeiture of sovereignty on the part of Finland. No independent
state would choose to renounce its sovereign right to engage in inter-
national relations, to include alliances or "coalitions" (Article Four),
except under coercion from its High Contracting treaty partner; and it is
superfluous for High Contracting Parties who are both independent
and sovereign states to stress "non-interference in the internal affairs
of the other state" (Article Six). Notwithstanding this superfluous pledge
of non-interference, the Soviet Union has repeatedly sought to enjoin
Finnish internal political competition viewed by the Soviets as detri-
17
mental to the Finnish communist movement.
The Finno-Soviet Treaty of 1948 is an anomaly in international law.
It is not a mutual defense treaty, but, by its peculiar phrasing, a self -
defense treaty. Article One specifies what Finland must do to "carry
out its duty as a sovereign State and ... to repel aggression, " but not
what the Soviet Union must do to reciprocate Finland's efforts. Also,
curiously, Article Two, which simply declares that the "Parties will
consult together in case there is found to be a threat of the military
aggression referred to in Article 1, " has proven to be a Soviet lever to
enlist Finnish military support of Soviet foreign policy. In this respect,
17
"Pravda Accuses Finnish Press of Promoting Anti- Communist
Campaign, " New York Times, 21 March 1975.
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the Finno-Soviet Treaty serves as a deterrent to military or political
coalitions among the non-signatory states of Scandinavia and northern
Europe. This view is expressed in a study by the Norwegian Institute
of International Affairs, in regard to Soviet reaction to the U-2 incident
(U.S. reconnaissance aircraft downed over Soviet territory) on 1 May I960,
among several other Soviet crisis reactions. Premier Kruschev traveled
to Helsinki to confer with President Kekonnen and
argued that the cause of peace in Northern Europe
would depend on the policies of Norway and Denmark.
In Norway Mr. Kruschev's declarations were viewed
as an attempt by the Soviet Union to enlist Finland in the
struggle to lessen Norwegian and Danish NATO ties. 18
On 6 April 1965, Pravda and Isvestia published commentaries to
celebrate the anniversary of the Finno-Soviet Treaty of 1948, wherein
"Izvestia in particular argued that recent developments had shown the
continued and even increased value of the Friendship treaty as an instru-
ment for securing peace in Northern Europe and for guaranteeing the
19
security of the Finnish-Soviet border. "
The bilateral treaty history of Finland and the USSR after 1950
shows a decline from 20 .to an average of seven per five-year periods
up to 1970. This is about twice the treaty rate of any other non-communist
1 ftArne Olav Bruntland, The Nordic Balance, Past and Present





European state with the Soviet Union. The most common subjects of
negotiation have been, in order, administrative /diplomatic procedures,
economic/trade; social/science programs, aid, and military agreements
(See Table 6, p. 113a)
.
Iceland
After Finland, Iceland has the highest percentage of treaties with
the Soviet Union. Eleven percent of Iceland's total of recorded treaties
(1970) name the Soviet Union as partner. It is interesting that most of
these treaties were negotiated relatively recently, compared to the
history of USSR diplomacy with the rest of Scandinavia. Iceland did not
become an independent state until 1944, and the Soviet Union had recorded
only one treaty, concerning trade, with pre-independent Iceland in 1927.
(Iceland progressed from home rule in 1874 to becoming an autonomous
state in Union with Denmark in 1918). The next formal treaty, also
covering trade relations, was not concluded until 195 3. Following the
renewal of treaty relations in 195 3, the Soviet Union launched a veritable
diplomatic offensive to establish close ties with Iceland, based primarily
on trade. Author Vincent H. Malmstrom, who has followed the geo-
political development of the Nordic countries in the U.S.. and in Norway
since 1950, notes the coincidence of increased Soviet diplomatic activity
in Iceland and two other international factors: 1) the deterioration of
Icelandic -United Kingdom commercial relations over disputes regarding
Icelandic territorial fishing boundaries; and 2) the denunciation of U.S.
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military rights by Icelandic parliament and referendum. (See Table 7,
p. 114).
Norway
Norway has devoted seven percent of her treaties to agreements
with the USSR. It is significant that by far the largest number of these
agreements (over 50%) have been in the category of diplomatic and
administrative procedures. More specifically, the majority of these
treaties have concerned territorial rights at issue since the USSR-
Finland treaty ceding the Pechengo area of northern Finland to the
USSR. This is yet another irony of the far reaching effect Soviet
diplomacy with Finland was to have on the rest of Scandinavia. Cession
of the Pechengo (Petsamo) area by terms of the Russo-Finnish armistice,
19 September 1944 (confirmed by Russo-Finnish protocol of 26 October
1945 and ratified with the Russo-Finnish Peace Treaty of 10 February
1947) made Norway an abutting neighbor of the Soviet Union across a
210 mile border south of its North Cape. Norway was merely a spectator
to this border change but has attempted to accommodate its new neighbor
in a series of territorial negotiations (see Appendix B, Treaty Chronol-
ogy). Norway has also been indirectly juxtaposed to the Soviet Union
as a result of an international agreement, the Spitzbergen Treaty of
1920, concerning the administration and sovereignty of the Svalbard
20Vincent H. Malmstrom, Norden: Crossroads of Destiny and
Progress (New Jersey: Van Nostrand, 1965), pp. 109-110.
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Archipelago. By the terms of this Treaty, Norway was recognized as
having sovereign authority in the administration of that arctic domain,
with the reservations that 1) all signatories enjoy equal rights to mineral
21
resources; and 2) the islands remain demilitarized. The Soviet Union
was not one of the original 15 signatories, but subsequently acceded to
22
the Treaty on 7 May 1935. Disputes over the use and inhabitation of
the islands, particularly Spitzbergen, the largest of the group, have
flared between the Soviets and the Norwegians following the recent dis-
coveries of large oil reserves in addition to the substantial coal deposits
23
that are being mined by both countries.
Aside from territorial settlements, trade agreements comprise the
bulk of other treaty topics, one fourth of all Soviet-Norwegian treaties
up to 1970. (See Table 8, p. 115. )
Sweden
Sweden, the most economically developed of the five Scandinavian
countries, has maintained a proportionately lower level of diplomatic
relations with the Soviet Union than her flanking neighbors. A review
21
"Svalbard Archipelago Jurisdiction Issue" (U/FOUO) Monthly
Intelligence Digest, (Norfolk, Virginia: Naval Field Operations Office,
Fleet Intelligence Center), April 1975, p. 28.
22 Robert M. Slusser, et. al . , A Calendar of Soviet Treaties
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 100.
23Axel Somme, The Geography of Norden (Bergen, Norway:
J. W. Eides Boktrykkeri, A. S. , I960), p. 291.
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of Sweden's treaty profile reveals that her fairly even distribution of
treaties gives to the Soviet Union only a slightly smaller share than to
the United States, both having about four percent of Sweden's total..
However, almost 60 percent of Sweden's agreements with the Soviets
were concluded immediately following World War II and have tapered
off in frequency to an average of one treaty per five-year period since
I960. The bulk of these treaties (8 out of 18) have concerned economic
and trade relations. In keeping with her international policy of "non-
alignment in peace and neutrality in war, " Sweden has conspicuously
avoided bilateral covenants in her preference for multilateral accords
24
reached through the auspices of the United Nations. (See Table 9,
p. 116. )
Denmark
Unlike Sweden, Denmark's international relations are weighted
heavily in favor of the United States (nine percent of the treaties), while
the Soviet Union ranks number six, behind the United Kingdom, Sweden,
West Germany and Norway. Nevertheless, Denmark, although now allied
with NATO, has shown a history of neutralism that inclines toward accommoda.
tions of convenience. Vincent H. Malmstrom notes in his study Norden :
Crossroads of Democracy that by the late eighteenth century, Denmark's
Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Sweden and the United
Nations (New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1956), pp. 167-171.
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foreign policy was a realistic expression of her geopolitical position:
Friendly relations with Russia, the new mistress of the
Baltic, became the cornerstone of Danish policy, and to that
end Denmark enumerated a doctrine of armed neutrality for
her large merchant fleet. During the American Revolutionary
War, the Danes propounded several basic resolutions which
have since been incorporated into the body of international law --
namely, that the oceans were free to the trade of all nations,
that the flag covers the cargo, apart from contraband, between
belligerents, and that neutral ships cannot be denied access
to ports and harbors that are not effectively blockaded.
Perhaps the most threatening diplomatic encounters that the Danes
have had with the Soviets have been over the issue of Danish sovereignty
and military rights on the Island of Bornholm. While Denmark was
occupied by German forces during World War II, Soviet forces occupied
the Bornholm Island, the "Baltic cork, " prior to the liberation of
Denmark by Allied armies. They remained there even after peace had
been restored until an unpublished agreement was announced jointly by
the Danes and the Soviets on 20 March 1946, whereby the Soviet Union
removed forces from the Island after extracting Denmark's promise
not to permit non- Danish military on the Island. The later use of the
Island by Denmark for a radar site has caused repeated Soviet protests,
and has provided a pretext for escalated Warsaw Pact maneuvers in its
vicinity (official Soviets documented in January, 1953, December 1961,
26
and Fall 1975). The topics of Soviet-Danish treaties have been
2D Malmstrom, op. cit .
, pp. 40-41.
26
Nils Orvik, The Scandinavian Members of NATO, Adelphi
Paper No. 23, (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1965), p. 3.
See also, "NATO's Listening Post Behind the Iron Curtain, " Christian
Science Monitor , 26 May 1976, p. 20.
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evenly distributed over categories of trade/ economics, diplomatic pro-
cedure and social cooperation. Frequency of agreements has not varied
significantly since the conclusion of World War II, averaging four per
five-year period. (See Table 10, p. 117. )
It is noteworthy that an increasing responsibility for Soviet foreign
policy is being transferred to its socialist sister states in Eastern
Europe. Thomas W. Wolfe cites the Bucharest Conference as a turning
point in Soviet foreign policy toward West Europe which signaled a new
diplomatic offensive of the Brezhnev-Kosygin era which continues to the
present day.
With the promulgation of the Bucharest declaration in
mid-1966 [6 July 1966], the forging of a new Soviet European
policy line under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime was for all
practical purposes complete. In regard to Western Europe,
this policy seemed pointed primarily toward the familiar
aim of breaking up NATO and loosening Europe's links with
the United States, although a secondary element, reflected
in negotiations with the United States on a nuclear non-pro-
liferation treaty, also kept alive the notion of Soviet-American
collaboration on matters affecting Europe's future.
The recommendations of the Bucharest Declaration were as follows:
1. Cultivation of good-neighbor relations among European
countries and the development of closer economic, technical, and
cultural contacts.
2. Liquidation of military alliances in Europe, with the added
proviso that, if the West was not prepared for this step, the military
27
Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 312.
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organizations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact might be abolished, with
the alliances themselves tenuously remaining.
3. Commencement of incremental disarmament "toward a military
detente in Europe, " to include
a) dismantling of foreign bases,
b) withdrawal of all foreign troops within their national
frontiers,
c) phased reductions of the armed forces of the two German
states
,
d) creation of nuclear free zones,
e) and cessation of flights over European territory by nuclear-
armed foreign aircraft.
4. Preclusion of West German access to nuclear weapons "in any
form whatsoever. "
5. Recognition of the immutability of Europe's postwar boundaries
as the basis of a durable peace.
6. Acceptance of the reality of two German states incorporated
into a peace settlement.
7. Convening of "an all-European conference to discuss security
28
and promote European cooperation. "
The Bucharest Declaration outlined the idea of detente which has been
the hallmark of Soviet foreign policy ever since. Four of these objectives







the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which was
endorsed in Helsinki on 1 August 1975 by the High Representatives of
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic
of Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Rumania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom,
the United States of America and Yugoslavia. To give even further force
and scope to this document as an international covenant, the opening
and closing sessionsof the Conference were solemnly addressed by the
Secretary- General of the United Nations, into whose jurisdiction the
29
Act was ultimately consigned. CPSU General Secretary Leonid
^ Final Act, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
,
1 August 1975; text in World Marxist Review
,
No. 15 (15 August 1975),
p. 5. Section A of the Final Act, "Declaration on Principles Guiding
Relations Between Participating States, " consists of 10 articles within
which the commitment of the signatories to economic, technical and
cultural cooperation; the inviolability of Europe's existing boundaries
(status quo); and the postwar status of separate German states is
subsumed. Those articles are designated as follows: I. Sovereign
equality and respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty; II. Refraining
from the threat or use of force; III. Inviolability of frontiers; IV. Ter-
ritorial integrity of States; V. Peaceful settlement of disputes; VI. Non-
intervention in internal affairs; VIII. Respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience,
religion or belief; VIII. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples;
IX. Cooperation among States; X. Fulfillment in good faith of obliga-
tions under international law.
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I. Brezhnev, in his address to the Conference on the eve of its con-
clusion, presented his view of the Declaration:
The document that we are signing is a broad but clear-
cut platform to guide unilateral, bilateral and multilateral
actions of states in the years and, perhaps, the decades to
come. What has been achieved, however, is not the limit.
Today, is the maximum of the possible but tomorrow, it should
become a starting point for making further headway along the
lines mapped out by the Conference.
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe brought
the fruition of more than half of the declared policy objectives set out
by the Bucharest Conference nine years earlier. What is significant
about this accomplishment is that it represents the success of a new
Third Division in Soviet foreign relations. That is, the Bucharest
Conference mobilized the socialist states of Europe as an important
force in Soviet foreign policy. This is an unprecedented development
in Soviet foreign policy, and perhaps in international relations overall.
As the introduction to this paper notes, Soviet foreign policy has
always appeared to be a bifurcated one, deferring both to traditional
interests of the State and to the ideological interests of a Party which
regards the state as a passing institution. One could see in the Comin-
tern (1919-1943) and its successor the Cominform (1947-1956) a trans-
national vehicle of Soviet foreign policy. But the enlistment and
30 L. I. Brezhnev, "In the Name of Peace, Security and Coopera-
tion, " speech to Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
Helsinki; text in World Marxist Review, Ibid . , p. 75.
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direction by the Soviet Union of "sovereign" states to do its bidding,
as contrasted to the extra-legal direction of a "communist movement, "
31
is a novel development in international relations. The Bucharest
Declaration outlined the idea of detente which has been the hallmark
of Soviet foreign policy ever since.
It remains for the new diplomatic offensive of the Soviet Union on
Europe to secure the remaining three objectives (2, 3 and 4) of Bucharest,
and it is apparent that Soviet diplomacy is geared to that very purpose.
Consistent with the aims of Soviet sponsored programs to unite Europe
in order to decouple the Atlantic alliance, interaction between the
31
Following the reconstruction of the European state system by the
Congress of Vienna, nothing compares to the new diplomatic offensive
launched at Bucharest in July, 1966. Even the Machiavelliate maneuver-
ing of Bismark, the "honest broker of Europe, " is hardly comparable.
For a consideration of the difficulties posed to the U.S. in assembling
a diplomatic counter-force in the West, see Henry A. Kissinger, The
Troubled Partnership (New York: McGraw Hill, 1965). Certainly, the
world of Metternich has long since expired.
32
The specific objectives of the Soviet Peace Program -- primarily
to liquidate military alliances in Europe and to remove nuclear weapons
from Europe -- are reaffirmed in the " 'Report of the CPSU Central
Committee and the Party's Immediate Objectives in Home and Foreign
Policy. ' Delivered by General Secretary of the Central Committee,
Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, February 24, 1976, " at the 25th Congress of
the CPSU, New Times
,
No. 9 (February, 1976), pp. 29-64; in particular,
"Development of Relations with the Capitalist States, " Ibid. , pp. 34-38.
See also Speech by L. I. Brezhnev at the Conference of European Com-
munist and Workers' Parties on 30 June 1976 in Berlin, New Times ,
No. 28 (July, 1976), pp. 17-23; also, Conference resolution "For
Strengthening the Process of Detente by Taking Effective Measures





Communist states of East Europe and the NATO states of West Europe
has increased markedly. The increased diplomatic activity between
the Scandinavian states and the Communist states of Europe has been
especially pronounced. Of 25 states comprising the Western Europe
group, the five Scandinavian states have concluded 41 percent of the
treaties negotiated between Western European states and the Com-
33
munist States. Excluding Austria, the average number of treaties
concluded by a Scandinavian state with the Communist states is twice
that of any other West European state. Finland leads the states of West
Europe in diplomatic ties with the Communist group, committing 2 8
percent of all its treaties to the Communist group. Sweden follows
with 13%; Norway, Denmark and Iceland have each allotted 12% of
their treaty ties to the Communist states. Besides Finland, Sweden,
Norway and Denmark, only four other West European states are listed
among the top 30 treaty partners of Communist states. They are
Austria (15%), Italy (8%) and the United Kingdom (5%). By comparison,
West European states ranking among the top partners of the Soviet Union
33 Peter H. Rohn, Director of the Treaty Research Center at the
University of Washington, Spokane, has grouped the countries for treaty
analysis as follows: West Europe (25 states) -- Austria, Belgium,
Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany West, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trieste,
Turkey, Holy See. Communist (12 States) -- Albania, Bulgaria, China
People's Republic, Czechoslovakia, Germany East, Hungary, Korea
North, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, USSR, Vietnam. Treaty Profiles
(Santa Barbara, CA: Clio Press, 1976), p. 37.
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alone are Iceland (11%), Norway (7%), Sweden (4%), Austria (4%),
Denmark (4%), Italy (3%), France (2%) and the U.K. (2%). (See Table
11, p. H8.)
It thus appears that the Nordic states have been more affected by
the new diplomatic offensive from the East than have been their NATO
neighbors. It remains to be seen how successful the Soviet Union will
be in attaining its expressed objectives of the dissolution of military
alliances (NATO and the Warsaw Pact), the removal of nuclear weapons
and the progressive disarmament of Europe. But it should be noted
that the Nordic countries have gone farther toward these ends than any
other NATO members. Even though Denmark, Norway and Iceland
have subscribed to NATO membership, none of the Nordic countries
will permit either nuclear weapons or allied forces on their soil (with
the exception of Iceland, which lacks a military force of its own and
grants the U.S. limited force and base rights, but also bans nuclear
34
weapons). Moreover, many in high government circles have responded
enthusiastically to Soviet calls for increased regional integration. Nils
Orvik reported some recent developments toward this end in an article
for International Organization:
There already exists an organization for "Northern Cap
cooperation, " within the northernmost counties in Finland,
34Egil Ulstein, "Nordic Security, " Adelphi Paper , No. 81.
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), p. 9-
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Norway, and Sweden, which is working in close connection
with the Nordic Council. So far local issues have been
in the foreground but prominent national politicians have
been involved. The Norwegian ex-premier, Einas Gerhardsen,
is among those who have publicly raised the question of whether
the Soviet Union ought not to be formally included in the organi-
zational framework for Nordic cooperation in this area. 35
In evaluating the Soviet proposals for liquidation of NATO and
Warsaw Pact alliances, it should be pointed out that the Warsaw Pact
is reinforced by bilateral treaties between the Soviet Union and each
of the Warsaw Pact members, while NATO is an exclusively multi-
lateral alliance. Therefore, if both alliances were dissolved
tomorrow, a collection of bilateral mutual defense arrangements
would be retained by the Soviet Union, while the defensive arrange-
ment of the North Atlantic Alliance would evaporate. Similarly, if
nuclear weapons were banned in Europe, the Soviet Union's conventional
forces, even without East Bloc support, would outweigh the conventional
forces available in Western Europe. And given the Brezhnev Doctrine,
the maintenance of a formal military alliance in Eastern Europe is
37
superfluous anyway. In short, the diplomatic offensive mobilized
2 C
Nils Orvik, "Nordic Cooperation and High Politics, " International
Organization
,
Vol. 28, no. 1 (Winter, 1974), p. 87.
yL
Kulski, op. cit .
, p. 49.
37
"The Military Balance, 1976/77, " Air Force Magazine ,
December, 1976, pp. 98-105. See also, "NATO: Still Strong Enough
to Block a Blitz? ", Time, 13 December 1976, pp. 42-53; "In terms
of numbers, the alliance [NATO] today is outmanned, outgunned, out-
tanked and out-planed. ... its only substantial quantitative edge in
combat power in Europe is its 2-to-l superiority in tactical nuclear
weapons . " (p. 47).
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by the Soviet Union in the company of Europe's socialist states would
dissolve the existing alliances and therefore the confrontation between
East and West, but it would also make the Soviet Union an unchallenged
and dominant force on the Continent.
Treaty Patterns
The following tables show bilateral diplomatic relations of the
respective Scandinavian states with a) each other, b) selected
"Socialist" states and c) selected "Capitalist" states. The Soviet
Union is cited as the focal state of this paper; Poland, a Warsaw Pact
member, is cited because it is an important Baltic state, a likely
trade partner; the United States offers a Western reference for contrast
to the USSR; and the U.K., an Atlantic ally of the U.S. , is a valuable
referent against which diplomatic variations can be guaged, given its
long standing, equitable relations with most of the Scandinavian states.
Treaties between the Scandinavian states and each of the Germanies
are cited as a further indicator of East/ West bias.
The following data was extracted from Peter H. Rohn, ed. ,
World Treaty Index, (Santa Barbara, California: ABC Clio Press,
Inc.
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IV. TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE
SCANDINAVIAN STATES
Trade and diplomacy are the natural avenues of peaceful foreign
relations. For the Soviet Union, trade fulfills three functions: 1) aug-
mentation of the domestic economy, 2) expansion of political influence
abroad, and 3) access to foreign technology. General Secretary Brezhnev
acknowledged as much in the course of the most recent Congress of the
CPSU:
In foreign economic relations are intertwined politics and
economics, diplomacy and commerce, industrial production
and trade. Consequently, the approach to them and their
guidance must likewise be comprehensive, linking up the
efforts of all departments and our political and economic
interest. This is exactly how this important issue is regarded
by the Party's Central Committee.
Like the other countries, we strive to use the advantages
offered by foreign economic relations to muster additional
potentialities for the successful fulfillment of economic tasks
and saving time, for enhancing production efficiency and speed-
ing up scientific and technological progress.
We regard foreign economic relations as an effective means
helping to carry out political and economic tasks.
With respect to domestic benefits, Soviet economics clearly appreciate
the advantages of trade with the West:
L. I. Brezhnev, Central Committee Report to the 25th Congress of




The increase in trade with developed capitalist countries
has helped in the solution of a number of economic problems
which the Soviet Union has been facing in the postwar period.
One of these problems has been and remains the acceleration
of the Soviet economy's growth rate thanks to imports of
industrial and transportation equipment as well as of those raw
materials which are in short supply [in the USSR].
Leonard Shapiro assumes that trade has always been an integral part of
Soviet revolutionary strategy.
In essence this view is the logical implementation of
Lenin's policy of combining trade and correct diplomatic
relations on one hand with subversion and political war-
fare on the other.
To support this assumption, Shapiro cites a private memorandum at-
tributed to Lenin. "After emphasizing that the 'deaf-mute' capitalists
will only too readily believe Soviet assertions that their government
organs are quite independent of both party and Comintern, he [Lenin]
adds that the capitalists
will open their doors wide to us, and through these doors
will speedily enter the emissaries of the Comintern and
our party, investigation organs in the guide of diplomatic,
cultural and trade representatives .... They will open
up credits for us, which will serve us for the purpose of
supporting Communist parties in their countries. They
will supply us with the materials and technology which we
lack and will restore our military industry, which we need
for our future victorious attacks on our suppliers. "
P. N. Kumykin, ed. , 50 Let Sovetskoi Vneshnei Torgovli
, p. 215;
in W. W. Kulski, The Soviet Union in World Affairs (Syracuse, Syracuse
University Press, 1973), p. 60.
Leonard Shapiro, "Totalitarianism in Foreign Policy, " in The
Soviet Impact on World Politics , Kurt London, editor (New York:
Hawthorn Books, Inc.
, 1974), p. 8.
V. I. Lenin, part of a memorandum supposedly written to foreign
minister Chicherin and later discovered by portraitist Annenkov in 1924;
full text in Novy Zhurnal
,
no. 65 (New York, 1961), pp. 146-147; cited




As with diplomacy, so also trade is a peculiar adjunct
High on the list of advantages in the conduct of foreign
policy is government control over foreign trade and the
absence of private uncontrolled capitalist enterprise.
... [i] n conditions or private enterprise where the state
has no monopoly of foreign trade, it is difficult if not im-
possible for a government to restrict or direct the foreign
commercial dealings of the private enterprise so as to cor-
relate them with the government's political objectives.
There is, of course, no difficulty about such correlation
on the Soviet or Chinese side.
But there is no more Comintern or Cominform and the new Soviet
strategy in trade, like diplomacy, is traceable to the origins of detente.
The Central Committee Report to the 25th Congress of the CPSU, as in
the first item of the Bucharest Declaration and the ninth "basket" of the
Helsinki Declaration (CSCE), stressed the importance of trade to en-
hance the further integration of East and West Europe.
A substantial increase of foreign trade is planned for
the tenth five-year period.
. . . economic, scientific and technical links with the
capitalist states are consolidating and broadening the
material basis of the policy of peaceful coexistence.
Acting in the spirit of the Final Act of the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe the Council of
Mutual Economic Assistance has, on behalf of the govern-
ments of its member states, offered to establish official
5
....---
Shapiro, in London, op. cit. , p. 15
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relations with the European Economic Community. The
EEC Council of Ministers has been given the draft of an
Agreement on Principles of Relations envisaging the
creation of favourable conditions for equal cooperation
between the two organizations and between their member
states. We are prepared for such cooperation. 6
What is significant about Soviet trade relations in today's era of
"detente, " when Russian resources are increasingly in demand and
Soviet manufacturing is essentially self-sufficient, is the dependency it
can create on the part of its partners. Finland, again, is the best model.
The Soviet Union gained a strong economic foothold in Finland by its
Treaty of Peace with Finland in 1947. Under the reparation and indemnity
terms of that treaty, Finland was obliged to pay over an eight year period
compensating damages equal to $300,000,000 "in commodities (timber
products, paper, cellulose, sea going and river craft, sundry machinery
7
and other commodities). " Specifically, 60 percent of the reparations
were to be paid in the form of metallurgical items, the rest with the
principal exports of timber, pulp, etc. "Since Finland's metallurgical
industry was hardly sufficient to supply the domestic market an
L. I. Brezhnev, op. cit . CEMA member states are the USSR,
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and
Rumania. The EEC member states are Belgium, France, Germany,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Ireland,
and Denmark.
7
"Treaty of Peace with Finland, " quoted in Anatole G. Mazour,
Finland: Between East and West (New Jersey: Van Nostrand, 1956),




extraordinary rapid expansion of industry was called for. " What the
Soviet Union got was a captive industrial complex and a virtual monopoly
over exported resources. Since the Soviet Union set the specifications
for manufactured items to satisfy reparations, today she has guaranteed sup-
plies from Finland, long after the fulfillment of treaty reparations.
Under barter terms of trade today, Finland is dependent upon the Soviet
Union for 70 percent of its crude oil requirements. The cost of that crude
increased $160 million in the first eight months of 1973 to $500 million
for the same period in 1975, which is still under the price plus trans-
portation of crude from the Persian Gulf. Until Finland completes three
nuclear power plants projected for operation in 1980, she will remain
9
heavily dependent upon the USSR. As will be noted from the accompany-
ing tables, Finland's dependence upon imports from Communist coun-
tries doubled from 1973 to 1974, the preponderance of which imports were
from the USSR. This was the sharpest increase in trade with the USSR
and communist countries registered by any European state (East and
West). On the other hand, exports to the USSR and to CEMA increased
during the same year less than one percent. During a tumultous year of
inflation and unemployment, Finland managed in 1975 to almost double
gMazour, Ibid .
, p. 173.
9 CIA, "Finland's Oil Imports, " (Unclassified) Weekly Intelligence
Summary, 12 December 1975, p. 15.
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its exports to her trade partners in the USSR and CEMA over the pre-
vious year, while letting imports decline (see Table, "Finland's Trade
Partners"). Finland was the first state in Western Europe to join
CEMA in May, 1963. 10
The important lesson to be drawn from Finland's 1975 experience
is that she was buoyed by exports to the Communist countries while
most of her partners in the West were foundering in rough economic
seas -- rampant inflation and unemployment. This is the advantage
wielded by the USSR and the other Communist states over their capitalist
rivals. The state-run economic systems of the Communist countries
can expand or contract their trade at will, if only to the detriment of
their laboring population, to accommodate the foreign policy of their
governments. In this usage, trade becomes a political weapon. (See
Tables 23/24, pp. 141-142.)
The pattern of Iceland's trade relations with the USSR bears a close
resemblance to the Finnish pattern. Vincent Malmstrom observed this
development, which evolved from the deterioration of Icelandic relations
with Britain as a result of Iceland's extension of her territorial limit.
Such an open break between two NATO allies was much
too tempting a prospect to go unnoticed by Moscow. The
death of Stalin and Kruschev's call for 'peaceful coexistence'
heralded the beginnings of an all-out trade offensive in which
little Iceland promised to become one of the prime targets.
Peter H. Krosby, "Finland: The Politics of Economic Emergency,"
Current History
,
April 1976, p. 174.
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Although the Soviet Union conducted almost no trade with Iceland
in 1952, by 1955 it had become the leading buyer of Icelandic
exports and the second largest supplier of Icelandic imports. 11
The U. S. State Department, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, in its
annual report (no. 635, 1971-1975) on Trade of NATO Countries with
Communist Countries called attention to Iceland's increasing dependence
on Communist trade partners. As a percentage of total trade, Icelandic
trade with the Communist bloc represented 13. 5 percent of imports and
12. 5 percent of exports in 1975. Iceland's trade with the USSR alone in
1975 represented 10. 4 percent of all imports and 10. 5 percent of all
exports. During the 1975 recessionary fall-off of trade in the West,
the PRC and Czechoslovakia moved in to pick up a big share of Iceland's
exports of fish, feeding stuffs and clothes; thereby displacing Poland,
who has long been runner-up to the Soviet Union in westward trade among
the Communists. Iceland, like Finland, depends now almost exclusively
12
upon the Soviet Union for petroleum to meet its fuel/energy requirements.
Perhaps the most significant development in Icelandic trade is the steady
decline of its trade with the West, in inverse proportion to its growing
dependence on the Soviet market -- and to its growing alienation from
Vincent H. Malmstrom, Norden: Crossroads of Destiny and
Progress (New York: Van Nostrand, 1965), p. 109.
12Nordiska Radet, Nordisk Statistisk Arsbok (Stockholm: The
Nordic Council, 1970), p. 100.
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the UK and the EC fraternity. 13 (See Tables 18 and 19, p. 136. )
It remains to be seen whether Iceland's gravitation toward the Soviet
Union in trade relations will lead to Iceland's disengagement from NATO.14
Of the other Scandinavian states, highly industrialized Sweden main-
tains the most active trade with the Communist countries, who in 1974
provided 5. 7 percent of her imports and took in return 5. 6 percent of
Sweden's foreign sales. The Soviet Union contributed 44. 9% of those
imports in petroleum, ores and metals; in exchange for machinery,
transportation equipment and boats representing 20. 1 percent of Sweden's
1
5
business with the Communist bloc. Sweden's trade with the Communist
countries has been consistently with the USSR, Poland and East Germany,
increasing only gradually in imports from USSR and in exports to Poland.
(See Tables 25 and 26, pp. 144-146.)
Denmark, over the past five years has held its percentage of imports
from the East Bloc slightly above the European NATO average, while her
exports have held slightly below the European NATO average. The USSR
and Poland are her principal partners among the CEMA states, providing




, pp. 119-120; Trade with the EEC, 1959-1969.
14
Mr. Zubho, "At the Foot of a Volcano, " Izvestiya
,
5 September. 1974,
in 'Icelanders Reject Rightist Views on NATO, Favor Detente, " Foreign
Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Soviet Union, Vol. Ill (10 September
1974), p. E2.




transportation equipment and ships --as does Sweden. Norway, by-
contrast, over the last five years has steadily decreased its percentage
of imports from Communist states but expanded its percentage of exports
1 7
in that direction, ranging from foodstuffs to paper products. The
exports are distributed mainly among the PRC, USSR, Poland and East
Germany. In 1975, Norway conducted nearly twice as much trade with
the PRC as any other Nordic country, exports totaling 108 million.
(See Denmark Trade Tables 16 and 17, pp. 134-135 ; and Norway Trade
Tables 20 and 21, pp. 137-138 ).
The effectiveness of the Helsinki accord (CSCE, August 1975) in
merging the economic development of East and West Europe has not yet
been reflected in standard compilations of trade statistics. As of this
writing, the only clear-cut inroads to Scandinavian economic life blazed
by Soviet trade have been in Finland and Iceland. But these are striking
examples of the strategic potential of trade. In both cases the Soviet
18









Britain was a signatory to the 1947 Finnish peace treaty, but
acceded to Soviet power in the Baltic. In the case of Iceland, the British
after 1952 receded from former North Sea fishing grounds (and forfeited
naval maneuvering room) as Icelandic territorial limits were progressively





As Soviet technology gains, the USSR is showing an increasing interest
in the trade of more industrial states, as the overtures of CEMA to EEC
testify. Reflecting on the Finland -Iceland patter, future recessions in
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DENMARK'S IMPORTS FROM COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 1972-1975
(Millions of dollars c.i.f.)
VALUE PERCENT OF TOTAL LMPO
1972 1973 1974
RTS
Country of Origin 1972 1973 1974 1975 1975
Albania insig insig 0.1 0.1 insig insig insig insig
3ulgaria 3.3 5.2 6.5 6.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Czechoslovakia 25.1 35.8 38.8 40.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4
GDR 22.9 32.9 58.4 60.7 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.5
Hungary 12.8 23.6 25.0 26.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Poland 51.3 70.9 147.7 183.1 1.0 0.9 1.5 1.8
Romania 5.9 9.7 22.8 32.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3
USSR 37.1 93.6 125.3 170.3 0.7 1.2 1.3 1.7
PRC 11.2 20.3 29.6 21.6 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2
Other Asian
Communist Areas 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.1 insig insig insig insig
Cuba 0.4 0.6 0.2 10.0 insig insig insig 0.1
Total Communis
t
Countries listed 17C.1 292.7 454.8 551.1 3.4 3.8 4.6 5.3
Total imports from




DENMARK'S EXPORTS TO COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 1972-1975
(Millions of dollars f.o.b.)
VALUE PERCENT OF TOTAL EXPO
1972 1973 1974
RTS
Country of Destination 1972 1973 1974 1975 1975
Albania 0.1 0.4 0.9 0.7 insig insig insig insig
3ulgaria 2.9 3.3 8.8 11.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Czechoslovakia 17.1 21.6 26.7 30.1 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4
GDR 24.7 31.3 29.3 26.3 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3
Hungary 16.3 24.4 35.2 27.6 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.3
Poland 41.4 61.4 121.2 135.1 1.0 1.0 1.6 1.6
Romania 11.3 13.7 15.3 10.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1
USSR 26.3 37.8 42.7 64.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7
?RC 8.8 3.7 14.1 22.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3
Other Asian
Communist Areas 0.3 0.5 3.6 22.4* insig insig insig 0.3
Cuba 5.8 3.6 21.1 26.9 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3
Total Communist
Countries listed 155.5 202.7 318.9 378.0 3.6 3.3 4.1 4.3
Total Exports to
entire world: 4,330.1 6,118.9 7,719.3 8,709.6








ICELAND'S TRADE WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 1972-1975















































0.1 insig insig insig insig
4.1 1.3 0.9 1.0 0.5
0.9 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
0.2 0.1 0.1 insig insi2
4.6 2.9 1.3 2.7 0.9
0.1 insig insig insig insig
50.5 5.9 6.4 9.5 10.4
0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
10.6 9.0 13.5 12.5
Total imports from
entire world: >30.; 355.7 513.4 487.3
EXPORTS
Country of Destination
Albania . — _ . _ — _
Bulgaria insig insig 0.1 insig insig insig insig insig
Czechoslovakia 2.1 1.7 1.7 4.2 1.1 0.6 0.5 1.4
GDR 1.0 0.3 3.5 0.3 0.5 0.1 1.1 0.1
Hungary 0.5 0.8 0.4 insig 0.3 0.3 0.1 insig
Poland 4.3 10.6 11.6 3.9 2.3 3.7 3.5 1.3
Romania insig 0.1 0.1 0.2 insig insig insig 0.1
USSR 14.0 10.4 23.6 32.4 7.4 3.6 7.1 10.5
?RC 1.1 1.4 0.2 11.2 0.6 0.5 0.1 3.6
Other Asian
Communist Areas - - - - - - - -
Cuba - insig - - - insig - -
Total Communist
Countries listed 23.0 25.3 41.2 52.2 12.2 8.7 12.5 17.0
Total exports to




NORWAY'S IMPORTS FROM COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 1972-1975
(Millions of dollars c.i.f.)
VALUE PERCENT OF TOTAL IMPORTS
Country of Origin 1972 1973 1974 1975 1972 1973 1974 1975
Albania insig _ insig 0.3 insig _ insig insig
Bulgaria 3.5 1.3 2.3 2.6 0.1 insig insig insig
Czechoslovakia 15.5 24.6 32.2 37.7 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
GDR 26.9 31.1 38.7 32.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.3
Hungary 7.7 11.3 15.8 14.6 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Poland 51.1 62.3 52.4 69.5 1.2 1.0 0.6 0.7
Romania 2.0 2.0 15.3 6.2 insig insig 0.2 0.1
USSR 28.4 47.0 69.3 84.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.9
PRC 5.1 6.8 9.5 8.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Other Asian
Communist Areas 0.1 0.2 0.3 1.4* insig insig insig insig
Cuba 1.3 3.0 3.3 - insig msig insig -
Total Communist
Countries listed 141.6 189.6 239.1 257.6 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.7
Total imports from
entire world: 4,372.6 6,219.0 8,414.4 9,674.8











NORWAY'S EXPORTS TO COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 1972-1975
(Millions of dollars f.o.b.)
VALUE PERCENT OF TOTAL EXPO
1972 1973 1974
RTS
Country of Destination 1972 1973 1974 1975 1975
Albania _ insig _ insig _ insig _ insig
Bulgaria 9.8 3.6 5.2 4.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1
Czechoslovakia 9.6 15.7 17.7 23.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
GDR 17.9 29.3 59.4 48.0 0.5 0.6 0.9 0.7
Hungary 6.7 11.4 11.8 9.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
Poland 27.6 49.0 53.7 63.0 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.9
Romania 2.7 9.1 10.6 11.4 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2
USSR 19.5 22.0 40.0 96.2 0.6 0.5 0.6 1.3
PRC 25.6 24.1 67.9 108.0 0.8 0.5 1.1 1.5
Other Asian
Communist Areas - 0.5 insig 17.7* - insig insig 0.3
Cuba 0.4 1.4 3.1 9.7 insig insig insig 0.1
Total Communist
Countries listed 119.8 166.1 269.3 390.5 3.7 3.5 4.3 5.4
Total exports to
entire world: 3,281.2 4,679.9 6,274.5 7,195.7
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FINLAND'S IMPORTS FROM COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 1971-1974
(Millions of dollars c.i.f.)
VALUE PERCENT OF TOTAL IMPORTS
Country of Origin 1971 1972 1973 1974 1971 1972 1973 1974
Albania insig insig insig insig insig insig insig insig
Bulgaria 2.7 4.5 3.6 4.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Czechoslovakia 14.7 14.6 21.8 23.2 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3
CUR 18.0 19.2 22.9 41.1 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6
Hungary 9.6 12.0 19.7 25.9 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4
Poland 54.6 47.8 68.4 154.1 2.0 1.5 1.6 2.3
Romania 9.4 16.6 14.0 13.6 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.2
USSR 392.5 383.7 531.6 1,213.2 14.0 12.0 12.2 17.8
PRC 11.1 9.4 18.5 19.8 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3
Ocher Asian
Communis C Areas insig insig 0.5 3.4* insig insig insig insig
Cuba 0.2 3.7 5.0 40.2 insig 0.1 0.1 0.6
Tocal Communist
Countries listed 512.8 511.5 706.0 1,539.2 18.3 16.0 16.3 22.6
Total imports from
entire world: 2,796.2 3,198.4 4,341.1 6,807.0








FINLAND'S EXPORTS TO COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 1971-1974
(Millions of dollars f.o.b.)
VALUE PERCENT OF TOTAL EXPORTS
Country of Destination 1971 1972 1973 1974 1971 1972 1973 1974
Albania 0.1 insig insig insig insig insig insig insig
Bulgaria 2.9 3.3 5.9 7.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Czechoslovakia 15.8 14.2 14.6 24.0 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.4
GDR 15.5 16.8 24.1 28.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5
Hungary 8.8 9.1 12.4 25.1 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.5
Poland 22.5 28.0 30.6 47.6 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.9
Romania 9.7 13.4 7.2 3.9 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.1
USSR 254.1 364.0 452.2 767.1 10.8 12.4 11.8 13.9
PRC 12.0 17.0 10.6 21.1 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.4
Other Asian
Communist Areas 0.1 0.1 0.5 31.6* insig insig insig 0.6
Cuba 1.2 1.7 2.5 3.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Total Communist
Countries listed 342.7 467.6 560.6 960.1 14.5 15.9 14.6 17.4
Total exports to
entire world: 2 ,356.4 2,947.0 3,836.9 5,523.0









FINLAND'S TRADE WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 1972-1975
(Millions of dollars, imports c.i.f., exports f.o.b.)
IMPORTS
VALUE PERCENT OF TOTAL
Countrv of Oriain 1972 1973 1974 1975 1972 1973 1974 1975
Albania insig insig insig 0.1 insig insig insig insig
3ulgaria 4.5 3.6 4.7 6.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Czechoslovakia 14.6 21.3 23.2 31.1 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.4
GDR 19.2 22.9 41.1 56.4 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.7
Hungary 12.0 19.7 25.9 28.2 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4
Poland 47.8 68.4 154.1 167.9 1.5 1.6 2.3 2.2
Romania 16.6 14.0 13.6 11.0 0.5 0.3 0.2. 0.1
USSR 383.7 531.6 1.,213.2 1,269.7 12.0 12.2 17.8 16.7
PRC 9.4 18.5 19.8 23.5 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3
Other Asian
Communist Areas insig 0.5 3.4 0.5 insig insig insig insig
Cuba 3.7 5.0 40.2 39 .
2
0.1 0.1 0.6 0.5
Total Communist
Countries listed 511.5 706.0 1,539.2 1,634.0 16.0 16.3 22.6 21.5
Total imports from
entire world: 3,198.4 4,341.1 6,807.0 7,618.0
EXPORTS
Country of Destination
Albania insig insig insig insig insig insig insig insig
3ulgaria 3.3 5.9 7.3 6.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Czechoslovakia 14.2 14.6 23.3 30.2 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.6
GDR 16.8 24.1 28.4 43.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.8
Hungary 9.1 12.4 25.0 29.6 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5
Poland 28.0 30.6 47.3 70.2 1.0 0.8 0.9 1.3
Romania 13.4 7.2 3.8 3.4 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.1
USSR 364.0 452.2 761.5 1,133.6 12.4 11.8 13.9 20.6
PRC 17.0 10.6 20.9 15.4 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.3
Other Asian
Communist Areas 0.1 0.5 31.6 0.1 insig insig 0.6 insig
Cuba
list
1.7 2.5 3.6 9.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Total Commuj
Countries Listed 467.6 560.6 953.2 1,341.4 15.9 14.6 17.4 24.4
Total exports to




SWEDEN'S IMPORTS FROM COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 1971-1974
(Millions of dollars c.i.f.)
VALUE PERCENT OF TOTAL IMPORTS
Country of Origin 1971 1972 1973 1974 1971 1972 1973 1974
Albania 0.4 insig 0.3 1.3 insig insig insig insig
Bulgaria 2.8 3.7 4.9 7.1 insig insig insig insig
Czechoslovakia 30.5 34.1 47.5 60.9 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
GDR 47.2 48.1 75.1 113.0 0.7 0.6
11
0.7
Hungary 21.6 26.4 35.0 47.5 0.3 0.3 0.3
Poland 58.7 69.9 106.8 166.1 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0
Romania 12.8 17.3 31.0 43.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
USSR 163.1 159.4 207.8 402.7 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.5
PRC 17.2 20.9 28.4 39.5 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2
Other Asian
Communist Areas 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 insig insig insig insig
Cuba 8.7 12.1 10.9 15.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1
Total Communist
Countries listed 363.1 392.1 547.9 896.7 5.1 4.9 5.2 5.7
Total imports from




SWEDEN'S IMPORTS FROM COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 1972-1975
(Millions of dollars c.i.f.)
VALUE PERCENT OF TOTAL IMPORTS
Country of Origin 1972 1973 1974 1975 1972 1973 1974 1975
Albania insig 0.3 1.3 2.3 insig insig insig insig
Bulgaria 3.7 4.9 7.1 7.9 insig insig insig insig
Czechoslovakia 34.1 47.5 60.9 77.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
CTR 48.1 75.1 113.0 161.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.9
Hungary 26.4 35.0 47.5 54.8 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Poland 69.9 106.8 166.1 195.7 0.9 1.0 1.0' 1.1
Romania 17.3 31.0 43.2 66.0 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4
USSR 159.4 207.8 402.7 525.7 2.0 2.0 2.5 2.9
PRC 20.9 28.4 39.5 47.0 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3
Other Asian
Communist Areas 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.7 insig insig insig insig
Cuba 12.1 10.9 15.0 32.6 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2
Total Communist
Countries listed 392.1 547.9 896.7 1,171.7 4.9 5.2 5.7 6.5
Total imports from




SWEDEN'S EXPORTS TO COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 1971-1974
(Millions of dollars f.o.b.)
VALUE PERCENT OF TOTAL EXPORTS
Councrv of Origin 1971 1972 1973 1974 1971 1972 1973 1974
Albania 0.5 0.9 0.7 0.4 insig insig insig insig
Bulgaria 9.2 10.0 18.6 21.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1
Czechoslovakia 35.1 33.5 46.2 62.8 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4
GDR 69.6 61.6 90.2 114.3 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.7
Hungary 27.5 25.7 37.3 62.0 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4
Poland 59.9 87.1 175.0 296.1 0.8 1.0 1.4 1.9
Romania 22.0 27.7 38.2 52.6 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
USSR 88.0 84.5 115.4 180.2 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.1
PRC 30.3 42.1 50.2 60.2 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4
Other Asian
Communist Areas 1.1 0.8 8.0 21.8* insig insig 0.1 0.1
Cuba 12.3 8.6 12.6 24.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2
Total Communist
Countries listed 355.5 382.5 592.4 895.5 4.8 4.4 4.9 5.6
Total exports to
entire world: 7,439.8 8,654.2 12,114.1 15,909.6








SWEDEN'S EXPORTS TO COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 1972-1975
(Millions of dollars f.o.b.)
Destination
VALUE PERCENT OF TOTAL EXPORTS
Country of 1972 1973 1974 1975 1972 1973 1974 1975
Albania 0.9 0.7 0.4 1.2 insig insig insig insig
Bulgaria 10.0 18.6 21.1 37.7 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2
Czechoslovakia 33.5 46.2 62.8 74.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
am 61.6 90.2 114.3 154.2 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.9
Hungary 25.7 37.3 62.0 75.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4
Poland 87.1 175.0 296.1 411.2 1.0 1.4 1.9 2.4
Romania 27.7 38.2 52.6 50.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
USSR 84.5 115.4 180.2 293.5 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.7
PRC 42.1 50.2 60.2 41.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.2
Other Asian
Communist Areas 0.3 8.0 21.8 97.4* insig 0.1 0.1 0.6





382.5 592.4 895.5 1,280.9
8,654.2 12,114.1 15,909.6 17,406.6
4.4 4.9 5.6 7.4







V. MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS IN THE SCANDINAVIAN AREA
The proportion of defense literature addressed to Soviet strategy
on Europe's northern flank is miniscule and has originated primarily
from periodic staff reports of NATO's Northern Command. Current staff
studies (contrasted to the ceremonial "reports, " issued on anniversaries
and following changes of command) of the Soviet strategy, a sine qua non
of our own strategic planning have seldom been undertaken.
The purpose of this paper is to address Soviet strategy in the context
of known geographical constraints, political vulnerabilities and Soviet
force disposition.
A. The Strategic Geography of the Scandinavian States in the Defense of
the North Atlantic Community




C. The Manifest Soviet Strategy in Scandinavia
D. The Defense Posture of the Scandinavian States
1. Role in NATO
2. Force Disposition
E. The Challenge of Nordic Security
1. Short of War
2. In the Event of War
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This paper is not in defense of geographic determinism, such as
espoused by Sir Halford Mackinder at the turn of the century; 1 however,
there are geographical constraints which cannot be ignored in an appraisal
of military strategy.
In short, there is a geostrategic arena, deeply affected
by economic and technical factors, within which international
politics operates and which strongly conditions the range of
military and other instruments of foreign policy.
Scandinavia is such an arena. The distance from Copenhagen to Kirkenes
equals the distance from Copenhagen to Crimea; from Oslo to Vardo
equals Oslo to Rome. Ranging from the Icelandic archipelago to the
Finlandic Taiga, Scandinavia is the redoubt of northern Europe. Europe's
security is dependent upon this flank.
Its strategic value to Europe is amply attested to by history. In
1807, the British became apprehensive of the danger posed by Napoleon's
control of the Danish fleet and consequent domination of the North Sea
passage to England. The British, therefore, pre-emptively bombarded
Copenhagen and seized the Danish fleet. At that time, Norway was a
part of Denmark, as was Iceland. Sweden joined Russia in the coalition
H. J. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History, " Geographic
Journal
, XXIII (1904) 421-444; in Systematic Political Geography , 2nd
ed. , by Harm J. de Blij, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. , 1973),
pp. 271-286.
2






against Napoleon, while Finland was a duchy of Russia, taken from Sweden
by war in 1809. 3
When Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, on July 28, 1914,
Germany warned Denmark that any military preparations in Denmark
would be met by German reprisals. Denmark, Norway and Sweden
promptly responded with joint and separate declarations of neutrality.
In spite of these declarations, Germany insisted upon mining the Store
Baelt (Danish-Swedish straits), which Denmark acquiesced in doing
herself. Iceland acquired importance from the trans -Atlantic traffic
occasioned by American involvement in Europe. Finland pleaded futilely
for support from the West, turned in despair to Germany and was dis-
, 4
ciplined by Russia as the war ended.
Only one of the Nordic nations -- Sweden -- escaped the scourage of
World War II. Protesting their neutrality to no avail, Denmark and
Norway were forced to submit to the role Hitler assigned to them, while
Finland was yet again the victim of unprovoked Russian (now Soviet)
aggression. Iceland was taken into custody of Britain and then the U.S.
5
to serve Atlantic defense and supply functions.
3John H. Wuorinen, Scandinavia , (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 25-27; William L. Langer, An Encyclopedia of World
History
,
(Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co. , 1972), pp. 747-748.
4
Ibid .





In all of the great European wars Scandinavia has been indispensable (
o
to control of the Continent. Today, the contest for Europe has assumed
wider dimensions, becoming an East-West conflict that straddles
Scandinavia. The evolution of strategic bombers, land based inter-
continental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) and submarine launched ballistic
missiles (Sj§BM's), have created a triad of destruction balanced upon
a Scandinavian fulcrum. General Sir Walter Walker, former Commander
in Chief of Allied Forces Northern Europe remarked in 1970, "As I see
it, there is a growing awareness in Britain of the importance of a success-
6
ful defence of Denmark and Norway to the security of Britain herself. "
Rear Admiral Magne Braadland of the Norwegian Navy warned the same
year, "The threat to the U.S. is not coming from Viet Nam and not from
7
Central Europe either. It is sailing from- Murmansk. "
What are the peculiar features in this geostrategic setting? Denmark
is the cork in the Baltic bottle which contains an effervescent Soviet lake.
Norway is Europe's North Atlantic rampart, at the northeast end of which
is based the largest fleet in the Soviet navy, harbored in the ice-free
waters of Murmansk, abutting Norway's North Cape. Iceland is a North
6 General Sir Walter Walker, "The Challenge in the North, " NATO's
Fifteen Nations , April, 1971, p. 45.
7




Atlantic mooring and look-out post. Finland and Sweden are contiguous
buffers between East and West. Denmark, Norway and Iceland belong to
NATO. Finland and Sweden do not. Sweden subscribes to uncompromising
neutrality, while Finland defers to the USSR in security matters, though
technically non-allied under the terms of a 1948 Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation.
II. The Soviet Order of Battle
Until 1709, when the Swedes under Charles VII met defeat by the
Russians at the Battle of Poltava, Sweden had thwarted Russian ambitions
in the Baltic. Poltava marked the decline of Swedish power and the
awakening of Russian interest in Europe. Peter the Great promptly
established his window on the West by moving his court from Moscow to
St. Petersburg and set himself to the task of building a respectable navy.
But it was slow going for Peter against the weight of history. Russian
8
security had always depended primarily upon control of the heartland.
Prior to World War II, the Soviets owned only 60 miles of the Baltic
Sea coastline, in the vicinity of Leningrad (formerly Petrograd). With
the acquisition of territory from the Baltic States, Poland, and Finland
and with control over the present coastlines of East Germany and Poland,





defenses were to fail, the Soviet Baltic Fleet could break out and cut
NATO sea communications to Norway and the North Cape, freeing the
Northern Fleet and effectively collapsing the European north flank
9
defenses. Such is the value of the Baltic to the defense of Europe.
Whereas the Baltic Fleet poses an immediate challenge to the con-
trol of northern Europe, the Northern Fleet is today the strategic bul-
wark of the Soviet Union's challenge to the entire North Atlantic Com-
munity. Once the smallest of the four Soviet fleets (Northern, Baltic,
Black Sea and Far East), the Northern Fleet has become since World
War II the largest. The Norwegian Minister of Defense expressed the
alarm in November, 1970: "Adjacent to our border in the North there
has through the years been built up the world's mightiest complex of
bases. " In the Northern Fleet alone are over 30% of all Soviet surface
ships, nearly half of all submarines with 70% of the USSR's submarine
launched ballistic missile (SLBM) force -- the trump card of global
strategic superiority -- and the USSR's primary anti-submarine warfare
12
(ASW) and amphibious attack forces.
^Colonel Albert Leo Romaneski, U.S. Army, "Nordic Balance in
the 1970's, " U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings , August, 1973, p. 34.
10Egil Ulstein, Nordic Security , Adelphi Paper 81, (London:
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), p. 13.
Ibid .
12Major General J. L. Moulton, Royal Marines (Ret), "The Defense
of Northwest Europe and the North Sea, " U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings ,




The naval superiority of the Warsaw Pact countries in the Baltic
is about 4 or 5 to 1. A fair proportion of the Baltic Fleet is, however,
ocean-going and intended for operations farther afield. What is most
disconcerting to Europe is that the Baltic Fleet is much stronger than
NATO opposition warrants, even if the Swedish Navy were added. Should
the Soviet Command consider control of Danish territory desirable, it
has at its disposal Soviet, Polish and East German specialized units
particularly suited to assist regular military forces in such an operation.
In the Baltic areas there are one Soviet and one Polish marine division
especially trained for amphibious operations. The amphibious capacity
includes 80 Soviet, 24 Polish and 18 East German landing craft able to
land near one division, and to this should be added merchant ships for
follow-up operations. Both the Soviet Union and Poland have considerable
13
airborne forces in the area.
The International Institute for Strategic Studies cautions in its
1975 assessment of area forces:
It is not possible to make precise calculations as to Soviet
or Warsaw Pact formations that would be committed to the
Baltic area rather than towards the NATO Central European
Command, since in both land and air forces there is a con-
siderable degree of flexibility to do either. For the Warsaw
Pact this sector is a coherent front, though a number of Soviet




Peninsula, would undoubtedly be directed towards Norway.
(See Table One).
B. The North
Unlike the face-off in Central Europe over recent borders
drawn between East and "West, there is no legacy of territorial dispute
north of the Baltic States. Nevertheless, an unprovoked expansion of
military forces is underway. The Soviet forces permanently stationed
in the two Military Districts bordering the Nordic Area already have a
capability far in excess of what would be needed for defensive or offen-
sive purposes against their neighbors. And judging from the nature of
their equipment, they are not on station for the purpose of providing
purely local defense. About 20 divisions (including two airborne
divisions and three marine corps brigades) backed by a tactical air force
of some 500 aircraft would not be needed for this purpose. The highly
developed air defense system comprising all the known warning and
control installations situated along the Baltic and Arctic coasts (including
Moscow early warning systems) are clearly to shield an enlarged strategic
capability in that region.
The Soviet Naval Air Force operates continuously over the Barents
Sea, the Norwegian Sea and the North Atlantic. The Territorial, Tactical,
14The Military Balance, 1974-75, (London: International Institute
for Strategic Studies), p. 95.
1 5
Stefan Geisenheyner, "NATO's Northern Flank -- Vital, But
Increasingly Vulnerable, " Air Force Magazine , July, 1971, p. 58.
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Strategic and Transport Air Forces operate more sporadically, but also
regardless of weather and seasons, in the same area. The bases support-
ing these forces are located in Kola, from Murmansk to the Norwegian
border, and include a variety of hardened facilities. Air bases and other
air force facilities have a capacity much in excess of those needed for
the units permanently stationed in the area. A few of the 700 medium
range ballistic missiles (MRBM's) targeted on Western Europe are also
situated in Kola. It is estimated that the Soviet Arctic Fleet has con-
ventional submarines carrying 70 strategic missiles and nuclear -powered
submarines loaded with at least 215 SS-N-5 and SS-N-6 missiles (700
and 1,500 miles range respectively). "By 1974-75, it is thought that
the Soviet Navy will comprise 35-50 nuclear -powered submarines and
1 7
560 - 800 missiles. " It is now documented that the SS-N-8, with a
18
range of 4, 000 plus nautical miles, is in use in the SLBM force.
C. Force Development
The most profound operational change has been in the employ-
ment of the Soviet Naval Infantry. The Naval Infantry has not been of
any significance in previous wars and was reportedly disbanded at the
Ulstein, op. cit .
Ibid .
18





end of World War .II. A reappraisal of the force structure in the early
sixties resulted in their re -institution and they now number 18 - 20,000
strong. Grouped in brigades, they are attached to each of the four Soviet
fleets. The Baltic Sea Brigade can be expected to secure Baltic exits
through Denmark and the strategically placed island of Bornholm. In
this operation, they are likely to be assisted by Polish and East German
naval forces, both of whom have specialized in amphibious landings with
their own assault craft. To be sure, the Northern Fleet Brigade is
prepared to make assault landings along the northern coast of Norway
20
at the outset of any hostilities threatening Murmansk.
Concerning the present Soviet disposition of forces, Professor
John Erickson has written for the Royal United Services Institute that
the basic order of battle has not changed, but the capabilities have:
The basic framework has been retained (that is, there seems
to be no expansion of the nominal order of battle), but existing
forces are being 'filled out 1 with extra equipment and weapons,
as well as being supported by material stored close to the ? ,
frontier lines and available to reservists who can be flown in.
The recent Soviet build-up, particularly the qualitative advances,
expansion and diversification, has enhanced the prospect of pre-emption
19
E. P. Takle, "Soviet Naval Infantry, " Royal United Services
Institute Journal (RUSI), June, 1975, p. 29.
20Ibid.
21 John Erickson, "Soviet Military Capabilities in Europe, " RUSI ,
March, 1975, p. 67.
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while at the same time increasing options -- for military and political
leaders alike. The most likely rationale for this newly proportioned,
forward deployed armed force is to prevail in a situation where weapons
are not used, but where military force is deployed and displayed -- even
brandished -- as a means of directly influencing political behavior, not
least on the flanks of Europe.
While the concentration of Soviet striking power on the
central sector may bring misgivings, it may be that the
diversification of this capability -- with its multiple possi-
bilities of bringing pressure to bear in a number of areas --
could bring the most disquieting results.
III. Manifest Soviet Strategy
Former Soviet Defense Minister A. A. Grechko recognizes three
basic types of maneuver for achieving a military objective:
1) Encirclement and subsequent destruction of the
enemy by the delivery of two attacks in converging directions,
while at the same time shattering the enemy's defenses and
pushing one's own offensive deep into the enemy rear.
2) One or more frontal attacks against an enemy
defensive position, with the fragmentation of the enemy's
resistance and the subsequent development of one's own
offensive sideways in the flanks of the enemy's position
and deep into his rear.
3) A single attack delivered with the intention of pinning the
enemy up against an insurmountable natural barrier, such as an




P. H. Vigor and C. N. Donnelly, "The Soviet Threat to Europe, "




Given these fundamentals of offensive strategy, it is generally-
assumed that the major thrust of a Soviet attack in Europe would be
focused on West Germany, opposite the Warsaw Pact forces already
massed immediately to the East. This is the "set piece" with which
NATO must reckon. In this theater context, the vital flanks alluded to
in principle (2) above, would be the Mediterranean and Scandinavian
states.
To many observers, the Soviet naval threat takes the
form of a three -pronged naval pincers with the southern
arm through the Mediterranean, the northern arm curving
down into the Atlantic from Murmansk; and the central arm
emerging through the Baltic. Against the northern two arms
of this naval threat, the Baltic and the Scandinavian Peninsula
are of vital importance to the sea communications between
24
the United States and its North Atlantic Allies.
Despite increasing alarm over the growing Soviet naval presence
in the Mediterranean, the overwhelming preponderance of Soviet flanking
forces -- naval, air and amphibious -- are poised on the northern flank.
Since 1963, a pattern of Soviet naval maneuvers has been occurring
in the far north based upon two major exercises per year, one in the fall
and the other in the spring. The area of operations extends to all of the
Norwegian Sea and occasionally into the central portions of the Atlantic
as well. The exercises indicate that Soviet naval planners may look to
the Iceland-Faroes gap as their forward defense zone covering the access
24Romaneski, op. cit. , p. 34..
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routes to and from the Atlantic. The major tasks of the Soviet navy in
the Northeast Atlantic include the following:
-- to counter Polaris /Poseidon submarines
to neutralize U.S. strike carriers prior to aircraft launch
-- to ensure control of the fleet areas
-- to assure access for Soviet SSBN's to stations off the East Coast
of the United States
to intercept NATO lines of communication and supply-
to provide maritime fleet support for land operations in
contiguous coastal areas
to create and sustain impressions of Soviet power and reduce
2 5the perceived efficiency of American guarantees to Northern Europe.
At the North Cape, Norway shares more than 100 miles of frontier
with the Soviet Union. If the North Cape fell, the Soviet's most powerful
fleet would enjoy largely unhindered access to the Atlantic. The threat
to Great Britain is similar to and more intense than the threat posed by
German naval elements after the Nazi occupation of Norway in April of
1940. Professor Nils Orvik has drawn out the parallel between the
Nazi "neutralization" of Norway and the current Soviet exercises aldng
the same littoral. Known to NATO observers as exercises Sever and
Ckean, large Soviet naval forces with landing ships and naval infantry
sail through the Danish straits along the Norwegian coast all the way to
2 5
Richard B. Foster, et. al . , editors, Strategy for the West ,
(New York: Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., 1974), p. 165.
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the North, copying the German operation of 1940. While their exercise
originates from the Baltic, a complementary one forms in Kola, where
crack amphibious forces assault the local coast, implying tactics to be
26
applied from Kirkenes to Narvik.
Another axis of attack might be by land movement, supported by air,
through northern Finland and Sweden to Narvik. The object, again, would
be to make the North Cape defense line untenable to NATO. Wolf Holsti,
a Finnish military writer, envisions northern Norway as a huge aircraft
27
carrier to launch Soviet air and naval operations far out into the Atlantic.
Control of the Baltic also has high priority in both offensive and
28defensive strategies of the Soviets in Europe. Toward this end, Soviet
possession of southern Sweden, B^rnholm, and Denmark are of critical
importance. This operation, too, is being well rehearsed in flagrant
29
disregard of western protests. The point is, the Soviet capability and
intentions are manifest from both visible force levels and actual exercises.
Nils Orvik, "Scandinavian Security in Transition: The Two-
dimensional Threat, "ORBIS, Fall, 1972, p. 725.
2 7Ibid . See also FBIS, 11 February 1976, p. PI.
28
Vigor, op. cit. , p. 74.
29Berlingske Tidende , 10 February 1976, p. 1, FBIS, Western
Europe
,




The potential for the realization of Soviet strategic objectives has
been described by Dr. R. J. Vincent in an Adelphi Paper for the Inter-
national Institute of Strategic Studies as emanating from three "tactical
threats": opportunism, catalysis and spill-over and accretion
. In the
first, the Soviet Union might make a forward move in northern Norway,
where the Soviets have an enormous advantage in manpower and equip-
ment both at sea and on land. If the attack came as a surprise and since
the defense of Norway depends on allied reinforcement, the Soviet Union
might gamble on the West thinking the better of a major confrontation
and accepting the fact of Soviet expansion. In the second scenario,
the Soviet Union might intervene in a local uprising (catalyst) -- for
example in Spitzberg, jointly occupied with Norway in oil rich arctic
waters -- and the "spillover" of Soviet military influence would naturally
ensue. In the third situation, Norway might inevitably yield to the pre-
ponderance of Soviet military power in the Kola area, as well as to an
economic authority acquired from oil fields in territorial waters. The
accretion of naval influence alone could beget further concessions extend-
30
ing to a "natural defense line" in the Atlantic.
R. J. Vincent, Military Power and Political Influence: The
Soviet Union and Western Europe , Adelphi Paper 119, (London: The
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975), pp. 13-14.
See also Mark Goldsmith, "Norwegian-Soviet War of Wives on Spitsbergen, "
The Christian Science Monitor, 8 April, 1976, p. 9.
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In another Adelphi Paper, Mr. Egil Ulstein sees Soviet captivity
within the Baltic and the Barents Seas as grating to the self-respect of
a superpower with a super navy. For the Soviet Union, the logical
course would be to push on from the North Cape to secure access to the
Norwegian Sea between Iceland and Scotland, which could be done by the
gradual build-up of a formidable presence in the outer access area.
3
1
Analysts see this tendency as "already manifested in Soviet behavior. "
The major new elements in Soviet air and naval power are intensely
political, in that they could force the adversary to concede that armed
confrontation would automatically produce escalation to levels unaccept-
32
able in the circumstances, to other members of the alliance.
Premised upon the two verifiable facts of the increasing Soviet naval
build-up and the pattern of Soviet naval exercises over the last ten years,
the conclusion may be drawn that the Soviet Union has both the ambition
and the resources necessary to push its forward defense well out into
the Atlantic to the Iceland-Faroes line, thus acquiring a Mare Sovieticum .
A permanent Soviet naval presence in this realm does not seem impossible,
Recognizing the present need for land based air support to the Soviet navy,
forward bases loom as an enticing prospect. As no European navy can
any longer bring the Soviet Fleet to bay, the gauntlet has passed to
33
the United States.








IV. The Defense Posture of the Scandinavian States
A. Role in NATO
Dr. Johan J. Hoist, formerly of SHAPE and Director of Research
at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, and Norway's new
Minister of Defense has pointedly observed that despite their cultural
homogeneity and political interdependence, "Scandinavianism has, how-
ever, never constituted sufficient reason and foundation for the security
34
posture of the Scandinavian states. " While the spirit of Nordic coopera-
tion has exclusively enveloped many aspects of government and society
in Scandinavia, the individual states are on their own regarding matters
3 5
of defense. Following the bitter experience of World War II and alarmed
by the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, Sweden, Denmark and Norway
got together in the aftermath of the Czech Coup to discuss a Nordic
Alliance. Sweden stipulated absolute non-alignment with major powers
as a condition of their union. Norway, still persuaded of the importance
of British naval protection and desirous of more aid and arms assistance
than Sweden could afford, opted for NATO. Denmark had little choice
36




5Richard Petrow, The Bitter Years
,
(New York: William Morrow
Company, 1974).
36
Laszlo Hadik and Wolfgang Klaiber, Acceptability to European
Allies of Tactical Nuclear Defense Concepts
,
(Washington, D. C. :
International Research Group, Ltd., 1973), p. 18; Defense Documentation
Center, classification - Secret.
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evolved, wherein Iceland, Norway and Denmark belong to NATO while
Sweden and Finland provide a neutral buffer to the East. 37 Dr. Nils
Orvik made this assessment: "In terms of strategy and empirical data,
the theory of Nordic balance seems hardly tenable. As a political
3 8
concept, however, it may look different. "
As regards the roles of Finland and Sweden, the degree of neutrality
varies. Finland is bound by a 1948 semi-mutual assistance Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union. Under the terms of
this agreement, Finland is obligated to mutually .resist attacks upon the
Soviet Union "through Finland" but is committed only to "consult" with
the Soviet Union concerning threats to Soviet security not transgressing
Finnish territory. The treaty is an exception to the standard mutual
assistance treaties executed by Stalin with Russia's allies in Eastern
39
Europe. Sweden, by contrast, is a true neutral, beholden to no one.
Sweden's per capita outlay for defense is by far the highest in Europe,
40
behind only the United States and the Soviets among theater forces.
3
~For an excellent analysis of the "Nordic balance" see Colonel
Albert Leo Romaneski, "Nordic Balance in the 1970's, " U. S. Naval
Institute .
380rvik, The Scandinavian Members of NATO , op. cit . , p. 9.
3<
^Hadik, op. cit .
, p. 19.
40




Sweden is well armed. While remaining strictly neutral, she expressly
reserves the right to ally herself with other forces in the event her
neutrality is violated. Her motto is "non-alignment in peace in order
i. . 41
to maintain neutrality in war. "
Among the three NATO allies (Denmark, Norway and Iceland), their
loyalty is less than exemplary. In the midst of the present naval contest
for the North Atlantic, Iceland's government has taken in Communist
cabinet ministers and entertained public demands for the ouster of U.S.
forces. Withdrawal from NATO is repeatedly proposed in Parliament.
Denmark's Communist Party was elected to its Parliament in 1973 for
the first time in over 20 years and promptly increased its seats in 1975.
Norway, while not courting the communists in its government has been
increasingly at pains to improve detente with her Soviet neighbor in the
oil fields. Norway rejected membership in EEC by referendum in 1973,
42
while Denmark's referendum approved their membership. Iceland
makes no military contribution to NATO on its own, while Denmark and
Norway each contribute a respectable share of their GNP. The most
significant demonstration of commitment by their military, if not an
overwhelming part of their populace and Parliament, was the recent
purchase of the latest USAF fighter-interceptor, the F-16, by the
41 . ->->Vincent, op. cit .
, p. ZZ.
42Richard Staar, Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1976 ,
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press), pp. 123-175.
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consortium of Denmark, Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands. 43
Neither Denmark nor Norway allows the permanent basing of NATO
troops on their territory. They also exclude nuclear weapons.
In addition to the principal states of Denmark, Norway and Iceland,
other strategic territories also come within the domain of NATO --
Greenland, Jan Mayen and the Faroes, for example. Beyond the European
theater, these territories are perhaps the most crucial of all to the
strategic defense of the Atlantic Community. Captain Christer Fredholm
of the Royal Swedish Navy wrote for the U.S. Naval War College Review:
The strategic significance of Iceland today cannot be
overemphasized. The confined waters in the Greenland-
Iceland-Faroes-Scotland region might be likened to a lock,
and whoever holds the key controls the North Atlantic.
The key is Iceland. A change in the existing situation
would result in an entirely new politico -military picture
both in Europe and the north.
B. Force Disposition
NATO's position in the north is dependent upon two critical
anchors of NATO: the northward deployments of Allied Forces Northern
Europe (AFNORTH) and AFNORTH's southern subsidiary, the Baltic
Approaches Command (COMBALTAP). It should also be noted that in
a deterrent context, the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT),
including the U.S. Second Fleet, has more than salutary effect in dis-
couraging aggression against Northern NATO. AFNORTH has its
4 ~i
"The Military Balance, " Air Force Magazine , op. cit . , p. 58.
44
Fredholm, op. cit. , p. 61.
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headquarters at Kolsas, Norway and is responsible for the defense of
Norway, Denmark, Schle swig
-Hols te in and the Baltic Approaches. The
BALTAP sub-command has its headquarters at Karup, Denmark and
alternates commanders between Danish and German naval officers. 45
The defenses of the "northern anchor" are positioned against the
Tromso Line, which marks the southernmost contiguity of Finland and
Norway, north of Narvik. The NATO Air Defense Ground Environment
system (NADGE) extends from the North Cape of Norway to Southern
46
Europe and is the vital nerve of northern European defense. The
Tromso Line itself is basically indefensible. It can be assumed that in
case of war the Soviets would strike overland through northern Finland
and Sweden, thereby by-passing the Tromso defenses. NATO exercise
"Arctic Express" takes place biannually (as do the Soviet practice excur
sions into area waters) to rehearse the airlift that would be necessary
to halt a Soviet overland attack. The primary and continuing NATO
mission in the far north is air defense by the Norwegian Air Force.
The mission objectives are to defend Norwegian forward airfields,
reconnoiter Arctic/Barents Sea threats and to interdict the sea lanes
47
to Murmansk in the event of hostilities.
45
Romaneski, op. cit .
, p. 36.
46Moulton, op. cit .
, p. 91.
47
Geisenheyner, op. cit . , p. 59.
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The "southern anchor" is set at the western exit of the Baltic, or
the "Baltic approaches. " This defensive line, including the Danish
straits and proximate islands, comprises only five per cent of the Baltic's
total coastline. About 60 per cent is shared by Sweden and Finland while
the remainder belongs to the USSR and her socialist sister states. Al-
though NATO "controls" this strategic narrows, it has very little to
counter this threat and, what is more important, to present a credible
deterrent posture. As in the North Cape, the collective COMBALTAP
forces are outnumbered by about 10 to one. Denmark contributes four
infantry brigades with supporting armor and artillery, two frigates to
the North Sea and 16 motor torpedo boats (MTB's) to the Baltic. The
Danish Air Force has about 100 combat aircraft awaiting modern replace-
ment. West Germany offers a fleet of 40 MTB's in the Baltic, 150 fighter
and support aircraft and one armored division with supporting tactical
48
air force for shore defense. General Kurt Ramberg, Danish Chief of
Staff in 1971, gave a sober assessment of Denmark's blocking position:
Denmark would not be able to defend against even the
first wave of a conventional attack. Allied reinforcements,
therefore, would not have time to come to Denmark's aid
49before the country was overrun by the enemy.
48
Ibid





V. The Challenge to Nordic Security
A. Short of War
The expansion of Soviet control westward into Scandinavia by-
tactics short of war has been popularly described as "Finlandization. " 50
A couple of scenarios would best illustrate the concept.
1. Assuming a reduced American resolve following withdrawal
from Vietnam and the progress of detente in more conspicuous theaters,
the USSR might assert its right to "unharrassed" movement of its naval
forces in and out of its largest ports. Accordingly, the USSR demands
that Norway cease its surveillance activities in the North Cape, as the
U. S. insisted of Cuba. The Norwegians reject the demand, the Soviets
issue an ultimatum and seize the Varanger Peninsula of the North Cape.
Predictably, the Soviet attack meets little resistance and the Kremlin
declares to the world that its "intervention" is only consistent with its
security interests in Kola and that no further advances are intended.
The U.S., eager to display its "commitment to Europe, "
mobilizes NATO forces on the Central Front and reserves in the U.S.
and dispatches the Second Fleet to the North Cape. The U.N. Security
Council meets and typically establishes a neutral zone to "separate the
belligerents." in the Finnmark area. The USSR complies with a resolution
50 Vincent, op. cit. , p. 18. The Vincent article is an acknowledged
riposte to debunking of Finlandization by George Kennan in "Europe's
Problem's, Europe's Choices, " Foreign Policy , Spring, 1974.
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of the Security Council to withdraw its military but also persuades the
U.N. to keep the area "neutral of both forces* 1 (Soviet and NATO), there-
by graciously restoring peace and securing its immediate objective --
the elimination of NATO forces and surveillance in that vicinity.
2. More practicable, if at some future time the nuclear deter-
rent situation seemed to justify the risk, would be an operation designed
to gain control of the Baltic Straits, or even a politico-military showdown
over control of the strategically placed island of B^rnholm -- previously
under Soviet control, at the close of World War II. The main attack
would come from the Baltic, while ancillary action would be mounted in
the North Sea, on the western side of the Straits. Raids to disable the
NADGE system, seize the peninsular air fields and establish missile-
firing patrol boats in Norwegian fiords might ensue to isolate the area
from NATO reinforcements. Prevented from reacting quickly and
effectively, NATO might be presented with a fait accompli in preference
to either nuclear escalation or the mounting of a prolonged conventional
attack throughout the area. Indeed, judging from the Danish and
Norwegian responses in two previous wars, they would more likely
52
prefer peace and neutrality to a homeland war in defense of NATO.
The increasing inclination of Denmark, Norway and Iceland
to ''reassure" an anxious Soviet Union navy that Scandinavia harbors no
51
]
'Moulton, op. cit .
, p. 91.





ill intent by eliminating "sources of provocation" could wed the Soviet




B. In the Event of War
If, despite the declared policies of both sides, conventional
war were to erupt in Europe, it would likely take place in two main
theaters: a land/air war in Germany and a sea/air war in the Atlantic.
Unless these were ruled out by some sort of tacit truce as has some-
times occurred in wars outside Europe, operations in the North Sea,
though not in the far north, would be supportive to the main effort.
In a war of this sort, Russian control of the Baltic
exists, achieved perhaps by a surprise attack at the out-
break, besides allowing submarines, if not surface ships
to exchange between the Northern and Baltic Fleets, would
make possible the attack on NATO military and commercial
traffic in the North Sea by missile firing patrol boats and by
older and smaller submarines not required in the Atlantic.
If, however, the Pact had achieved effective air superiority,
air attack on shipping, docks and communications and air
mining of sea approaches would be likely to achieve the same
results more quickly, probably closing the North Sea ports
and stopping supplies to the forces of AFCENT.
In their assessment of the Soviet threat to Europe in 1974, Messrs.
Vigor and Donnelly visualize an advance across the North German Plain
to Schleswig-Holstein. From there, Soviet operations would have the
additional support of a seaborne landing to meet the advancing armor.
5 Vincent, op. cit .
, p. 20.
54Moulton, op. cit. , p. 92.
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"The Russians, of course, have paid considerable attention to the training
of their seaborne infantry, and as Poland and East Germany have been
developing forces of this nature, a fairly big seaborne landing by the
Warsaw Pact forces can be expected .... "^
Today's military environment is a strange one. Wars can be won
and lost without an actual engagement. Such is the case in Europe.
British Prime Minister Edward Heath explained Scandinavia's situation
in the House of Commons in 1971:
The Soviets may calculate that eventually the sheer
disparity of military strength would leave Western Europe
with no convincing strategy. Political pressure, shrewdly
applied and backed by threat of greatly superior military
force, could compel one of the more exposed members of
the alliance to lapse into neutrality. Then a process of
disintegration could begin which would lead to the ultimate
price, an extension of the Soviet sphere of influence grad-
ually into countries at present members of NATO, and if
possible, to the Atlantic.
Preoccupation with Central Europe and neglect of NATO's flanks
can be disastrous to all of Europe. The Baltic has already been aban-
doned to the Soviet realm while adjacent North Sea ports remain the
economic lifeline of Europe. Beyond the Continent proper, the Scandinavian
Peninsula alone insulates the North Atlantic Community from the strate-
gic bulwark of the Soviet Union. And the Scandinavian Peninsula is




"The Soviet Threat to NATO's Northern Flank, " op. cit .
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former commander, "Nowhere is the imbalance of standing forces
between the Warsaw Pact and NATO greater than it is in Northern
57
Europe. " When the move on the north is made, resistance is im-
probable and the Atlantic will devolve to the USSR.
57




Returning to the Grosser analysis of Soviet foreign policy set out
in the Introduction to this paper, one can visualize the design of Soviet
foreign policy in Scandinavia manifested by Soviet activity in that realm.
Concerning the first aspect of Soviet foreign policy defined by Grosser,
that policy which is "deliberately pursued by those in power in accord-
ance with the objectives they have set, " it is manifest that Marxist-
Leninist goals still prevail, even though Marxist -Leninist means are
being clouded by the developments of Eurocommunism. Evidence of
this ideological state of affairs is seen in the deliberate and consistent
policy statements of General Secretary Brezhnev, as chief spokesman
for the Central Committee and its Politburo of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union. While Brezhnev has consistently reaffirmed the foreign
policy goal of Marxist-Leninist communism in the spirit of proletarian
internationalism, the revolutionary methods to be employed internation-
ally in pursuit of supranational communism vary considerably from
place to place and from time to time.
Brezhnev addressing the 2 5th CPSU: "We Soviet Communists con-
sider defense of proletarian internationalism the sacred duty of every
Marxist-Leninist .... Communists of different countries follow each
others' work with interest and understandable attention. Differences of
opinion and approach to some question may arise among them from time
to time. "
Immediately following the above quote, New Times (A Soviet Weekly
of World Affairs) turns to an interview published in II Messeggero ) with
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Chapter Two of this paper applied the theoretical premises of
communism -- as set out by Marx, Engels and Lenin -- to the social
and political history of Scandinavia to illustrate the incongruity between
Marxist theory and the form of non-Marxist socialism which has actually
evolved in most of Scandinavia. Despite the historical dissimilarity of
socialist revolution in Russia and socialist evolution in Scandinavia, the
conclusion of Chapter Two leaves open the possibility of an eventual
coincidence of Soviet and Scandinavian socialism. The latter develop-
ment would represent a coincidence of socialist ends, irrespective of
(revolutionary or evolutionary) means, and might be a logical extra-
polation of the Soviet foreign policies respecting Finlandization and
Eurocommunism.
Ideology aside, it is a fact of life in the international system that the
Soviet Union must reckon with the institutions of international relations
that prevail in today's world. That world is essentially a system of
sovereign states that is becoming increasingly integrated into regional,
Italian Communist Party General Secretary Enrico Berlinguer to support
the new Moscow foreign policy line of unity in diversity among fellow
communists: "The Italian Communist Party is absolutely independent
of the Soviet Union. There can be no question of any dependence or of
directives of any kind. The Soviet Union has never made the slightest
attempt to tell us what we should and should not do, not only as regards
Italy, but also as regards our activity and participation in the inter-
national working-class movement. "
Boris Vesin, "Proletarian Internationalism and Its Bourgeois
Enemies, " New Times, No. 24, (June, 1976), p. 5.
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supranational and transnational entities that group affairs of state under
ever widening umbrella organizations. In Europe today vestiges of the
Metternich system remain within the embryo of a European Community,
and the Soviet Union -- its own concept of a world community notwith-
standing --is constrained to cope with the existing "norms" of diplomacy
to insure its own survival. In light of these circumstances, Grosser's
second aspect of Soviet foreign policy is discernible, "policy that is in
fact pursued, though not necessarily deliberately "
Chapters Three, Four and Five focused on the familiar instruments of
foreign policy, which, apart from ideological declarations, express
Soviet foreign policy in fact: international diplomacy, trade and armed
force. These instruments are the currency of international relations
in today's state-system and are essential to the survival of the Soviet
Union within that system. The Soviets have capitalized on the use of
each of these instruments to extend their influence in Scandinavia. In
the case of diplomacy, the Soviet Union has steadily strengthened its
treaty links between East and West from its post World War II rapproche-
ment with Finland to its 1975 multinational accord concluding the Con-
ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. In the realm of trade,
the Soviet Union has become the dominant suppliers of vital fuel-energy
requirements to Finland and Iceland and has, with her COMECON partners
steadily increased its share of the Nordic countries' world trade.
The most visible and the most ominous activity of the Soviets in
Scandinavia is that of their military forces, which are far out of proportion
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to any opposing forces and are still growing. This clarion manifestation
of policy in fact should come as no surprise to the student of Soviet
foreign relations:
This intimate link between the armed forces and foreign
policy was characteristic of Lenin's outlook from the start,
since Lenin, who greatly admired Clausewitz, drew no firm
distinction between war and politics, and whose specific con-
tribution to twentieth century foreign policy was its militarization.
The third and final aspect of Soviet foreign policy delineated by Alfred
3Grosser concerns "the image of this policy to outside interlocutors. "
How the Scandinavian states and their allies respond to the increasing
Soviet presence in that region depends directly upon the former's per-
ception of Soviet foreign policy goals in that region. If Soviet intentions
are perceived to be innocuous or benign, Soviet activity will doubtlessly
be tolerated. It is obvious from the deliberate tone of Soviet foreign
policy pronouncements -- the proposed abolition of alliances at Bucharest
in 1966; the Peace Program of the 24th CPSU; the Declaration on Security
and Cooperation in Europe, in 1975 -- that the methods of diplomacy,
peace and cooperation are being assiduously cultivated. But it is equally
obvious from the growing strength of Soviet armed forces in the waters
and on the borders of Scandinavia pose an overwhelming threat to
Leonard Shapiro, "Totalitarianism in Foreign Policy, " in The Soviet
Impact on World Politics , edited by Kurt L. London, (Hawthorn Books,
Inc., New York, 1974), p. 9.
3
See Alfred Grosser, Chapter One, p.
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Scandinavian security. The purposes of such forces might still be
explained by the classic post World War n assessment of Mr. X. in
"Sources of Soviet Conduct":
The main thing is that there should always be pressure,
increasing, constant pressure toward the desired goal.
There is no trace of any feeling in Soviet psychology that
that goal must be reached at any given time.
The "pressure" that is being applied by the Soviets on Scandinavia
today is verbal diplomatic appeals for the renunciation of military
alliances, while the Soviet Union remains the dominant military force
on the continent, if not the world.
Mr. X (George F. Kennan), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct,
"
Foreign Affairs , Vol. 25, no. 4 (July, 1947), p. 575.
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APPENDIX A: Treaty Chronology
(Soviet Union and the Scandinavian States
From 1917 to 1970)
DENMARK
Sept. 21, 1918. Trade and credit agreement
Dec. 18, 1919. Agreement concerning repatriation. 8
Apr. 23, 1923. Preliminary agreement concerning political and
economic relations, with protocol and declaration
concerning claims. 38
June 18, 1924. Note extending recognition de jure to the USSR. 43
June 18, 1924. Exchange of notes constituting an agreement on
commerce and navigation with declaration
concerning claims. 4
Dec. 13, 1924 and June 23 and 29, 1925. Exchange of notes constituting
an agreement concerning reciprocal recognition of
tonnage measurement certificates. 51
Dec. 23, 1927 Exchange of notes concerning reciprocal registration
of trade-marks. 64.
Jan. 24, 1929. Exchange of notes, extending the agreement of
June 29, 1925, concerning reciprocal recognition
of tonnage measurement certificates. 68
June 11, 1934. Trade agreement. 95
June 17, 1935. Trade agreement for 1935. 103
June 29, 1936. Parcel post agreement. 112
July 7, 1936. Trade agreement. 112
*Data compiled from Robert M. Slusser, Jan F. Triska, et al. , A
Calendar of Soviet Treaties, 1917-1957 (Stanford University Press, 1959);
and Peter H. Rohn, ed. , World Treaty Index, Vol. IV, op. cit.
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July 22, 1936. Agreement modifying the trade agreement of
July 7, 1936.
Nov. 30, 1938. Exchange of notes concerning payment for goods
supplied to the USSR during 1937.
Sept. 18, 1940. Trade and payments agreement.
May 21, 1941. Trade protocol.
Apr, 18 and 2 3, 1944. Exchange of notes concerning establishment
of diplomatic relations.
May 10 and 16, 1945. Exchange of notes concerning re-establishment
of diplomatic relations.
Mar. 3, 1946. Announcement of beginning of evacuation of Soviet
military units from the Island of Bornholm.
July 8, 1946. Commercial agreement.
July 8, 1946. Trade protocol
Aug. 8, 1946 Agreement concerning establishment of telegraph
communications with annex.
Aug. 17, 1946. Treaty of commerce and navigation, with annex
concerning the Soviet Trade Mission in Denmark.
Aug. 17, 1946. Protocol concerning temporary principles of
arbitration.
July 8, 1948. Protocol modifying and extending the commercial
agreement of July 8, 1946, and extending the
arbitration protocol of August 17, 1946.
July 8, 1948. Trade protocol.
July 17, 1953. Trade protocol, with two annexes
Sept. 7, 1955. Agreement concerning transformationof diplomatic
missions into embassies.




Mar. 6, 1956. Agreement concerning saving human lives in the
Baltic Sea.
Mar. 31, 1956. Agreement concerning air communications between
Moscow and Copenhagen, with two annexes and an
exchange of notes.
May 14, 1956. Trade protocol for the period 1956-1958.
June 14, 1956. Agreement concerning communications between the
rescue services of the USSR and Denmark for col-
laboration in saving human lives in the Baltic Sea.
DENMARK, four-way
Aur. 9, 1918. Agreement concerning exchange of civilian and
military personnel (RSFSR, Denmark, Sweden,
Switzerland).
May 30, 1959. Treaty concerning finances and payments.
May 10, I960. Treaty concerning taxation.
July 20, I960. Treaty concerning consular agreement and
citizenship.
Sept. 11, 1962. Treaty concerning culture.
Feb. 27, 1964. Treaty concerning specific claims or waivers.
July 17, 1970. Treaty concerning research and scientific projects.
FINLAND, bilateral
July 29, 1918. Agreement concerning liberation and exchange of
citizens arrested for political reasons.
Jan. 15, 1919. Agreement concerning conditions of trade.
Aug. 13, 1920. Armistice agreement.
Oct. 14, 1920. Peace treaty, with note, five declarations, and
an annex (Treaty of Dorpat).


















Temporary agreement concerning transfer of
railroad rolling stock.
Temporary agreement concerning rafting timber
in the Minalanioki and Tulemanioki Rivers.
Agreement concerning rafting timber in the Repola
and Porosozero volosts.
Act regulating the functions of the Central Russian-
Finnish Mixed Commission, established under Art.
37 of the peace treaty of October 14, 1920.
Temporary agreement concerning rail transporta-
tion of passengers, baggage and freight from Finland
to Russia and vice versa, via the frontier stations
of Rajajoki and Valeasaari (Beloostrov).
Agreement transferring the solution of border
incidents to the Central Mixed Rus so- Finnish
Commission.
Agreement concerning measures for ensuring
security of the border, with protocol.
Temporary agreement concerning establishment of
telegraph communications.
Temporary agreement concerning establishment
of postal communications.
Agreement concerning former government property.
Agreement concerning repatriation, with three
declarations.
Agreement concerning the return of ships.
Agreement concerning fishing regulations in the
Gulf of Finland.
Convention concerning fishing and seal hunting in
territorial waters of the Arctic Ocean.
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Oct. 28, 1922. Agreement concerning maintenance of the main
channel and fishing in the border water systems.
Oct. 2 8, 1922. Convention concerning floating of timber in water
courses running from the territory of Russia into
the territory of Finland and vice versa.
Oct. 2 8, 1922. Agreement concerning the conditions under which
the RSFSR and its citizens shall be entitled to free
transit through the district of Petsamo (Pechenga).
Oct. 28, 1922. Convention concerning fishing and seal hunting on
Lake Ladoga.
Jan. 2 and 4, 1923. Exchange of notes concerning consular matters.
Feb. 12, 14, and 21, 1923. Exchange of notes concerning exemption of
certain urban property from stamp duty and all other
charges on the occasion of its homologation or
registration.
June 5, 192 3. Agreement concerning navigation by Finnish mer-
chant and cargo vessels of the Neva between Lake
Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland, with protocol.
July 28, 1923. Agreement concerning maintenance of order in the
parts of the Gulf of Finland situated outside terri-
torial waters, the upkeep of maritime installations,
and pilotage service in the Gulf.
July 31, 1923. Protocol modifying the convention of October 21, 1922,
concerning fishing and seal hunting.
June 18, 1924. Convention concerning telephone communications,
with final protocol.
June 18, 1924. Convention concerning postal communications,
with supplementary protocol.
June 18, 1924. Convention concerning telegraph communications,
with supplementary protocol and annex.
June 18, 1924. Convention concerning direct transportation of
passengers and freight by rail.
June 18, 1924. Regulations concerning direct transportation of
passengers and freight by rail.
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June 18, 1924. Agreement concerning reciprocal return of archives
and documents of public institutions, with protocol
and annex.
July 12, 1924. Protocol concerning identification papers of citizens
engaged in fishing and seal hunting on Lake Ladoga,
with annex.
Feb. 20, 1925. Agreement concerning change of postal money orders.
Mar. 29, 1927. Agreement modifying Regulations of June 18, 1924,
concerning direct transportation of passengers and
freight by rail.
i
Sept. 2, 1927. Exchange of notes concerning regulation for Finnish
merchant and cargo vessels navigating the Neva.
Mar. 17, 1928. Agreement concerning regulations for Finnish mer-
chang and cargo vessels navigating the Neva.
Sept. 24, 1928. Exchange of notes constituting an agreement con-
cerning appointment of border commissioners on
the Karelian Isthmus.
Nov. 17, 1928. Exchange of notes modifying the Regulations of
June 18, 1924, concerning direct transportation of
passengers and freight.
Apr. 13, 1929. Convention concerning customs supervision in the
Gulf of Finland, with final protocol.
Apr. 13, 1929. Protocol amending the agreement of July 28, 1923,
concerning maintenance of order in the Gulf of Finland,
in accordance with the convention of April 13, 1929,
concerning customs supervision in the Gulf of Finland.
Oct. 7, 192 9. Protocol modifying the postal convention of June
18, 1924, with supplementary protocol.
Jan. 21, 1932. Treaty concerning nonaggression and the peaceful
settlement of disputes, with protocol of signature.
Apr. 22, 1932. Convention concerning conciliation procedure.




Nov. 30, 1932. Exchange of notes concerning reciprocal recognition
of trade-marks.
Jan. 5, 1933. Convention revising the convention of June 18, 1924,
concerning direct transportation of passengers and
freight by rail.
July 4, 1933. Convention concerning reindeer, with final protocol.
Oct. 15, 1933. Convention modifying the convention of October 28,
1922, concerning floating of timber in border water
courses, with final protocol.
Apr. 7, 1934. Protocol extending the treaty of January 21, 1932,
concerning nonaggression and the peaceful settlement
of disputes.
Feb. 11, 1936. Protocol modifying the convention of June 18, 1924,
concerning direct transportation of passengers and
freight by rail.
Feb. 11, 1937. Communique concerning negotiations.
Apr. 11, 1938. Parcel post agreement.
Apr. 28, 1938. Protocol concerning demarcation of the border, with
maps and protocol of border marks.
Dec. 23, 1938. Exchange of notes confirming documents and maps
defining the state border.
Mar. 12, 1940. Peace treaty, with map and protocol concerning an
armistice.
Apr. 8, 1940. Exchange of notes concerning procedure for exchange
of prisoners of war.
Apr. 9, 1940. Act of transfer of Petsamo to Finland.
Apr. 19, 1940. Exchange of notes concerning establishment of
temporary direct telephone and telegraph communica-
tions between Moscow and Helsinki.
Apr. 29, 1940. Protocol concerning demarcation of the border.
June 2 8, 1940. Commercial treaty, with annex concerning the
Soviet Trade Mission in Finland.
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June 28, 1940. Agreement concerning payments.
Sept. 6, 1940. Agreement concerning direct railroad freight traffic.
Oct. 11, 1940. Agreement concerning demilitarization of the
Aaland Islands.
Nov. 18, 1940. Protocol concerning demarcation of the border,
with maps and protocols of border marks.
May 10, 1941. Exchange of notes validating the protocol of
November 18, 1940, concerning demarcation of the
border.
Aug. 25-Sept. 3, 1944. Cease-fire agreement.
Sept. 19, 1944. Armistice agreement, with annex and two maps.
Dec. 16, 1944. Protocol concerning demarcation of the border in
the Porkkala-Udd region, with annex, maps, and
protocol of border marks.
Dec. 17, 1944. Agreement concerning reparations deliveries by
Finland.
Jan. 31, 1945. Trade agreement.
Mar. 14, 1945. Exchange of notes concerning entry into force of the
border protocol of Dec. 16, 1944, describing the
border in the region of Porkkala-Udd, with annexes.
May 8, 1945. Trade agreement for 1945.
Aug. 5, 1945. Communique by the Allied Control Commission for
Finland concerning modification of the conditions
of the armistice.
Aug. 6, 1945. Exchange of declarations concerning re-establishment
of diplomatic relations.
Aug. 11, 1945. Supplementary trade agreement.
Oct. 26, 1945. Protocol concerning the boundary in the Pechenga
(Petsamo) area, with annexes and maps.
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Dec. 31, 1945. Agreement concerning extension of the period of
reparations payments and reduction of annual
installments, with protocol.
Feb. 19, 1946. Exchange of notes confirming the protocol of
October 26, 1945, concerning the boundary in the
Pechenga (Petsamo) area.
Apr. 24, 1946. Joint communique concerning negotiations.
Apr. 30, 1946. Trade agreement for 1946.
Apr. 30, 1946. Agreement concerning lease to the Soviet comdine
Pechenga-Nikel' of a concession for a power station
on the Patso-Yoki, with protocol.
Aug. 19, 1946. Agreement concerning telegraph and telephone
communications.
Aug. 19, 1946. Agreement concerning postal exchange.
Dec. 5, 1946. Trade and payments agreement.
Dec. 5, 1946. Trade protocol for 1947, with annex.
Feb. 3, 1947. Treaty concerning transfer to the USSR of part of
the state territory of Finland in the region of the
Janiskoski hydroelectric station and the Niskakoski
control dam, with annex and map.
Feb. 3, 1947. Agreement concerning use of the USSR of former
German funds in Finland transferred to the USSR,
with annex and two protocols.
Feb. 3, 1947. Protocol concerning establishment of a Soviet-
Finnish joint- stock company for production of
artificial fibers.
Feb. 3, 1947. Protocol concerning work of the Soviet combine
Pechenga-Nikel' in Finland.
Feb. 10, 1947. Treaty of peace, with six annexes.
Apr. 24, 1947. Agreement concerning regulation of Lake Inari by




Apr. 24, 1947. Rules for regulating the water level on Lake Inari
in connection with operation of the Niskakoski dam.
May 2 4, 1947. Agreement granting Finland the right of railroad
transit for freight and passengers through the area
of the Soviet naval base at Porkkala-Udd.
Oct. 14, 1947. Agreement concerning direct rail transportation of
passengers and freight between Helsinki and Leningrad.
Nov. 16, 1947. Joint communique concerning negotiations.
Dec. 1, 1947. Treaty of commerce, with annex concerning the
Soviet Trade Mission in Finland.
Dec. 1, 1947. Trade protocol for 1948.
Dec. 7, 1947. Protocol concerning demarcation of the border in the
area of the Janiskoski hydroelectric station and the
Niskakoski control dam, with eight appendices.
Dec. 19, 1947. Agreement concerning direct rail communications,
with annex.
Mar. 13 and 16, 1948. Exchange of notes concerning renewal of prewar
treaties.
Apr. 6, 1948. Treaty of f friendship, cooperation, and mutual
assistance.
June 3, 1948. Decision to reduce reparations payments.
June 19, 1948. Convention concerning procedure for settling border
disputes and incidents, with related documents.
Dec. 9, 1948. Treaty concerning the regime on the state border,
with final protocol.
Dec. 17, 1948. Trade agreement for 1949.
June 1950. Agreement defining trade contingents for three-way
trade between the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Finland.
June 13, 1950. Trade agreement for the period 1951-1955.
June 13, 1950. Trade protocol for 1950.
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May 2 9 and July 18, 1950. Exchange of notes concerning entry into force
of the border protocol of Dec. 7, 1947.
Dec. 2, 1950. Trade protocol for 1951.
Dec. 21, 1951. Trade protocol for 1952.
Sept. 21, 1952. Trade agreement.
Sept. 23, 1952. Agreement concerning supplementary trade during
1952-1955.
Jan. 1, 1953. Changes in the agreement of Dec. 19, 1947, con-
cerning direct railroad communications.
Feb. 23, 1953. Trade protocol for 1953.
June l,and Aug. 26, 1953. Exchange of notes modifying the agreement
of August 19, 1946, concerning postal exchange.
Nov. 25, 1953. Trade protocol for 1954.
Feb. 6, 1954. Agreement concerning a loan to Finland.
Apr. 29, 1954. Protocol concerning execution of the agreement of
April 24, 1947, concerning regulation of Lake Inari.
Apr. 29, 1954. Protocol modifying the rules of April 24, 1947, for
regulating the water level on Lake Inari.
July 17, 1954. Joint communique concerning negotiations.
July 17, 1954. Trade agreement for the period 1956-60.
Dec. 1, 1954. Communique concerning a visit to Finland of A. I.
Mikoyan, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers
of the USSR.
Jan. 24, 1955. Trade protocol for 1955.
Jan. 24, 1955. Agreement concerning a loan to Finland.
June 17, 1955. Supplementary protocol to the agreement of August 19,




June 17, 1955. Supplementary protocol to the agreement of August 19,
1946, concerning postal exchange.
Aug. 16, 1955. Agreement concerning scientific and technical
collaboration.
Sept. 15, 1955. Agreement concerning renunciation by the USSR
of rights to the use of the territory of Porkkala-Udd
as a naval base and the withdrawal of Soviet armed
forces from the territory.
Sept. 19, 1955. Protocol concerning extension of the treaty of friend-
ship, cooperation, and mutual assistance of April 6,
1948.
Sept. 20, 1955. Joint communique concerning the visit to Moscow of
J. K. Paasikivi, President of Finland.
Oct. 19, 1955. Agreement concerning air communications.
Dec. 2, 1955. Trade protocol for 1956.
Dec. 10, 1955. Agreement concerning technical and commercial
service on air communications between Moscow
and Helsinki, an
Jan. 26, 1956. Final protocol concerning transfer to Finland of the
naval base and installations at Porkkala-Udd.
Mar. 3, 1956. Communique concerning the first meeting of the
USSR- Finland commission for scientific and tech-
nical collaboration.
May 25, 1956. Protocol concerning transfer to the USSR of a hydro-
electric station on the Rajakoski waterfall.
Sept. 14, 1956. Agreement concerning trackage rights on Soviet
railroads of freight trains of the Finnish railroads,
with annex.
Oct. 18, 1956. Communique concerning the second meeting of the
Soviet- Finnish commission for scientific and
technical collaboration.






Agreement concerning collaboration between rescue
service in the Baltic Sea.
Joint communique concerning political and economic
relations.
Communique concerning the third meeting of the
Soviet- Finnish commission for scientific and tech-
nical collaboration.
June 12, 1957. Joint communique concerning the visit of a Soviet
governmental delegation to Finland.
June 12, 1957 (approximate date). Supplementary trade protocol for 1957.









Agreement concerning telegraph communications
(RSFSR, Finland, Norway).
Agreement defining areas subject to control under
the convention of August 19, 1925, concerning sup-
pression of the contraband traffic in alcoholic
products (USSR, Estonia, Finland).
Protocol defining state borders under the agreement
of August 19, 1925, supplementary to the convention
of the same date concerning suppression of the contra-
band traffic in alcoholic products, with final protocol
(USSR, Estonia, Finland).
Protocol defining the junction point of the borders
of the USSR, Finland, and Norway (USSR, Norway,
Finland).
Documents concerning the frontier mark erected at
Muotkavaara (Krikfjellet) (USSR, Norway, Finland).
Trade and payments agreement (USSR, Finland,
Czechoslovakia).




1950. Trade and payments protocol (USSR, Finland,
Cz echos lovakia)
.
1951. Trade and payments protocol (USSR, Finland,
Czechoslovakia).
Apr. 14, 1951. Trade agreement (USSR, Finland, Poland).
Dec. 17, 1951. Trade protocol (USSR, Finland, Poland).
1952. Trade and payments protocol (USSR, Finland,
Czechoslovakia).
Sept. 21, 1952. Trade and payments agreement, with two annexes
(USSR, Finland, Chinese People's Republic).
195 3. Trade and payments protocol (USSR, Finland,
Czechoslovakia).
Feb. 7, 1953. Protocol concerning maintenance of the border
mark erected at Muotkavaara (Krokfjeller)
(USSR, Finland, Norway).
1954. Trade and payments protocol (USSR, Finland,
Czechoslovakia).
1955. Trade and payments protocol (USSR, Finland
Czechoslovakia).
Mar. 31, 1955. Trade agreement (USSR, Finland, Poland).
1956. Trade and payments protocol (USSR, Finland,
Czechoslovakia).
Feb. 24, 1956. Protocol concerning regulation of the water regime
of the Pasvik-El'v river and Lake Inari, with
regulations (USSR, Finland, Norway).
FINLAND, unverified




FINNISH DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, bilateral
Dec. 1, 1939. Exchange of notes concerning recognition and
establishment of diplomatic relations.
Dec. 2, 1939. Treaty of mutual assistance and friendship.
Sept. 14, 1956. Agreement concerning land transportation.
Dec. 7, 1956. Agreement concerning humanitarian matters.
June 26, 1958. Agreement concerning commodity trade.
Feb. 21, 1959. Agreement concerning the conservation of specific
resources.
Apr. 29, 1959. Agreement concerning specific claims or waivers.
Oct. 22, 1959. Agreement concerning general trade.
Dec. 22, 1959. Agreement concerning loans and credits.
May 27, I960. Agreement concerning culture.
June 23, I960. Agreement concerning boundaries of territory.
Nov. 24, I960. Agreement concerning customs duties.
Feb. 3, 1961. Agreement concerning specific property.
Apr. 6, 196 1. Agreement concerning technical assistance.
Sept. 27, 1962. Agreement concerning boundaries of territory.
Apr. 24, 1964. Agreement concerning boundaries of territory.
May 20, 1965. Agreement concerning boundaries of territory.
Jan. 4, 1965. Agreement concerning the conservation of specific
resources.
Jan. 24, 1966. Agreement concerning consular relations and
citizenship.




Mar. 7, 1968. Agreement concerning general transportation.
Oct. 18, 1968. Agreement concerning land transportation.
May 14, 1969. Agreement concerning atomic energy assistance.
May 30, 1969. Agreement concerning education.
June 13, 1969. Agreement concerning conservation of specific
resources.
'ICELAND
June 22 and 24, 1926. Exchange of notes concerning recognition of
the USSR de jure and establishment of diplomatic
relations.
May 25, 1927. Exchange of notes concerning the regime of most-
favored-nation in trade relations.
July 27, Sept. 21 and Oct. 4, 1943. Exchange of telegrams concerning
establishment of diplomatic relations.
Aug. 1, 1953. Trade and payments agreement, with two
annexes.
Jan. 30 and Feb. 5, 1954. Exchange of notes modifying the trade and
payments agreement of August 1, 1953.
June 19, 1954. Trade protocol.
Sept. 23, 1955. Trade protocol for 1956.
Sept. 23, 1955. Exchange of notes concerning an increase in the
trade balance limit.
Dec. 3, 1955. Agreement concerning transformation of diplomatic
missions into embassies.
Sept. 27, 1956. Trade protocol for 1957- 1959.
Mar. 13, 1958. Treaty concerning consular agreement and
citizenship.




Aug. 18, 1958. Agreement concerning loans and credits.
Mar. 14, I960. Agreement concerning consular agreement and
citizenship.
May 17, I960. Agreement concerning finances and payments.
Apr. 25, 1961. Agreement concerning general health, education,
culture, welfare, labor.
Dec. 19, 1962. Agreement concerning commodity trade.
NORWAY
Sept. 2, 1921. Temporary agreement concerning political and
economic relations.
Nov. 15, 1922. Agreement concerning conditions of a loan offered
by Norway to the RSFSR.
Feb. 15 and Mar. 10, 1924. Exchange of notes concerning recognition
of the USSR de jure
.
Dec. 15, 1925. Treaty of commerce and navigation, with final
protocol.
Apr. 9, 1926. Declaration concerning reciprocal recognition of
tonnage measurement certificates.
June 9 and Oct. 26, 1927, and Jan. 16, 1928. Exchanges of notes con-
cerning mutual notification in the case of nations of
either country being arrested in the other.
Feb. 24, 1928. Convention concerning reciprocal protection of
industrial property rights, with final protocol.
Mar. 12, 1932. Trade agreement.
May 29, 1933. Trade agreement for 1933.
May 19, 1934. Trade agreement.
Apr. 10, 1941. Trade and payments agreement.




Aug. 1, 1942. Exchange of notes concerning reorganization of
diplomatic missions into embassies.
May 16, 1944. Agreement concerning civil administration and
jurisdiction in Norwegian territory after its
liberation by Allied expeditionary forces.
1945. Agreement concerning establishment of a mixed
Soviet-Norwegian commission to investigate living
and working conditions of Soviet citizens in German
captivity in Norway.
Dec. 27, 1946. Trade and payments agreement.
Dec. 27, 1946. Trade protocol for 1947.
Feb. 11, 1947. Agreement concerning establishment of telegraph
and telephone communications.
Feb. 11, 1947. Parcel post agreement, with final protocol.
Dec. 18, 1947. Final protocol of the mixed Soviet-Norwegian
border commission, with related documents, con-
stituting an agreement for demarcation of the state
border.
Dec. 22, 1947. Informal agreement concerning trade in 1948.
Jan. 6, 1948. Trade protocol for 1948.
Apr. 28, 1949. Communique and protocol concerning work of a
mixed Soviet-Norwegian commission to investigate
living and working conditions of Soviet citizens in
German captivity in Norway.
Jan. 10, 1949. Trade protocol for 1949.
May 23, 1949. Exchange of notes concerning approval and entry
into force of the border prbtocol of December 18,
1947.
Dec. 29, 1949. Treaty concerning the regime on the state border
and procedure for settling border disputes and
incidents, with related documents.
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July 2, 1953 (approximate date). Informal agreement concerning care
of the graves of Soviet citizens killed in Norway
during the war.
Aug. 26 and Sept. 7, 1953. Exchange of notes modifying the parcel post
agreement of February 11, 1947.
Jan. 25, 1954. Trade protocol for 1954.
May 2 3, 1955. Trade protocol for 1955.
Nov. 15, 1955. Joint communique concerning diplomatic negotiations,
Nov. 15, 1955. Trade protocol for the period 1956-1958.
Nov. 15, 1955. Supplementary trade protocol for 1956.
Mar. 31, 1956. Agreement concerning air communications, with
two annexes and an exchange of notes.
Oct. 12, 1956. Agreement concerning cultural collaboration.
Oct. 19, 1956. Agreement concerning collaboration in rescuing
persons in distress and in searching for missing
persons in the Barents Sea, with the exchange of
notes
.
Feb. 5, 1957. Supplementary trade protocol for 1957.
Feb. 15, 1957. Agreement concerning the sea boundary in the
Varanger Fjord.
June 7, 1957. (approximate date). Protocol concerning joint exploitation
of the hydroelectric resources of the border river
Pasvik-El'v (Paatso- Joki).
Aug. 1, 1957. Protocol concerning demarcation of the maritime
boundary.
Nov. 22, 1957. Agreement concerning measures for regulating
seal-hunting and for protection of seal reserves in
the North-eastern Atlantic Ocean, with annex and
exchange of notes.
Nov. 29, 1957. Final documents concerning demarcation of the
border in the Varanger Fjord.
198

Dec. 18, 1957. Agreement concerning exploitation of the hydro-
electric resources of the Pasvik-El'v river.
NORWAY, three-way
Sept. 19, 1921. Agreement concerning telegraph communications
(RSFSR, Norway, Finland).
Oct. 26, 1945. Protocol defining the junction point of the borders
of the USSR, Finland, and Norway (USSR, Norway,
Finland).
Dec. 3, 1947. Documents concerning the frontier mark erected at
Muotkavaara (Krokfjellet) (USSR, Norway, Finland),
Feb. 7, 1953. Protocol concerning maintenance of the border
mark erected at Muotkavaara (Krokfjeller) (USSR,
Norway, Finland).
Feb. 24, 1956. Protocol concerning regulation of the water regime
of the Pasvik-El'v river and Lake Inari, with
regulations (USSR, Norway, Finland).
Oct. 20, 1958. Agreement concerning culture.
Sept. 30, 195 9. Agreement concerning claims and debts.
Dec. 9, 1959. Agreement concerning specific claims or waivers.
May 12, 1961. Agreement concerning consular agreements and
citizenship.
Feb. 22, 1963. Agreement concerning conservation of specific
resources.
Apr. 16, 1962. Agreement concerning conservation of specific
resources.
Dec. 24, 1963. Agreement concerning boundaries of territory.
Aug. 8, 1964. Agreement concerning boundaries of territory.
Jan. 29, 1965. Agreement concerning finances and payments.




Dec. 18, 1967. Agreement concerning boundaries of territory.
July 9, 1968. Agreement of administrative cooperation.
NORWAY, multi-lateral treaties
Treaty concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen, with annex
Signed Feb. 9, 1920, in Paris. "~
Soviet adherence by decree of Feb. 27; 1935. Entered into force for
the USSR May 7, 1935.
SWEDEN
June 1, 1918. Trade agreement.
Oct. 28, 1918. Trade agreement.
Oct. 31, 1918. Agreement supplementing the trade agreement of
October 28, 1918.
Mar. 15, 1924. Commercial agreement.
Mar. 15, 1924. Declaration concerning claims.
Mar. 15 and 18, 1924. Exchange of notes concerning recognition of
the USSR de jure
.
Sept. 12, 1924. Agreement concerning exchange of parcel post and
insured letters.
July 21, 1926. Exchange of notes concerning reciprocal protection
of trade-marks.
Feb. 2, 1927. Exchange of notes constituting an agreement on
rights and immunities of consuls.
Oct. 9, 1927. Convention concerning the legal status of the Soviet
Trade Mission in Sweden, with final protocol.
Apr. 1940. Agreement concerning regular air communications
during the summer of 1940.
Sept. 1940. Agreement concerning repatriation of persons of
Swedish origin from Estonia.
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Sept. 7, 1940. Trade and payments agreement.
Sept. 7, 1940. Agreement concerning an arbitration court.
Sept. 7, 1940. Trade agreement for 1940-1941.
Sept. 7, 1940. Credit agreement, with protocol.
May 30, 1941. Agreement concerning settlement of property
claims' relating to the Baltic States.
Nov. 4, 1941. Protocol concerning regulation of questions concern-
ing trade under wartime conditions.
Oct. 7, 1949. Protocol modifying and extending the trade and
payments agreement of September 7, 1940, with
two lists
.
Oct. 7, 1946. Credit agreement with annex, list, and protocol.
Oct. 7, 1946. Exchange of notes concerning an increase in trade.
Oct. 7, 1946. Exchange of notes concerning prices for goods
purchased in Sweden by the USSR.
Oct. 7, 1946 Informal agreement concerning settlement of
certain property claims arising out of the war.
Oct. 25, 1946. Agreement concerning establishment of regular
air communications.
Oct. 25, 1946. Protocol concerning flights using air facilities
in Finland.
Nov. 5, 1946. Parcel post agreement.
Dec. 10, 1946. Exchange of notes concerning entry into force of the
trade protocol of Oct. 7, 1946.
Jan. 30, 1947. Agreement concerning general conditions for
delivery of goods to the USSR, with annex.
Dec. 31, 1947. Trade protocol for 1948.
Apr. 2, 1949. Trade protocol for 1949.
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Apr. 9, 1953. Trade protocol for 1953.
June 29 and Aug. 26, 1953. Exchange of notes modifying the parcel
post agreement of November 5, 1946.
Jan. 23, 1954. Protocol modifying the agreement of October 25,
1946, concerning establishment of regular air
communications
.
Feb. 2, 1954. Trade protocol for 1954.
Sept. 29, 1954. Agreement concerning cooperation for rescue in
the Baltic Sea.
Nov. 24 and Dec. 4, 1954. Exchange of notes modifying the parcel
post agreement of November 5, 1946.
Apr. 22, 1955. Trade protocol for 1955.
Dec. 9, 1955. Trade protocol for 1956.
Mar. 31, 1956. Agreement concerning air communications, with
two annexes and two exchanges of notes.
Apr. 3, 1956. Joint communique concerning political negotiations,
Dec. 21, 1957. Trade protocol for 1958.
SWEDEN, four-way
Aug. 9, 1918. Agreement concerning exchange of civilian and
military personnel (RSFSR, Sweden, Denmark,
Switzerland).
SWEDEN, unratified
Mar. 1, 1922. Temporary commercial treaty.
Mar. 16, 1934. Agreement concerning a loan by Sweden of one
hundred million Swedish crowns.
Mar. 27, 1958. Agreement concerning facilities and property.
Mar. 28, 1958. Agreement concerning privileges and immunities.
Feb. 2, 1962. Agreement concerning general trade.




APPENDIX B: Finno-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and
Mutual Assitance
*Rgproduced from U.N. Treaty Series , 1950, pp. 156-160.
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156 United Nations — Treaty Scries 1950
Transition — Traduction
No. 742. TREATY 1 OF FRIENDSHIP, CO-OPERATION AND
MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN THE UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE REPUBLIC
OF FINLAND. SIGNED AT MOSCOW, ON 6 APRIL 1948
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the President of the Republic of Finland,
With a view to the further development of friendly relations between the
USSR and Finland,
Being convinced that the strengthening of good-neighbourly relations and
co-operation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic
of Finland is in accordance with the vital interests of both countries,
Considering Finland's endeavours not to be involved in clashes between
the interests of the great Powers, and
Being inflexibly resolved to co-operate in the interests of maintaining inter-
national peace and security in conformity with the purposes and principles of
the United Nations,
Have decided for this purpose to conclude the present Treaty and have
appointed as their plenipotentiaries:
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics: Vyacheslav Mihailovich Molotov, Vice-President of the Council of
Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR;
The President of the Republic of Finland: Mauno Pekkala, Prime Mini-
ster of the Republic of Finland,
Who, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form,
have agreed on the following provisions:
Article 1
Should either Finland, or the Soviet Union through the territory of Finland,
become the object of military aggression on the part of Germany or any Power
allied with Germany, Finland will carry out its duty as a sovereign State and
1 Canie into force on 31 May 1948, by the exchange of the instruments of ratification at
Helsinki, in accordance with article 8.
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158 United Nations— Treaty Series 1950
will fight to repel aggression. In so doing, Finland will direct all the forces at
its disposal towards defending the integrity of its territory on land, sea and air,
acting within the limits of its boundaries, in accordance with its obligations under
the present Treaty, with the help, if necessary, of the Soviet Union or together
with the Soviet Union.
In the above-mentioned cases the Soviet Union will extend to Finland any
necessary assistance, this to be supplied as mutually agreed between the Parties.
Article 2
The High Contracting Parties will consult together in case there is found
to be a threat of the military aggression referred to in Article 1.
Article 3
The High Contracting Parties affirm their intention to participate, in the
sinccrest fashion, in all action for the maintenance of international peace and
security in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
Article 4
The High Contracting Parties confirm the undertaking contained in article
3 of the Treaty of Peace signed at Paris on 10 February 1947 1 not to enter into
any alliance or take part in any coalition directed against the other High Con-
tracting Party.
Article 5
The High Contracting Parties affirm their resolve to act in a spirit of co-
operation and friendship for the further development and strengthening of the
economic and cultural ties between the Soviet Union and Finland.
Article 6
The High Contracting Parties agree to act in accordance with the principles
of mutual respect for their national sovereignty and independence and of non-
interference in the internal affairs of the other State.
Article 7
The present Treaty will be implemented in conformity with the principles
of the United Nations.




160 United Nations— Treaty Series 1950
Article 8
The present Treaty will be subject to ratification and will remain in force
for ten years from the dale of its coming into force. The Treaty will come into
force on the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which will
take place at Helsinki as soon as possible.
If neither of the High Contracting Parties gives notice one year before
the expiration of the said ten-year period that it wishes to denounce the Treaty,
it will remain in force for a further five years, until such time as either High
Contracting Party gives notice in writing one year before the expiration of the
current five-year period of its intention to terminate the Treaty.
In FAITH whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty
and attached their seals thereto.
Done at Moscow on 6 April 1948, in two copies, each in the Russian and
Finnish languages, both texts being equally authentic.
By authorization of the Presidium of the By authorization of the President of the
Supreme Soviet of the USSR: Republic of Finland:




APPENDIX C: A Survey of Government Interaction Between the
USSR and the Scandinavian States from 1 January
1966 to 31 December 1975.
Summary
Significant quantitative patterns emerge fr>om a survey of
interaction between the Kremlin and the respective Scandinavian
governments since 1966:
1. A marked variance in amount of interaction between the
USSR and the respective Scandinavian states, which in turn suggests:
a. Soviet relations with some Scandinavian states is more
active than with others.
b. The relations of the respective Scandinavian states
with the Soviet Union may be ranked in order of interaction.
c. The degree of interaction reflects
(1) Issues or conflicts that occur more frequently
between the USSR and some Scandinavian states than others.
(2) An allocation of government resources, bureaucratic
attention and leadership concern commensurate with the level
of interaction with other states.
(3) The focus of foreign policy and related national,
governmental or Party interests and objectives.
2. The number of reported interactions since 1970 is equal to
the number of reported interactions from 1966 to 1970, suggesting no
overall shift in Soviet-Scandinavian relations in this decade.
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3. The number of reported interactions between the USSR and
Norway increased significantly this decade over the previous five-year
period.
4. Interaction with Finland has decreased significantly in the
last five years.
5. Relations with Finland over the entire reporting period have
reflected predominant accord.
6. Relations with Sweden over the entire reporting period have
reflected predominant discord.
Operational Definitions
"Approval" or "accord": Interaction observed by government
officials or an official (government) news agency to be in consonance
with national policy.
"Disapproval" or "discord": Interaction observed by government
officials or an official news agency to be in conflict with national policy.
"Heads of State": President, prime minister or foreign minister.
Data source: Summaries of inter- governmental actions reported in the
N. Y. Times Index and filed in the WEIS data bank for computer print-
out. "World Event Interaction S udy Report, " Textscan, September 1976,
designed by University of Southern California, School of Politics and
International Relations, (Monterey, California: U. S. Naval Postgrad-
uate School Computer Center, 1976).
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APPENDIX D: Indicators of Comparative Economic Strength
(Tables 27-28)
The following tables are provided through the courtesy of Luci Korner
with the permission of the U. S. Department of State, (Bureau of Intel-
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